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VOL. XVII · APRIL 1965 · No. 3

CONTENTS

The Institutional Pattern of Authority — *Edward H. Buehrig* — 369

Political Development and Political Decay — *Samuel P. Huntington* — 386

People and Population — *S. N. Afriat* — 431

U.S. Business Interests in Cuba and the Rise of Castro — *Leland L. Johnson* — 440

REVIEW ARTICLES

The Progress of European Integration — *Ellen Frey-Wouters* — 460

Legal Scholarship, Realism, and the Search for Minimum World Order — *Richard S. Miller* — 478

The USSR, the United Nations, and the General Welfare — *Leon Gordenker* — 495

The Problem of Transforming Traditional Agriculture — *Lorand Dabasi-Schweng* — 503

Some Social and Political Implications of Economic Development — *Mancur Olson, Jr.* — 525

The Contributors — ii

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THE INTERNATIONAL PATTERN OF AUTHORITY

By EDWARD H. BUEHRIG

THE broad question posed here is how authority is distributed in the world and what shifts may be occurring in its pattern of distribution. Mainly, of course, authority is today allocated according to the Western State System, characterized in its legal mechanics by territorial rule among equals and in its political philosophy by consent of the governed. Conveniently dated from the Treaty of Westphalia and the French Revolution, the system is now more widespread than ever before.

Mingled with this dominant pattern, however, are remnants of the older religious systems. The Roman Catholic Church survives as a fascinating element in the contemporary structure of authority—nowhere more noteworthy than in Eastern Europe. Nor can Islam, though in serious disarray, be overlooked, when one considers the nuclear force with which in 1947 it erupted out of Indian society.

Communism and international organization are the newest claimants for possession of authority. Like the traditional religions, the former is a universal system, basing legitimacy on the truth of its doctrine. But, like them, it too has failed to provide a practical system for the governance of the world and has in its turn yielded to the workaday pattern of the Western State System. On the other hand, international organization is in the secular—which is to say, pragmatic—tradition of the Western State System, of which it is an outgrowth.

The contemporary pattern of authority is pluralistic in two respects. First of all, as between the Western State System and the ideologically based systems there is a radical difference of premise. Nationalism, the social cement of the territorial state, is neither universal in its claims nor, even within the confines of a single nation-state, is it (except in its pathological manifestations) exclusive of other loyalties. It is not constrained, as are the ideologies, to tie legitimate authority to a theology and to claim a monopoly on it. The nation-state could, however, without doing violence to its particularism, be part of a federal system. But in fact it is not. There is, then, a second respect in which the existing pattern is pluralistic: international law avowedly allocates authority to territorial sovereigns equal to each other. Thus, on top of competing though coexisting systems that seek to legitimize author-

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ity in essentially incompatible ways, the dominant system is itself, by virtue of its own internal principles, pluralistic.

The struggle for possession of authority is a constant theme of the drama of politics. What we have thus far witnessed in the twentieth century is the ability of the Catholic Church to hold its own; the shattering impact on Islam of its confrontation with the nation-state; the vain attempt of communism to supplant other systems; the spectacular multiplication of territorial sovereigns; and, despite many adversities, the development of international organization.

The broad survey here attempted shows that history has been more influential than logic in determining the contemporary pattern; and we may assume that circumstance will continue to mingle with intellectual endeavor to determine the pattern of the future. Certainly there is no prospect that the international pattern of authority will soon lend itself to an orderly diagrammatic presentation. Though it appears that international organization is the chief way in which the existing pattern is being modified, the concluding section of this article is not to be construed as arguing that the United Nations is a repository of authority in any but an equivocal sense. What has emerged is a certain autonomy of action, parallel, not superior, to the territorial state. Indeed, the latter is more than merely persistent. The argument is that it possesses its own utility and that international organization, despite its surprising vitality, cannot be pushed with profit beyond fairly narrow limits. Such as it is, however, international organization is the chief institutional response of the modern world to the extraordinary challenge of today's international politics.

I

Still part of the political landscape are two systems that were once rivals for universal allegiance, Christianity and Islam. Each ascribed legitimate authority to divine sanction; each arrogated to itself supreme authority, without equal; each, as is natural to authority based on religious faith, employed personal rather than territorial jurisdiction. For centuries these systems confronted each other, in theory mutually exclusive and in practice often hostile, each regarding the other as properly subject, on the one hand, to the Crusade and, on the other, to the Jihad.

Out of the Middle Ages there emerged in Europe a radically different pattern of authority, based on territorial jurisdiction and the assumption of equality between territorial sovereigns. It arose from

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many causes, one of which is here of particular interest. The new pattern at first assured the permanence of the split within Christendom; but ultimately it served to accommodate the schism, which could only have been exacerbated by continued belief in a supreme authority. Initially a rule of thumb was used. As between the Holy Roman Empire and the Lutherans of Northern Germany, the Treaty of Augsburg (1555) provided that the religion of the prince determined that of the people. The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) further emphasized territorial authority and expanded toleration of religious sects. Not until the American Constitution was the separation of church and state hit upon. Typically the European pattern today is a compromise between the formula of the Treaty of Augsburg and that of the American Constitution: an officially recognized and supported church, with allowance of non-conforming sects. Thus the dualism between religious and secular authority that has always characterized Western civilization continues today, but with the emphasis radically altered in favor of the latter.

The status of the Roman Catholic Church is the most notable feature of this continuing dualism. The Pope, more free than in the past from extraneous political pressure, continues to be exempt from mundane authority. The sovereignty of his person is augmented by the territorial independence of the Vatican City, by the immunities of members of the Curia, and by the diplomatic status of the representatives that the Holy See sends to and receives from other members of the international community: some, like the Netherlands, not predominantly Catholic and some, like Japan, not even predominantly Christian.

These are the formal attributes of authority of the Catholic Church today. No longer does it possess a territorial base capable of yielding taxes and soldiers. No longer does it exercise personal jurisdiction through its own law and its own courts (though the Uniat churches in Lebanon, for example, still have exclusive control over the personal status of their members). No longer does it have a monopoly on education. Nor is the Church capable today of legitimizing the use of force or, as it so often attempted with varying success, of actually organizing collective military action. Still available are the sanctions based on faith: the interdict and excommunication.

Yet the surviving status of the Catholic Church, diminished though it is, might well be the envy of the United Nations. The Church has ancient and compelling symbols of authority. It has a strong economy, based variously or in combination on government subsidy, private

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contributions, and income from property—the latter sources often exempt from taxation by the territorial authority. Finally, it has a dedicated bureaucracy whose loyalty neither nationalism nor communism has seriously affected.

Despite an unequal struggle with the secular state, the Catholic Church, highly adaptable, actually emerged as a member of the new international community; and it remains so today, even as that community expands to include a majority of non-Christian states. As a sovereign corporation, the Church by the formal device of the concordat penetrates with its personal jurisdiction the territorial preserve of the nation-state—though its influence is not mainly dependent on such formal means. Catholic political parties, for example, have been a significant postwar phenomenon in Europe.

Islam, meanwhile, has only in this century been forced into a showdown with the nation-state. Its confrontation has in two respects been less propitious than that of the Catholic Church. Lacking the organization and hierarchy of Catholicism, Islam cannot assert itself as a sovereign religious entity. The underlying difficulty, however, is still more profound. Islamic society has no tradition and little basis for distinguishing between secular and spiritual authority. Islamic law is all-inclusive; it is revealed; and it is applicable by religious courts on the basis of personal jurisdiction. Thus its claim to obedience is so extensive as to render the whole Islamic structure highly vulnerable to the nation-state, whose authority is territorially confined and can have only a mundane foundation. The expedient of dualism is not easily available to Islam.

II

Communism has been rightly characterized as the would-be successor to the traditional religions as an ideological center of world authority. However, its challenge to the Western State System is not impressive. If, a century hence, there is a fundamental change in the existing pattern of territorial authority among equals, it seems unlikely that communism will prove to have been the precursor. Undeniably, however, there are universalistic presumptions in communism.

Communism's model of the future, considered as a purely theoretical construct, is not, as sometimes depicted by its opponents, a reincarnation of the Roman Empire. The fact is that Marxian thought, like much of the liberal thought of the time, was deeply affected by the optimism of the nineteenth century. But, whereas the liberal assumed

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that clashing interests would not harm but actually contribute to the general welfare, the Marxist, in ambivalent but sympathetic relation to anarchist thought, believed that the basic clash itself could be eliminated. Attributing the cause of friction in human relations to institutional arrangements (above all, private property) rather than to human nature as such, communism forecasts a world society in which—after a final convulsion—politics will have become anachronistic. The authority and power of the state will wither away, leaving only administration above, and below, voluntaristic and self-regulating economic and social groupings.

Thus the Communist model, highly Utopian, lacks any provision for authority, except the truth of its ideology. Actually, the egoism and prejudice of an often irrational human nature and the tribulations of a world threatening to overpopulate itself suggest that society is not soon to be emancipated from the play of political power and the restraint of authority. Man cannot escape the old dilemma, full of immense difficulty and moral hazard: How use power and at the same time control it?

However, it must be emphasized that the disavowal of power in the ideal future has paradoxical consequences for communism's husbanding and use of power in the present. Since the future is so exceptionally attractive, the means to its attainment are not subject to restraint. Decisions of whatever character, whether touching on economics, education, art and literature, or on any other aspect of society, are typically made to turn on power considerations. Ideology renders the convinced believer undiscriminating as to the means of its furtherance. For the strength of his belief is not merely intellectual; it is psychologically tied to his innermost need for security.

This preoccupation with power, rationalized in terms of an imminent (and favorable) culmination of history, is the key to an understanding of the Communist outlook on the non-Communist world. Communist writings on international law, though increasingly conformist, suffer from a basic ambiguity. One perceives in them a division of the world that bears an unmistakable resemblance to what in Islamic law was made quite explicit. Islam was the "house of peace." Outside its borders—beyond the pale—was the "house of war." This classification placed the infidel at a juridical disadvantage; it clouded the legitimacy and justice of his authority and implied that his political existence was dependent on sufferance.

When communism speaks of the "peace zone" on the one hand and of the "imperialist camp" on the other, it is alleging a difference

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between itself and capitalism that cannot be resolved by policy, for it is represented as turning on structure and historical process—unaffected by subjective factors of intent. It is a difference in kind: something called communism is credited with progress and justice and with eventual triumph, and something called capitalism is identified with the decaying past, doomed by history itself to succumb to the new age.

It is notable that so sharp a qualitative distinction has failed to produce a systematic jurisprudence applicable to international politics. One inhibiting factor is the nonpolitical character of the model of the future that communism projects. But what about the strategy and tactics of the interim period, prior to the Utopian culmination?

Political power—advantage, that is, over opposition—is generated by an ideology that claims to explain the whole of history and that views events as ineluctably favoring its own preferences and predictions. Yet such a grand conception is bound to be wrong. Moreover, the "truth" is not immune to the perversity of its adherents, nor to the skepticism of nonbelievers. Actually the difficulties of implementing the universal pretensions of the Bolshevist revolution have been overwhelming. If in a simpler age Moslem jurisprudence had in fact to make substantial concessions to practicality, it is not surprising that in the modern world communism, despite a felt need, has failed to construct a juridical model rivaling that of the Western State System.

The Comintern possessed an interesting potential. Disdainful of the community of territorial states, its authority was based on ideology. Its hierarchy owed supreme loyalty to the corporate will, as did, in fact, all members of the Party. Authority was exercised through personal jurisdiction in disregard, often in violation, of the territorial jurisdiction of states. Here was an international organization that, despite profound differences of philosophy and objective, was in fact analogous to the Catholic Church—and in deadly combat with it.

Though communism continues as an international movement, the Comintern is now extinct. Long subjected to serving Russia's national interests, it was abolished by Stalin in his extremity in 1943. Its truncated successor, the Cominform, has also expired. There remain, however, without benefit of central organs of authority, periodic conferences of national Communist parties.

The failure of communism to sustain a dominant hierarchy is due not least to its own internal difficulties—to the irrepressible interests that cling to the particular, resisting absorption in the universal. Russia and China have not escaped the elemental frictions of politics: racial,

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territorial, economic, and, that most human of failings, rivalry for position. Moreover, the states of Eastern Europe have retained their national identities and have asserted themselves against the suffocating embrace of Moscow, essayed in the name of ideological fulfillment, yet hardly distinguishable from Russia's regard for her own security and welfare.

It is noteworthy that external resistance to the expansion of communism has failed to induce unity and central authority within the movement. Actually interaction between communism and the Western State System has eroded, not the prevailing system governing the allocation of authority, but the universal proclivities of communism itself. The innovations of the latter have atrophied and, despite its contempt for the justice of existing authority, communism has been obliged to conform to the pattern of diplomatic relations between equals, employing it even within its own sphere.

Innovation, meanwhile, has come from the West, in the form of international organization. To this, too, communism is adapting, but not without suspicion and often an ill-concealed disdain. Some forms of international organization communism has actually imported and applied to itself. Not only was the Cominform abortive. It was supplanted by the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, inspired respectively by the examples of NATO and the Common Market, though the importations lack the vitality of the originals.

III

The claim of a universal ideology to exclusive legitimacy is egocentric and is ambitious beyond the power of its adherents to implement. In an age that is the melting pot of civilizations, an ideologically centered system becomes insupportable.

The utility of secular authority is today self-evident. However, that it should be a quality of the Western State System is a virtue owing more to circumstance than to intent. True, writers like Bodin and Grotius at the inception of territorial authority among equals gave the system an underpinning in political theory and juridical definition. But it did not emerge from a preconceived blueprint. It was an adjustment incidental to the struggle of Protestant and Catholic and of the other contending forces of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe.

Since that beginning, the system has spread until today it encircles the globe. In vast areas—the Americas, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa—European migrants achieved independent regimes on

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the model provided by the homeland. Black Africa succumbed to colonial rule. Meanwhile, the greatest contest between the European innovation and the traditional self-centered systems occurred in Asia. The clash was inevitable and resounding. The Ottoman Empire, owing to rivalries among the Europeans themselves, survived adversity into the twentieth century. However, most of South and Southeast Asia, unable to match the political energy of the West or to profit from playing one intruder against another, passed under European rule. Only Japan possessed the capacity to react with unity and vigor sufficient to meet the challenge—at the cost of molding itself on the European pattern.

The most stubborn and the least decisive confrontation occurred in China, which from time immemorial had viewed itself as occupying the center of the world, believing that "as there is one sun in heaven, so there can be but one ruler on earth." Accordingly China viewed its relationship to other peoples as that of suzerain to vassal. Throughout the nineteenth century, Europe and China were locked in a struggle of wills. In the beginning, at Canton, China lorded it over the foreigner. By the end of the century China, still unregenerate, was the underdog. Only momentarily, prior to the advent of the Communist regime, did the relations of the West and China assume, at least in the formal sense, the characteristics considered normal to the Western State System.

Since the Second World War, with a rush unprecedented in man's political history, filled though that history is with improbable happenings, a vast redistribution of authority has occurred. The pressures, a mingling typically of domestic and international politics, have been inexorable, producing catastrophic convulsions and grotesque political formations. It must be emphasized that the sudden proliferation of states has been a function not merely of receding European power but of new forces with which the new regimes, in their turn, must now contend. The location of authority within and among societies is what politics is about, but seldom has the attending controversy been so pervasive and so dangerous as today.

In times of great upheaval, existing patterns of authority are bound to undergo severe stress and strain. All the more striking, therefore, is the capacity of the Western State System not merely to survive but to expand; in the postwar period it has spread to virtually the whole land area of the earth. In its career of some three hundred years it has wrecked the universalistic systems of authority—the latter-day pretensions of communism no less than the traditional systems of

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Europe and Asia—and has supplanted as well the imperial extensions of Europe. What are we to say of territorial rule among equals in its time of final triumph?

It is remarkable that a system fashioned blindly by the crosscurrents of European history should transcend its parochial origin. The explanation cannot be simply that Europe imposed the system elsewhere, for Europe's own colonial rule has succumbed—beginning in North America in 1776. Rather the Renaissance produced a political outlook useful to an age, only just dawning, when all peoples were finally to interact with such intensity as to leave no alternative to the secularization of authority, at a level below the pretension of universal rule. That outlook was congenial to the notion that authority comes from below rather than from above; and in time the consent theory of political obligation eroded all other claims to legitimacy. From that point of view, it was inescapable that units of government should be territorial and juridically equal. An international law applicable to the whole world would seem bound to start with these assumptions—and only then to endeavor to mesh the general with the particular.

The contending forces in society have produced up to now about 125 units of authority, with prospect for still more. There is much cause for dismay in this outcome. Yet it would be invidious to dismiss the process as one of mere fragmentation. It is true, of course, that Islam (like Christianity before it) has been rent asunder. But its ideal had long since been corrupted and Ottoman rule had in its turn fallen into decay. Moreover, there was nothing in the imperial systems of Europe to suggest permanence. What has happened cannot, therefore, be represented as the breakdown of existing systems containing promise for the future.

There have always been difficulties with the nation-state both as an idea and as a practical device. The legitimization of authority in terms of the consent of the governed is a perplexing proposition: the will of the people is more metaphysical than it is tangible. There is also the question of how in actual fact authority can be allocated among the "peoples" of the world. Where does one "people" end and another begin? The West has struggled with these problems for a long time and, in consequence, they have begun to wear smooth. In the Americas and, more recently, in Europe (both east and west) there is substantial consensus as to the identity of nations and growing acquiescence (the German question apart) to existing boundaries. Outside of the West, however, these problems are many times intensified. Nor is it merely a matter in Africa and Asia of where lines

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should be drawn between units of authority. Still more fundamental is the question of their internal viability and capacity for meaningful self-direction.

The extreme decentralization of the Western State System has often been deplored, and the model of reform that most readily suggests itself is that of federation. Yet the degree of centralization envisioned by the advocates of world federation would not be without hazard. Actually the Western State System has the outstanding merit of keeping unlike things apart. At the system's inception the unity of Christendom was sacrificed to its pacification. If such an expedient could not then be avoided at the very heart of Western civilization, it seems fatuous to suppose that the world as a whole, having only just crossed the threshold of a common existence, could establish central organs of government without stultifying the attempt, or, worse, inducing mortal rivalry for control over them. Certainly the Communist and the non-Communist are not ready for the risks of so intimate an association.

The homeland of the Western State System, in a new burst of invention, has in this postwar period adopted ingenious ways of minimizing the economic consequences of boundaries and of promoting political solidarity. But what six European nations have done cannot be readily expanded in Europe itself. Nor is it an example that Russia and Eastern Europe, because of imbalance in political power and economic development, find easy to follow. It is, in fact, difficult to find situations that would warrant a similar attempt at extranational authority. Many combinations would be unprofitable, others sheer folly. For the United States and Canada to come closer together in common institutions would be a dubious thing. For the United States and Mexico to do so would set off an explosion.

Granting that territorial jurisdiction prevents a too intimate mixing of incompatible attitudes and of disparate interests, there is still the doctrine of equality, stultified, it is contended, by the vast differences of wealth and power among nations. Yet the doctrine, by its very assertion, achieves a certain reality. Nor is it wholly lacking in utility. It acts as a brake on the spread of control from the centers of economic and military power. That the postwar world has not in fact become polarized is not due to restraint in either Washington or Moscow but to the independent policy of nations resting often on little more than the juridical claim to equality. These nations have contrived to serve their material interests as well as satisfy their pride. They have extracted advantage by political means. Yet one cannot

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begrudge the freedom of action that enables them to chip away at the disproportionate wealth and power of the United States, Western Europe, and the Soviet Union.

IV

A checkerboard pattern is admittedly a crude way of allocating authority, for the life of the world is not similarly compartmentalized. The rudimentary character of the Western State System has been an intellectual affront to the lawyer and the political scientist. Meanwhile, violence in international politics, always a moral issue, has become as well a problem of intense practical concern. At first in response to the impulse of reform and soon under the lash of two world wars, countless proposals have been made for improving the organization of the world. Governments have themselves entered the quest, relieving the oppressiveness of sheer speculation with the trial and error of schemes put into actual operation.

Responding to the needs of security, of welfare and convenience, and of human dignity, governments have created scores of international organizations (universal, regional, and bilateral), with new ones steadily being added. That these innovations are modifying the international pattern of authority is a fair assumption. However, precisely what is evolving it is not easy to say. Often the more significant results have been by-products of intentions which have themselves been frustrated. Certainly the experience of history is again being borne out. The variables are so numerous and often so obscure as to defy architectural presumptions about allocating authority.

The attempt of the League of Nations and the United Nations successively to order the world—through law, peaceful change, and collective security—has had indifferent success. Indeed, the Charter, as did the Covenant, draws back from subjecting legal disputes to compulsory jurisdiction and refrains, in the case of political disputes, from giving any organ of international organization the authority of binding settlement. For dealing with aggression, the United Nations Charter gives the Security Council corporate capacity to determine its existence and to commit the whole United Nations membership to the carrying out of sanctions against it. However, the attempt, in this one instance, to establish supreme authority over governments is palsied by the veto. More than a mere question of procedure, the veto reflects the underlying difficulty (indeed, improbability) of achieving in the Security Council a political fulcrum sufficiently stable to

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permit the imposition of an authoritative restraint on international politics.

The international pattern of authority lacks a capstone, and it is not likely in the foreseeable future to acquire one. Instead of a vertical structuring of authority above the state, we have witnessed a lateral expansion of the international community to include numerous international organizations, which in a variety of ways have become a new independent variable in international relations.

Already acknowledged members of the international community, these institutions are still in process of legal evolution. Unlike the nation-state, they are not self-generating; nor are they, like the Church, a fixture of history. Yet, as international corporations created by treaty, they partake of the character of their sovereign creators and are subject to the jurisdiction of none. The headquarters of an international organization do not, like the Vatican City, enjoy a separate sovereignty. However, the authority of the host state is withdrawn, affording the organization a limited territorial control in its own precincts. The autonomy of international organization is further augmented through the immunities possessed, in varying degrees, from the highest through the lower ranks, by members of its secretariat. Permanent delegations from governments may be accredited to it. It also has the capacity to enter into formal agreements with others of its kind and with governments.

The legal autonomy enjoyed by international organization can provide the basis for legislative and administrative authority applicable to individuals. This potential has been most highly developed in the European Communities, especially the Coal and Steel Community, whose independent power of decision is notable not only for its scope but for its location in extraordinary degree in the High Authority, an organ composed of experts rather than representatives of governments. The Common Market, too, has wide authority, though in this instance the Council of Ministers is more heavily weighted in the making of decisions. Whether legislative or administrative, decisions are enforceable in the national courts and, ultimately, in the European Community Court of Justice, which is common to all three Communities, including the Atomic Energy Community. The genius of these arrangements is, through personal jurisdiction, the penetration laterally of the territorial jurisdiction of states. Moreover, the individual citizen may be party to litigation in the European Court, as may corporations, governments, and the Communities themselves. On a much wider basis than the six states comprising the Commu-

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nities, Europe has adopted a treaty defining human rights, with a separate court of final appeal.

However, even without the potent aid of jurisdiction over individuals, international organization is capable of exploiting its legal autonomy in surprising ways. Thus the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund have money that they dispose of on their own conditions. In consequence, they are capable of imposing discipline on the economic and financial policies of governments. Such material inducements are not, however, plentifully available to international organization, lacking, as it does, possession of territory and all the perquisites that flow from control over territory.

The United Nations is a complex institution. As a forum in which national representatives confront each other in a parliamentary manner, it influences attitudes and behavior in many subtle ways. But in this role it is essentially passive. More interesting from the standpoint of the international pattern of authority is the performance by the United Nations of what Hammarskjöld called executive functions. How it manages to do this without legislative or jurisdictional authority, in the usual sense of these terms, and without material resources of its own is a matter of considerable interest.

In far greater degree than the League of Nations, the United Nations is more than the sum of its parts. To be sure, the Security Council, despite the encouragement of the Charter to admit political considerations into its decisions, has proved to be politically incapable of wielding the mandatory authority with which it is endowed. But the Charter, as well, increased the stature of the General Assembly and the Secretariat, the former by virtue of the two-thirds rule and the latter by virtue of the increased role of the Secretary-General; and in these instances the result has been not stultification but rather quite the opposite. The autonomy accorded these organs has under the stimulus of subsequent events developed in ways that were unexpected—not to say, unintended.

The Covenant of the League prescribed in substantive matters a voting formula of unanimity. The implications of the shift in the General Assembly of the United Nations to a rule of two-thirds of those present and voting are not at first glance apparent, for it is axiomatic that the Assembly does not have legislative power. The Assembly, in the words of Senator Vandenberg, was viewed as "the town hall of the world." Discussion might, of course, lead to the drafting of treaties on various subjects; but a treaty is not binding on a state until ratified by its government. Thus the particular voting

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formula employed by the General Assembly would seem to be of no tangible consequence. Yet, as regards the internal management of the Organization itself, the abandonment of unanimity has made a distinct difference. The use of the Secretariat for performing operational tasks in the field, some of which have been highly political in character, could hardly be undertaken except on the basis of a voting formula which permits dissent without precluding action. Thus, it may well be contended that the single most important difference between the Covenant and the Charter is in their voting provisions.

As the administrative arm of the United Nations, the Secretariat consists of civil servants subject, on the one hand, to the employer's normal means of control through the providing of a career and through the stimulation of loyalty to the leadership and purposes of the organization. However, beyond the normal kind of employment, the international civil servant is subject to a superior, the Secretary-General, whose personal status and autonomous role in the international community are unique, and whose subordinates are immune from territorial jurisdiction to the degree necessary for the performance of their official duties. The international civil servant may be denied admittance to a territory, but once on it he is not an alien in the ordinary sense. He is responsible for his official actions not to the territorial authority but to his principal. As regards its own hierarchy, therefore, the United Nations in a limited but nonetheless real sense exercises personal jurisdiction in the face of territorial sovereignty.

What, in combination, the General Assembly's power of resolution and the instrumentality of the Secretariat are capable of undertaking is illustrated by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. Concerned with the Arab refugees, UNRWA operates within the territorial jurisdiction of four states, performing functions normally those of government itself: providing minimal food, clothing, and shelter; health services; and education. To accomplish these purposes it recruits and controls its own personnel, whose activities are related to the host states through diplomatic representation and negotiation. The legal basis for the enterprise is not a treaty but resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. These fall short, however, of being legislative in character, for they cannot impose the arrangement on the four Arab states concerned, whose consent is a *sine qua non*. Though they touch profoundly the welfare of the Arab refugees and the politics of the Middle East, the resolutions are internal to the United Nations itself, essentially directives of the General Assembly to its own civil servants.

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The Congo is a further, more startling, illustration of the potency of resolutions addressed to the United Nations Secretariat. In this instance the Security Council (not the General Assembly) was the author. Responding to an appeal from the Congolese government, the resolutions instruct the Secretariat to undertake a wide range of activities, in pursuance of which the United Nations personnel, civil and military, is ancillary to the government of the Congo, yet subject to the control of the Secretary-General. Two authorities, one territorial in scope, the other limited in application to the personnel of the United Nations, are juxtaposed. Their relations, regulated on a diplomatic basis, are the subject of a special agreement between the Congo and the United Nations of November 1961 that strongly resembles a concordat. It is not surprising, however, that a line of demarcation between assistance to the Congolese government and intervention in its politics has proved difficult, if not impossible, to draw. As regards Katanga, the action of United Nations forces had an extraordinary result, profoundly affecting its relations with the central government.

When the history of this latter-day application of extraterritorial authority is written, it may be concluded that the nature of the task imposed on the United Nations required for its success nothing less than the assumption of full territorial responsibility. As a practical matter this is not an alternative easily available to the United Nations. It is not one, however, that is denied to it in principle. There is the interesting, if fleeting, precedent of West Irian. There, during the transition from Dutch to Indonesian rule, the United Nations, by General Assembly resolution (with Dutch concurrence), assumed the role of territorial ruler.

The exigencies of international politics, under the imperious restraint of the nuclear threat, are likely in the future to force further, even more varied, instances of action by the United Nations as an autonomous member of the international community. However, short of the Security Council's utilizing its full powers under Chapter VII of the Charter, the United Nations can proceed only on the basis of resolutions recommendatory in character and incapable, therefore, of imposing an action within the territory of a state without its consent.

There is as well a second, perhaps even more serious, stumbling block to the performance of executive tasks by the United Nations. Lacking resources of its own, it is dependent on its members for financial support. One alternative, illustrated by UNRWA, is to meet the cost on a voluntary basis. Some governments contribute, others

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don't. The other alternative is to assimilate the cost to the regular budget and to assess it against the whole membership—by two-thirds vote of the General Assembly. This course was adopted in the case of the Congo. It is a highly venturesome choice, for it probes the outer limits of what the authority of the United Nations is capable of attempting.

V

Under the enormous pressure of politics—that great human paradox of abrasion and cooperation—the allocation of authority in the world has been subject to a fascinating variety of concepts and of institutional forms. Ideology, in search of its own security, typically claims universal authority—promising in return the pacification of mankind. Communism, reaching out for the mantle of exclusive legitimacy, is the most recent case in point. Yet politics so conceived is today an anachronism. The nuclear age requires maturity, and maturity demands that authority divorce itself from, not tie itself to, man's speculative concern about his destiny.

Admittedly the principles of territorial jurisdiction and equality between territorial sovereigns cannot be represented as seeking peace as a direct objective, placing it above national interest. It does not follow, however, that the Western State System is wholly mischievous. Lacking ideological pretension, it is not burdened with the invidious task of converting the nonbeliever. But this is not its only advantage. As we have suggested, the autonomy characterizing the units of the Western State System has positive utility. Nationalism is often an unlovely thing, and admittedly it is abetted by the parochialism of territorial rule. But the great political storms that we are witnessing in mid-twentieth century cannot be explained on the basis of nationalism alone. To see this, one need only compare the circumstances of the First World War with the great disparities of ideology and of welfare that separate many of the influential participants in today's international politics. Such societies, contrasting sharply in their very warp and woof, would surely be subject to greater rather than less tension were they to be thrown together in a hierarchical system.

It is wrong to suppose that order is essentially a problem involving the hierarchical structuring of authority. In some circumstances the appropriate linkage may not be the amalgamation of authority but the keeping-at-arm's-length that is precisely the virtue of the diplomatic pattern of intercourse. Disparities of the magnitude that exist today—not likely soon to abate—belie a mutuality of interest capable of sup-

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porting common institutions of government. Not uniform policy but a negotiating situation is called for in the differences between East and West, between haves and have-nots, and between the new and the older nations. Even within the Atlantic Community, consisting of similar societies with many common interests, we will have to concede that it is not merely the perversity of nationalism that prevents close economic and political integration and that frustrates a unified policy in relation to the rest of the world.

International organization, we have said, is the main institutional response of the twentieth century to the challenge of its international politics. Yet, if universal order is beyond the reach of ideology, and if the Western State System acquiesces in an admittedly difficult situation, the goal of international peace and security also escapes the embrace of international organization, which has not in fact been able to control events.

This is not surprising, considering how formidable the task. However, short of providing a dominant center of authority and power, international organization is not without purpose. The functional roles that it performs are, to be sure, piecemeal in their approach to international relations. But the agencies engaged in promoting social welfare and economic progress, over and above their specific accomplishments, achieve a more general result. Operating on the basis of the accumulated knowledge and developing skills of the social sciences, they serve to foster an empirical and rationalistic outlook on human relations, which for large parts of the world is still an innovation. What the economist, the sociologist, the political scientist, and the lawyer can do, given the maturity of their disciplines and the receptivity of society around them, is illustrated by the European Communities, which are a monument to social science.

In the political realm as such, international organization, though asserting itself in ways that were unforeseen, has converted autonomous membership in the international community into something more significant than mere juridical novelty. As a third party, international organization has been active rather than passive. Though failing to materialize as a framework of order and justice, it has functioned as a new variable, interacting independently with the numerous factors comprising today's international politics. The contemporary situation, nineteen years after the Second World War, is significantly different from that prevailing at the comparable period after the First World War. Today international organization suffers not from desuetude but from problems generated by its own vitality.

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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL DECAY

By SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON*

AMONG the laws that rule human societies," de Tocqueville said, "there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased."[1] In much of the world today, equality of political participation is growing much more rapidly than is the "art of associating together." The rates of mobilization and participation are high; the rates of organization and institutionalization are low. De Tocqueville's precondition for civilized society is in danger, if it is not already undermined. In these societies, the conflict between mobilization and institutionalization is the crux of politics. Yet in the fast-growing literature on the politics of the developing areas, political institutionalization usually receives scant treatment. Writers on political development emphasize the processes of modernization and the closely related phenomena of social mobilization and increasing political participation. A balanced view of the politics of contemporary Asia, Africa, and Latin America requires more attention to the "art of associating together" and the growth of political institutions. For this purpose, it is useful to distinguish political development from modernization and to identify political development with the institutionalization of political organizations and procedures. Rapid increases in mobilization and participation, the principal political aspects of modernization, undermine political institutions. Rapid modernization, in brief, produces not political development, but political decay.

I. Political Development as Modernization

Definitions of political development are legion. Most, however, share two closely related characteristics. First, political development is identified as one aspect of, or as intimately connected with, the broader processes of modernization in society as a whole. Moderniza-

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[1] *Democracy in America* (Phillips Bradley edn., New York 1955), II, 118.

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tion affects all segments of society; its political aspects constitute political development. Indeed, many authors seem to prefer the phrase "political modernization" as more descriptive of their primary concern. Second, if political development is linked with modernization, it is necessarily a broad and complex process. Hence most authors argue that political development must be measured by many criteria. The "multi-function character of politics," Lucian Pye has said, ". . . means that no single scale can be used for measuring the degree of political development."[2] It thus differs from economic development, on the character of which there seems to be more general agreement and which is measurable through fairly precise indices such as per capita national income. Definitions of political development hence tend to itemize a number of criteria. Ward and Rustow list eight characteristics of the modern polity; Emerson has five. Pye identifies four major aspects of political development plus half a dozen additional "factors." Eisenstadt finds four characteristics of political modernization.[3]

The definitions are many and multiple; but, with a few exceptions, the characteristics which they identify with political development are all aspects of the processes of modernization. Four sets of categories recur continuously in the definitions. One set, focusing on the Parsonian pattern variables, can perhaps best be summed up as *rationalization.* This involves movement from particularism to universalism, from diffuseness to specificity, from ascription to achievement, and from affectivity to affective neutrality. In terms of political development, functional differentiation and achievement criteria are particularly emphasized.[4] A second set of characteristics identified with development involves nationalism and *national integration.* Almost all writers recognize the problem of the "crisis of national identity" and the necessity of establishing a firmly delimited ethnic basis for the political community.[5] A developed polity, it is usually assumed, must,

[2] Lucian W. Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton 1963), 16.

[3] Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, eds., *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton 1964), 6-7; Rupert Emerson, *Political Modernization: The Single-Party System* (Denver 1963), 7-8; Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development,* 17-18; S. N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy and Political Development," in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton 1963), 99.

[4] James S. Coleman, in Gabriel A. Almond and Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960), 532; Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucracy and Political Development: A Paradoxical View," in LaPalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development,* 122; Eisenstadt, in *ibid.,* 99; Ward and Rustow, eds., *Political Modernization,* 7.

[5] See, e.g., Gabriel A. Almond, "Political Systems and Political Change," *American*

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with rare exception, be a nation-state. "Nation-building" is a key aspect of political development. A third approach focuses on *democratization*: pluralism, competitiveness, equalization of power, and similar qualities. "Competitiveness," says Coleman, "is an essential aspect of political modernity. . . ." Hence, "the Anglo-American polities most closely approximate the model of a modern political system. . . ."[6] Frey argues that "the most common notion of political development in intellectual American circles is that of movement towards democracy." He finds this a congenial notion and offers his own definition of political development as "changes in the direction of greater distribution and reciprocity of power. . . ."[7]

Rationalization, integration, and democratization thus commonly appear in definitions of political development. The characteristic of political development or political modernization which is most frequently emphasized, however, is *mobilization*, or *participation*. Modernization, Karl Deutsch has emphasized, involves social mobilization, and "this complex of processes of social change is significantly correlated with major changes in politics." Increases in literacy, urbanization, exposure to mass media, industrialization, and per capita income expand "the politically relevant strata of the population," multiply the demands for government services, and thus stimulate an increase in governmental capabilities, a broadening of the elite, increased political participation, and shifts in attention from the local level to the national level.[8] Modernization means mass mobilization; mass mobilization means increased political participation; and increased participation is the key element of political development. Participation distinguishes modern politics from traditional politics. "Traditional society," says Lerner, "is non-participant—it deploys people by kinship into communities isolated from each other and from a center. . . ." Modern society, in contrast, is "participant society."[9] The "new world political culture," say Almond and Verba, "will be a political culture of participation. If there is a political revolution going on throughout the world, it is what might be called the participation explosion. In all the new nations of the world the belief that the ordinary man is polit-

Behavioral Scientist, VI (June 1963), 3-10; Ward and Rustow, eds., *Political Modernization*, 7.

[6] Coleman, in Almond and Coleman, eds., *Politics of Developing Areas*, 533.

[7] Frederick W. Frey, "Political Development, Power, and Communications in Turkey," in Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development*, 301.

[8] Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, LV (September 1961), 493ff.

[9] Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe 1958), 48-50.

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ically relevant—that he ought to be an involved participant in the political system—is widespread. Large groups of people who have been outside politics are demanding entrance into the political system."[10] Political development, Rustow argues, may be defined as "(1) an increasing national political unity plus (2) a broadening base of political participation. . . ." Similarly, Riggs declares that political development "refers to the process of politicization: increasing participation or involvement of the citizen in state activities, in power calculations, and consequences."[11]

All definitions are arbitrary. These definitions of political development as some combination or permutation of participation, rationalization, democratization, and nation-building are just as legitimate as any other definition. While all definitions may be equally arbitrary and equally legitimate, they do vary greatly, however, in their relevance to particular problems and their usefulness for particular ends. Presumably one major purpose of concepts of political development is to facilitate understanding of the political processes in contemporary Asian, African, and Latin American societies. To be analytically useful, a concept must be precise and relevant. It must also have sufficient generality of application to permit comparative analysis of differing situations. Many approaches to political development suffer from one or more of the following difficulties.

First, the identification of political development with modernization or with factors usually associated with modernization drastically limits the applicability of the concept in both time and space. It is defined in parochial and immediate terms, its relevance limited to modern nation-states or the emergence of modern nation-states. It becomes impossible to speak of a politically developed tribal authority, city-state, feudal monarchy, or bureaucratic empire. Development is identified with one type of political system, rather than as a quality which might characterize any type of political system. All systems which are not modern are underdeveloped, including presumably fifth-century Athens, the third-century B.C. Roman republic, the second-century A.D. Roman empire, the Han and T'ang empires in China, or even eighteenth-century America. None of these political systems was modern. Is it also useful to consider them underdeveloped? Would it not be more appropriate to consider development or underdevelopment as a characteristic which might be found in any type of political

[10] Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton 1963), 4.
[11] Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Vanishing Dream of Stability," *AID Digest* (August 1962), 13; Riggs, in LaPalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, 139.

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system? City-states could be developed or underdeveloped; so also could be bureaucratic empires or modern nation-states. This approach would cast additional light on contemporary modernizing societies by furnishing a second set of categories (in addition to the traditional-modern set) for comparing the processes of change in those societies with the processes of change in other types of societies. Such an approach, of course, would also liberate the concept of development from the even more limited identification of it with the Western, constitutional, democratic nation-state.

The second problem with many definitions of political development is the obverse but also the corollary of the first. On the one hand, development is limited to the characteristics of the modern nation-state. On the other, it is also broadened to include almost all politically relevant aspects of the modernization process. It acquires comprehensiveness at the cost of precision. There is a natural tendency to assume that political development is all of a piece, that one "good thing" is compatible with another. In addition, studies of modernization have shown a very high degree of correlation among such indices as literacy, urbanization, media participation, and political participation.[12] Hence, it is easy to assume that a similar correlation exists among the various elements identified as contributing to political development. In fact, however, the four, eight, or twelve criteria of development may or may not have any systematic relation to each other. They may indeed be negatively correlated. There is no particular reason, for instance, why more participation and more structural differentiation should go together; in fact, there is some *a priori* reason to assume that more of one might mean less of the other. If this be the case, two contradictory tendencies (A, —B; —A, B) could both be labeled "political development." The broader the definition of development, moreover, the more inevitable development becomes. The all-encompassing definitions make development seem easy by making it seem inescapable. Development becomes an omnipresent first cause, which explains everything but distinguishes nothing. Almost anything that happens in the "developing" countries—coups, ethnic struggles, revolutionary wars—becomes part of the process of development, however contradictory or retrogressive this may appear on the surface. Political development thus loses its analytical content and acquires simply a geographic one. At the extreme, it becomes synonymous with the political history of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.[13]

[12] Lerner, *Passing of Traditional Society*, chap. 2.

[13] For the *reductio ad absurdum*, see Majid Khadduri, *Modern Libya: A Study in*

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Thirdly, many definitions of political development fail to distinguish clearly the empirical relevance of the components going into the definition. Concepts of "developed" and "undeveloped" as ideal types or states of being are confused with concepts of "development" as a process which are, in turn, identified with the politics of the areas commonly called "developing." The line between actuality and aspiration is fogged. Things which are in fact occurring in the "developing" areas become hopelessly intertwined with things which the theorist thinks should occur there. Here again the tendency has been to assume that what is true for the broader processes of social modernization is also true for political changes. Modernization, in some degree, is a fact in Asia, Africa, Latin America: urbanization is rapid; literacy is slowly increasing; industrialization is being pushed; per capita gross national product is inching upward; mass media circulation is expanding; political participation is broadening. All these are facts. In contrast, progress toward many of the other goals identified with political development—democracy, stability, structural differentiation, achievement patterns, national integration—often is dubious at best. Yet the tendency is to think that because modernization is taking place, political development also must be taking place. As a result, many of the sympathetic Western writings about the underdeveloped areas today have the same air of hopeful unreality which characterized much of the sympathetic Western writing about the Soviet Union in the 1920's and 1930's. They are suffused with what can only be described as "Webbism": that is, the tendency to ascribe to a political system qualities which are assumed to be its ultimate goals rather than qualities which actually characterize its processes and functions.[14]

In actuality, only some of the tendencies frequently encompassed in the concept "political development" appear to be characteristic of the "developing" areas. Instead of a trend toward competitiveness and

Political Development (Baltimore 1963), and J. Clagett Taylor, *The Political Development of Tanganyika* (Stanford 1963). In the titles and content of both, "political development" has no analytical meaning. It is simply a synonym (euphemism?) for "political history." Both books are good history, but they are not social science.

[14] See, e.g., Milton J. Esman, "The Politics of Development Administration," to be published in John D. Montgomery and William Siffin, eds., *Politics, Administration and Change: Approaches to Development* (New York 1965). Esman bases his analysis on the assumption that the political leaders of modernizing societies are motivated by the goals of nation-building and social-economic progress and not by desire for personal power, wealth, status, or the territorial expansion of their countries. This assumption has about the same degree of truth and usefulness in explaining politics in the contemporary "developing" areas as the assumption that Stalin's policies were devoted to building communism has to the explanation of Soviet politics in the 1930's.

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democracy, there has been an "erosion of democracy" and a tendency to autocratic military regimes and one-party regimes. Instead of stability, there have been repeated coups and revolts. Instead of a unifying nationalism and nation-building, there have been repeated ethnic conflicts and civil wars. Instead of institutional rationalization and differentiation, there has frequently been a decay of the administrative organizations inherited from the colonial era and a weakening and disruption of the political organizations developed during the struggle for independence.[15] Only the concept of political development as mobilization and participation appears to be generally applicable to the "developing" world. Rationalization, competitiveness, and nation-building, in contrast, seem to have only a dim relation to reality.

This gap between theory and reality suggests a fourth difficulty in many concepts of political development. They are usually one-way concepts. Little or no provision is made for their reversibility. If political development is thought to involve the mobilization of people into politics, account should also be taken of the possibility that political de-development can take place and people can be demobilized out of politics. Structural differentiation may occur, but so also may structural homogenization. National disintegration is a phenomenon as much as national integration. A concept of political development should be reversible. It should define both political development and the circumstances under which political decay is encouraged.

The failure to think of political development as a reversible process apparently stems from two sources. Insofar as development is identified with modernization, many aspects of modernization do appear to be practically irreversible. Urbanization is not likely to give way to ruralization. Increases in literacy are not normally followed by sharp declines. Capital once invested in factories or power plants stays invested. Even increases in per capita gross national product are, more often than not, permanent, except for minor dips or destruction caused by war or natural catastrophe. With varying slopes, with hesitancy in some sectors but with strength and steady progress in others, virtually all the indices of modernization progress steadily upward on the charts. But political changes have no such irreversibility.

In other instances, one feels that an underlying commitment to the theory of progress is so overwhelming as to exclude political decay as

[15] On the "erosion of democracy" and political instability, see Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), chap. 15; and Michael Brecher, *The New States of Asia* (London 1963), chap. 2.

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a possible concept. Political decay, like thermonuclear war, becomes unthinkable. Almond, for instance, measures not just political development but *political change* by "the acquisition by a political system of some new capability."[16] The specific capabilities he has in mind are those for national integration, international accommodation, political participation, and welfare distribution. Before the Renaissance, Almond argues, political systems "acquired and lost capabilities . . . in anything but a unilinear, evolutionary way." Modernization, however, reduces "the independence of man's political experiments." Change is "far from unilinear," but it is toward "the emergence of world culture." Surely, however, modern and modernizing states can change by losing capabilities as well as by gaining them. In addition, a gain in any one capability usually involves costs in others. A theory of political development needs to be mated to a theory of political decay. Indeed, as was suggested above, theories of instability, corruption, authoritarianism, domestic violence, institutional decline, and political disintegration may tell us a lot more about the "developing" areas than their more hopefully defined opposites.

II. Political Development as Institutionalization

There is thus much to be gained (as well as something to be lost) by conceiving of political development as a process independent of, although obviously affected by, the process of modernization. In view of the crucial importance of the relationship between mobilization and participation, on the one hand, and the growth of political organizations, on the other, it is useful for many purposes to define political development as the institutionalization of political organizations and procedures. This concept liberates development from modernization. It can be applied to the analysis of political systems of any sort, not just modern ones. It can be defined in reasonably precise ways which are at least theoretically capable of measurement. As a concept, it does not suggest that movement is likely to be in only one direction: institutions, we know, decay and dissolve as well as grow and mature. Most significantly, it focuses attention on the reciprocal interaction between the on-going social processes of modernization, on the one hand, and the strength, stability, or weakness of political structures, traditional, transitional, or modern, on the other.[17]

[16] Almond, *American Behavioral Scientist*, VI, 6.

[17] The concept of institutionalization has, of course, been used by other writers concerned with political development—most notably, S. N. Eisenstadt. His definition, however, differs significantly from my approach here. See, in particular, his "Initial

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The strength of political organizations and procedures varies with their *scope of support* and their *level of institutionalization.* Scope refers simply to the extent to which the political organizations and procedures encompass activity in the society. If only a small upper-class group belongs to political organizations and behaves in terms of a set of procedures, the scope is limited. If, on the other hand, a large segment of the population is politically organized and follows the political procedures, the scope is broad. Institutions are stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior. Organizations and procedures vary in their degree of institutionalization. Harvard University and the newly opened suburban high school are both organizations, but Harvard is much more of an institution than is the high school. The seniority system in Congress and President Johnson's select press conferences are both procedures, but seniority is much more institutionalized than are Mr. Johnson's methods of dealing with the press. Institutionalization is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability. The level of institutionalization of any political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and procedures. So also, the level of institutionalization of any particular organization or procedure can be measured by its adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. If these criteria can be identified and measured, political systems can be compared in terms of their levels of institutionalization. Furthermore, it will be possible to measure increases and decreases in the institutionalization of particular organizations and procedures within a political system.

ADAPTABILITY-RIGIDITY

The more adaptable an organization or procedure is, the more highly institutionalized it is; the less adaptable and more rigid it is, the lower its level of institutionalization. Adaptability is an acquired organizational characteristic. It is, in a rough sense, a function of environmental challenge and age. The more challenges which have arisen in its environment and the greater its age, the more adaptable it is. Rigidity is more characteristic of young organizations than of old ones. Old organizations and procedures, however, are not necessarily adaptable if they have existed in a static environment. In addition, if over a period of time an organization has developed a set of responses

Institutional Patterns of Political Modernisation," *Civilisations*, XII (No. 4, 1962), 461-72, and XIII (No. 1, 1963), 15-26; "Institutionalization and Change," *American Sociological Review*, XXIX (April 1964), 235-47; "Social Change, Differentiation and Evolution," *ibid.*, XXIX (June 1964), 375-86.

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for dealing effectively with one type of problem, and if it is then confronted with an entirely different type of problem requiring a different response, the organization may well be a victim of its past successes and be unable to adjust to the new challenge. In general, however, the first hurdle is the biggest one. Success in adapting to one environmental challenge paves the way for successful adaptation to subsequent environmental challenges. If, for instance, the probability of successful adjustment to the first challenge is 50 per cent, the probability of successful adjustment to the second challenge might be 75 per cent, to the third challenge 87½ per cent, to the fourth 93¾ per cent, and so on. Some changes in environment, moreover, such as changes in personnel, are inevitable for all organizations. Other changes in environment may be produced by the organization itself; if, for instance, it successfully completes the task which it was originally created to accomplish. So long as it is recognized that environments can differ in the challenges which they pose to organizations, the adaptability of an organization can in a rough sense be measured by its age. Its age, in turn, can be measured in three ways.

One is simply chronological: the longer an organization or procedure has been in existence, the higher the level of institutionalization. The older an organization is, the more likely it is to continue to exist through any specified future time period. The probability that an organization which is one hundred years old will survive one additional year, it might be hypothesized, is perhaps one hundred times greater than the probability that an organization one year old will survive one additional year. Political institutions are thus not created overnight. Political development, in this sense, is slow, particularly when compared with the seemingly much more rapid pace of economic development. In some instances, particular types of experience may substitute for time: fierce conflict or other serious challenges may transform organizations into institutions much more rapidly than normal circumstances. But such intensive experiences are rare, and even with such experiences time is still required. "A major party," Ashoka Mehta has observed, in commenting on why communism is helpless in India, "cannot be created in a day. In China a great party was forged by the revolution. Other major parties can be or are born of revolutions in other countries. But it is simply impossible, through normal channels, to forge a great party, to reach and galvanize millions of men in half a million villages."[18]

[18] Ashoka Mehta, in Raymond Aron, ed., *World Technology and Human Destiny* (Ann Arbor 1963), 133.

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A second measure of adaptability is generational age. So long as an organization still has its first set of leaders, so long as a procedure is still performed by those who first performed it, its adaptability is still in doubt. The more often the organization has surmounted the problem of peaceful succession and replaced one set of leaders with another, the more highly institutionalized it is. In considerable measure, of course, generational age is a function of chronological age. But political parties and governments may continue for decades under the leadership of one generation. The founders of organizations—whether parties, governments, or business corporations—are often young. Hence the gap between chronological age and generational age is apt to be greater in the early history of an organization than later in its career. This gap produces tensions between the first leaders of the organization and the next generation immediately behind them, which can look forward to a lifetime in the shadow of the first generation. In the middle of the 1960's the Chinese Communist Party was forty-five years old, but in large part it was still led by its first generation of leaders. An organization may also change leadership without changing generations of leadership. One generation differs from another in terms of its formative experiences. Simple replacement of one set of leaders by another, i.e., surmounting a succession crisis, counts for something in terms of institutional adaptability, but it is not as significant as a shift in leadership generations, i.e., the replacement of one set of leaders by another set with significantly different organizational experiences. The shift from Lenin to Stalin was an intra-generation succession; the shift from Stalin to Khrushchev was an inter-generation succession.

Thirdly, organizational adaptability can be measured in functional terms. An organization's functions, of course, can be defined in an almost infinite number of ways. (This is a major appeal and a major limitation of the functional approach to organizations.) Usually an organization is created to perform one particular function. When that function is no longer needed, the organization faces a major crisis. It either finds a new function or reconciles itself to a lingering death. An organization which has adapted itself to changes in its environment and has survived one or more changes in its principal functions is more highly institutionalized than one which has not. Not functional specificity but functional adaptability is the true measure of a highly developed organization. Institutionalization makes the organization more than simply an instrument to achieve certain purposes.[19]

[19] See the very useful discussion in Philip Selznick's small classic, *Leadership in Administration* (New York 1957), 5ff.

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Instead its leaders and members come to value it for its own sake, and it develops a life of its own quite apart from the specific functions it may perform at any given time. The organization triumphs over its function.

Organizations and individuals thus differ significantly in their cumulative capacity to adapt to changes. Individuals usually grow up through childhood and adolescence without deep commitments to highly specific functions. The process of commitment begins in late adolescence. As the individual becomes more and more committed to the performance of certain functions, he finds it increasingly difficult to change those functions and to unlearn the responses which he has acquired to meet environmental changes. His personality has been formed; he has become "set in his ways." Organizations, on the other hand, are usually created to perform very specific functions. When the organization confronts a changing environment, it must, if it is to survive, weaken its commitment to its original functions. As the organization matures, it becomes "unset" in its ways.

In practice, organizations vary greatly in their functional adaptability. The YMCA, for instance, was founded in the mid-nineteenth century as an evangelical organization to convert the single young men who, during the early years of industrialization, were migrating in great numbers to the cities. With the decline in need for this function, the Y successfully adjusted to the performance of many other "general service" functions broadly related to the legitimizing goal of "character development." Concurrently, it broadened its membership base to include first non-evangelical Protestants, then Catholics, then Jews, then old men as well as young, and then women as well as men![20] As a result, the organization has prospered although its original functions disappeared with the dark satanic mills. Other organizations, such as the WCTU and the Townsend Movement, have had greater difficulty in adjusting to a changing environment. The WCTU "is an organization in retreat. Contrary to the expectations of theories of institutionalization, the movement has not acted to preserve organizational values at the expense of past doctrine."[21] The Townsend Movement has been torn between those who wish to remain loyal to the original function

[20] See Mayer N. Zald and Patricia Denton, "From Evangelism to General Service: The Transformation of the YMCA," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, VIII (September 1963), 214ff.

[21] Joseph R. Gusfield, "Social Structure and Moral Reform: A Study of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXI (November 1955), 232; and Gusfield, "The Problem of Generations in an Organizational Structure," *Social Forces*, XXXV (May 1957), 323ff.

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and those who put organizational imperatives first. If the latter are successful, "the dominating orientation of leaders and members shifts *from the implementation of the values the organization is taken to represent* (by leaders, members, and public alike), *to maintaining the organizational structure as such*, even at the loss of the organization's central mission."[22] The conquest of polio posed a similar acute crisis for the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis. The original goals of the organization were highly specific. Should the organization dissolve when these goals were achieved? The dominant opinion of the volunteers was that the organization should continue. "We can fight polio," said one town chairman, "if we can organize people. If we can organize people like this we can fight anything." Another felt that: "Wouldn't it be a wonderful story to get polio licked, and then go on to something else and get that licked and then go on to something else? It would be a challenge, a career."[23]

The problems of functional adaptability are not much different for political organizations. A political party gains in functional age when it shifts its function from the representation of one constituency to the representation of another; it also gains in functional age when it shifts from opposition to government. A party which is unable to change constituencies or to acquire power is less of an institution than one which is able to make these changes. A nationalist party whose function has been the promotion of independence from colonial rule faces a major crisis when it achieves its goal and has to adapt itself to the somewhat different function of governing a country. It may find this functional transition so difficult that it will, even after independence, continue to devote a large portion of its efforts to fighting colonialism. A party which acts this way is less of an institution than one, like the Congress Party, which after achieving independence drops its anti-colonialism and quite rapidly adapts itself to the tasks of governing. Industrialization has been a major function of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. A major test of the institutionalization of the Communist Party will be its success in developing new functions now that the major industrializing effort is behind it. A governmental organ which can successfully adapt itself to changed functions, such as the British Crown in the eighteenth and nineteenth

[22] Sheldon L. Messinger, "Organizational Transformation: A Case Study of a Declining Social Movement," *American Sociological Review*, xx (February 1955), 10; italics in original.

[23] David L. Sills, *The Volunteers* (Glencoe 1957), p. 266. Chap. 9 of this book is an excellent discussion of organizational goal replacement with reference to the YMCA, WCTU, Townsend Movement, Red Cross, and other case studies.

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centuries, is more of an institution than one which cannot, such as the French monarchy in the same period.

COMPLEXITY-SIMPLICITY

The more complicated an organization is, the more highly institutionalized it is. Complexity may involve both multiplication of organizational subunits, hierarchically and functionally, and differentiation of separate types of organizational subunits. The greater the number and variety of subunits, the greater the ability of the organization to secure and maintain the loyalties of its members. In addition, an organization which has many purposes is better able to adjust itself to the loss of any one purpose than an organization which has only one purpose. The diversified corporation is obviously less vulnerable than that which produces one product for one market. The differentiation of subunits within an organization may or may not be along functional lines. If it is functional in character, the subunits themselves are less highly institutionalized than the whole of which they are a part. Changes in the functions of the whole, however, are fairly easily reflected by changes in the power and roles of its subunits. If the subunits are multifunctional, they have greater institutional strength, but they may also, for that very reason, contribute less flexibility to the organization as a whole. Hence, a political system with parties of "social integration," in Neumann's terms, has less institutional flexibility than one with parties of "individual representation."[24]

Relatively primitive and simple traditional political systems are usually overwhelmed and destroyed in the modernization process. More complex traditional systems are more likely to adapt to these new demands. Japan, for instance, was able to adjust its traditional political institutions to the modern world because of their relative complexity. For two and a half centuries before 1868, the emperor had reigned and the Tokugawa shogun had ruled. The stability of the political order, however, did not depend solely on the stability of the shogunate. When the authority of the shogunate decayed, another traditional institution, the emperor, was available to become the instrument of the modernizing samurai. The collapse of the shogun involved not the overthrow of the political order but the "restoration" of the emperor.

The simplest political system is that which depends on one individual. It is also, of course, the least stable. Tyrannies, Aristotle pointed

[24] Sigmund Neumann, "Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties," in Neumann, ed., *Modern Political Parties* (Chicago 1956), 403-5.

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out, are virtually all "quite short-lived."[25] A political system with several different political institutions, on the other hand, is much more likely to adapt. The needs of one age may be met by one set of institutions; the needs of the next by a different set. The system possesses within itself the means of its own renewal and adaptation. In the American system, for instance, President, Senate, House of Representatives, Supreme Court, and state governments have played different roles at different times in history. As new problems arise, the initiative in dealing with them may be taken first by one institution, then by another. In contrast, the French system of the Third and Fourth Republics centered authority in the National Assembly and the national bureaucracy. If, as was frequently the case, the Assembly was too divided to act and the bureaucracy lacked the authority to act, the system was unable to adapt to environmental changes and to deal with new policy problems. When in the 1950's the Assembly was unable to handle the dissolution of the French Empire, there was no other institution, such as an independent executive, to step into the breach. As a result, an extraconstitutional force, the military, intervened in politics, and in due course a new institution, the de Gaulle Presidency, was created which was able to handle the problem. "A state without the means of some change," Burke observed of an earlier French crisis, "is without the means of its conservation."[26]

The classical political theorists, preoccupied as they were with the problem of stability, arrived at similar conclusions. The simple forms of government were most likely to degenerate; the "mixed state" was more likely to be stable. Both Plato and Aristotle suggested that the most practical state was the "polity" combining the institutions of democracy and oligarchy. A "constitutional system based absolutely, and at all points," Aristotle argued, "on either the oligarchical or the democratic conception of equality is a poor sort of thing. The facts are evidence enough: constitutions of this sort never endure." A "constitution is better when it is composed of more numerous elements."[27] Such a constitution is more likely to head off sedition and revolution. Polybius and Cicero elaborated this idea more explicitly. Each of the "good" simple forms of government—kingship, aristocracy, and democracy—is likely to degenerate into its perverted counterpart—tyranny, oligarchy, and mobocracy. Instability and degeneration can be avoided only by combining elements from all the good forms into a mixed

[25] *Politics* (Ernest Barker trans., London 1946), 254.
[26] *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (Gateway edn., Chicago 1955), 37.
[27] *Politics*, 60, 206.

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state. Complexity produces stability. "The simple governments," Burke echoed two thousand years later, "are fundamentally defective, to say no worse of them."[28]

AUTONOMY-SUBORDINATION

A third measure of institutionalization is the extent to which political organizations and procedures exist independently of other social groupings and methods of behavior. How well is the political sphere differentiated from other spheres? In a highly developed political system, political organizations have an integrity which they lack in less developed systems. In some measure, they are insulated from the impact of non-political groups and procedures. In less developed political systems, they are highly vulnerable to outside influences.

At its most concrete level, autonomy involves the relations between social forces, on the one hand, and political organizations, on the other. Social forces include the groupings of men for social and economic activities: families, clans, work groups, churches, ethnic and linguistic groupings. Political institutionalization, in the sense of autonomy, means the development of political organizations and procedures which are not simply expressions of the interests of particular social groups. A political organization which is the instrument of a social group—family, clan, class—lacks autonomy and institutionalization. If the state, in the traditional Marxist claim, is really the "executive committee of the bourgeoisie," then it is not much of an institution. A judiciary is independent to the extent that it adheres to distinctly judicial norms and to the extent that its perspectives and behavior are independent of those of other political institutions and social groupings. As with the judiciary, the autonomy of political institutions is measured by the extent to which they have their own interests and values distinguishable from those of other social forces. As with the judiciary, the autonomy of political institutions is likely to be the result of competition among social forces. A political party, for instance, which expresses the interests of only one group in society—whether labor, business, or farmers—is less autonomous than one which articulates and aggregates the interests of several social groups. The latter type of party has a clearly defined existence apart from particular social forces. So also with legislatures, executives, and bureaucracies. Political procedures, like political organizations, also have varying degrees of autonomy. A highly developed political system has procedures to minimize, if not to eliminate, the role of vio-

[28] *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, 92.

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lence in the system and to restrict to explicitly defined channels the influence of wealth in the system. To the extent that political officials can be toppled by a few soldiers or influenced by a few dollars, the organizations and procedures lack autonomy. Political organizations and procedures which lack autonomy are, in common parlance, said to be corrupt.

Political organizations and procedures which are vulnerable to non-political influences from within the society are also usually vulnerable to influences from outside the society. They are easily penetrated by agents, groups, and ideas from other political systems. Thus, a *coup d'état* in one political system may easily "trigger" a *coup d'état* by similar groups in other less-developed political systems.[29] In some instances, apparently, a regime can be overthrown by smuggling into the country a few agents and a handful of weapons. In other instances, a regime may be overthrown by the exchange of a few words and a few thousand dollars between a foreign ambassador and some disaffected colonels. The Soviet and American governments presumably spend substantial sums attempting to bribe high officials of less well-insulated political systems which they would not think of wasting in attempting to influence high officials in each other's political system.

In every society affected by social change, new groups arise to participate in politics. Where the political system lacks autonomy, these groups gain entry into politics without becoming identified with the established political organizations or acquiescing in the established political procedures. The political organizations and procedures are unable to stand up against the impact of a new social force. Conversely, in a developed political system, the autonomy of the system is protected by mechanisms which restrict and moderate the impact of new groups. These mechanisms either slow down the entry of new groups into politics or, through a process of political socialization, impel changes in the attitudes and behavior of the most politically active members of the new group. In a highly institutionalized political system, the most important positions of leadership can normally be achieved only by those who have served an apprenticeship in less important positions. The complexity of a political system contributes to its autonomy by providing a variety of organizations and positions in which individuals are prepared for the highest offices. In a sense, the top positions of leadership are the inner core of the political system; the less powerful positions, the peripheral organizations, and the semi-

[29] See Samuel P. Huntington, "Patterns of Violence in World Politics," in Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (New York 1962), 44-47.

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political organizations are the filters through which individuals desiring access to the core must pass. Thus the political system assimilates new social forces and new personnel without sacrificing its institutional integrity. In a political system which lacks such defenses, new men, new viewpoints, new social groups may replace each other at the core of the system with bewildering rapidity.

COHERENCE-DISUNITY

The more unified and coherent an organization is, the more highly institutionalized it is; the greater the disunity of the organization, the less its institutionalization. Some measure of consensus, of course, is a prerequisite for any social group. An effective organization requires, at a minimum, substantial consensus on the functional boundaries of the group and on the procedures for resolving disputes on issues which come up within those boundaries. The consensus must extend to those active in the system. Non-participants or those only sporadically and marginally participant in the system do not have to share the consensus and usually, in fact, do not share it to the same extent as the participants.[30] In theory, an organization can be autonomous without being coherent and coherent without being autonomous. In actuality, however, the two are often closely linked together. Autonomy becomes a means to coherence, enabling the organization to develop an esprit and style which become distinctive marks of its behavior. Autonomy also prevents the intrusion of disruptive external forces, although, of course, it does not protect against disruption from internal sources. Rapid or substantial expansions in the membership of an organization or in the participants in a system tend to weaken coherence. The Ottoman Ruling Institution, for instance, retained its vitality and coherence as long as admission was restricted and recruits were "put through an elaborate education, with selection and specialization at every stage." The Institution perished when "everybody pressed in to share its privileges. . . . Numbers were increased; discipline and efficiency declined."[31]

Unity, esprit, morale, and discipline are needed in governments as well as in regiments. Numbers, weapons, and strategy all count in war, but major deficiencies in any one of those may still be counterbalanced by superior coherence and discipline. So also in politics. The problems

[30] See, e.g., Herbert McCloskey, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," *American Political Science Review*, XVIII (June 1964), 361ff.; Samuel Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* (New York 1955), *passim*.

[31] Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (Abridgement of Vols. I-VI by D. C. Somervell, New York 1947), 176-77.

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of creating coherent political organizations are more difficult but not fundamentally different from those involved in the creation of coherent military organizations. "The sustaining sentiment of a military force," David Rapoport has argued, "has much in common with that which cements any group of men engaged in politics—the willingness of most individuals to bridle private or personal impulses for the sake of general social objectives. Comrades must trust each other's ability to resist the innumerable temptations that threaten the group's solidarity; otherwise, in trying social situations the desire to fend for oneself becomes overwhelming."[32] The capacities for coordination and discipline are crucial to both war and politics, and historically societies which have been skilled at organizing the one have also been adept at organizing the other. "The relationship of efficient social organization in the arts of peace and in the arts of group conflict," one anthropologist has observed, "is almost absolute, whether one is speaking of civilization or subcivilization. Successful war depends upon team work and consensus, both of which require command and discipline. Command and discipline, furthermore, can eventually be no more than symbols of something deeper and more real than they themselves."[33] Societies, such as Sparta, Rome, and Britain, which have been admired by their contemporaries for the authority and justice of their laws have also been admired for the coherence and discipline of their armies. Discipline and development go hand in hand.

One major advantage of studying development in terms of mobilization and participation is that they are measurable. Statistics are readily available for urbanization, literacy, mass media exposure, and voting. Hence, comparisons are easily made between countries and between different stages of the same country. What about institutionalization? Are the criteria of adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence also measurable? Quite obviously the difficulties are greater. The UN has not conveniently collected in its *Statistical Yearbook* data on the political institutionalization of its members. Nonetheless, no reason exists why with a little imagination and effort sufficient information could not be collected to make meaningful comparisons of the levels of political institutionalization of different countries or of the same country at different times. Adaptability can be measured by chronological age, leadership successions, generational changes, and functional changes. Complexity can be measured by the number

[32] David C. Rapoport, "A Comparative Theory of Military and Political Types," in Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, 79.

[33] Harry Holbert Turney-High, *Primitive War* (Columbia, S.C., 1949), 235-36.

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and diversity of organizational subunits and by the number and diversity of functions performed by the organizations. Autonomy is perhaps the most difficult of the criteria to pin down: it can, however, be measured by the distinctiveness of the norms and values of the organization compared with those of other groups, by the personnel controls (in terms of cooptation, penetration, and purging) existing between the organization and other groups, and by the degree to which the organization controls its own material resources. Coherence may be measured by the ratio of contested successions to total successions, by the cumulation or non-cumulation of cleavages among leaders and members, by the incidence of overt alienation and dissent within the organization, and, conceivably, by opinion surveys of the loyalties and preferences of organization members.

Experience tells us that levels of institutionalization differ. Measuring that difference may be difficult, but it is not impossible. Only by measuring institutionalization will we be able to buttress or disprove hypotheses about the relation between social, economic, and demographic changes, on the one hand, and variations in political structure, on the other.

III. Mobilization vs. Institutionalization: Public Interests, Degeneration, and the Corrupt Polity

Mobilization and institutionalization

Social mobilization and political participation are rapidly increasing in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These processes, in turn, are directly responsible for the deterioration of political institutions in these areas. As Kornhauser has conclusively demonstrated for the Western world, rapid industrialization and urbanization create discontinuities which give rise to mass society. "The *rapid* influx of large numbers of people into *newly* developing urban areas invites mass movements."[34] In areas and industries with very rapid industrial growth, the creation and institutionalization of unions lag, and mass movements are likely among the workers. As unions are organized, they are highly vulnerable to outside influences in their early stages. "The rapid influx of large numbers of people into a new organization (as well as a new area) provides opportunities for mass-oriented elites to penetrate the organization. This is particularly true during the formative periods of organizations, for at such times external constraints must carry the burden of social control until the

[34] William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe 1959), 145.

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new participants have come to internalize the values of the organization."[35]

So also in politics. Rapid economic growth breeds political instability.[36] Political mobilization, moreover, does not necessarily require the building of factories or even movement to the cities. It may result simply from increases in communications, which can stimulate major increases in aspirations that may be only partially, if at all, satisfied. The result is a "revolution of rising frustrations."[37] Increases in literacy and education may bring more political instability. By Asian standards, Burma, Ceylon, and the Republic of Korea are all highly literate, but no one of them is a model of political stability. Nor does literacy necessarily stimulate democracy: with roughly 75 per cent literacy, Cuba was the fifth most literate country in Latin America (ranking behind Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and Costa Rica), but the first to go Communist; so also Kerala, with one of the highest literacy rates in India, was the first Indian state to elect a Communist government.[38] Literacy, as Daniel Lerner has suggested, "may be dysfunctional—indeed a serious impediment—to modernization in the societies now seeking (all too rapidly) to transform their institutions."[39]

Increased communication may thus generate demands for more "modernity" than can be delivered. It may also stimulate a reaction against modernity and activate traditional forces. Since the political arena is normally dominated by the more modern groups, it can bring into the arena new, anti-modern groups and break whatever consensus exists among the leading political participants. It may also mobilize minority ethnic groups who had been indifferent to politics but who now acquire a self-consciousness and divide the political system along ethnic lines. Nationalism, it has often been assumed, makes for national integration. But in actuality, nationalism and other forms of ethnic consciousness often stimulate political disintegration, tearing apart the body politic.

Sharp increases in voting and other forms of political participation can also have deleterious effects on political institutions. In Latin

[35] *Ibid.*, 146.

[36] See Mancur Olson, Jr., "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," *Journal of Economic History*, XXVII (December 1963), 529-52; and Bert F. Hoselitz and Myron Weiner, "Economic Development and Political Stability in India," *Dissent*, VIII (Spring 1961), 172-79.

[37] See Daniel Lerner, "Toward a Communication Theory of Modernization," in Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development*, 330ff.

[38] Cf. Deutsch, *American Political Science Review*, LV, 496.

[39] Daniel Lerner, "The Transformation of Institutions" (mimeo.), 19.

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America since the 1930's, increases in voting and increases in political instability have gone hand in hand. "Age requirements were lowered, property and literacy requirements were reduced or discarded, and the unscrubbed, unschooled millions on the farms were enfranchised in the name of democracy. They were swept into the political life of the republics so rapidly that existing parties could not absorb many of them, and they learned little about working within the existing political system."[40] The personal identity crises of the elites, caught between traditional and modern cultures, may create additional problems: "In transitional countries the political process often has to bear to an inordinate degree the stresses and strains of people responding to personal needs and seeking solutions to intensely personal problems."[41] Rapid social and economic change calls into question existing values and behavior patterns. It thus often breeds personal corruption. In some circumstances this corruption may play a positive role in the modernizing process, enabling dynamic new groups to get things done which would have been blocked by the existing value system and social structure. At the same time, however, corruption undermines the autonomy and coherence of political institutions. It is hardly accidental that in the 1870's and 1880's a high rate of American economic development coincided with a low point in American governmental integrity.[42]

Institutional decay has become a common phenomenon of the modernizing countries. *Coups d'état* and military interventions in politics are one index of low levels of political institutionalization: they occur where political institutions lack autonomy and coherence. According to one calculation, eleven of twelve modernizing states outside Latin America which were independent before World War II experienced *coups d'état* or attempted coups after World War II. Of twenty states which became independent between World War II and 1959, fourteen had coups or coup attempts by 1963. Of twenty-four states which became independent between 1960 and 1963, seven experienced coups or attempted coups before the end of 1963.[43] Instability in Latin America was less frequent early in the twentieth century than it was in the middle of the century. In the decade from 1917 to 1927, military men occupied the presidencies of the twenty

[40] John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford 1964), 98-99.
[41] Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building* (New Haven 1962), 4-5.
[42] See, in general, Ronald E. Wraith and Edgar Simpkins, *Corruption in Developing Countries* (London 1963).
[43] These figures are calculated from the data in the Appendix of Fred R. von der Mehden, *Politics of the Developing Nations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964).

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Latin American republics 28.7 per cent of the time; in the decade from 1947 to 1957, military men were presidents 45.5 per cent of the time.[44] In the 1930's and 1940's in countries like Argentina and Colombia, military intervention in politics occurred for the first time in this century. Seventeen of the twenty Latin American states experienced coups or coup attempts between 1945 and 1964, only Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay having clean records of political stability.

In many states the decline of party organizations is reflected in the rise of charismatic leaders who personalize power and weaken institutions which might limit that power. The increasing despotism of Nkrumah, for instance, was accompanied by a marked decline in the institutional strength of the Convention People's Party. In Turkey, Pakistan, and Burma, the Republican People's Party, Muslim League, and AFPFL deteriorated and military intervention eventually ensued. In party organizations and bureaucracies, marked increases in corruption often accompanied significant declines in the effectiveness of governmental services. Particularistic groups—tribal, ethnic, religious—frequently reasserted themselves and further undermined the authority and coherence of political institutions. The legitimacy of post-colonial regimes among their own people was often less than that of the colonial regimes of the Europeans. Economists have argued that the gap between the level of economic well-being of the underdeveloped countries and that of highly developed countries is widening as the absolute increases and even percentage increases of the latter exceed those of the former. Something comparable and perhaps even more marked is occurring in the political field. The level of political institutionalization of the advanced countries has, with a few exceptions such as France, remained relatively stable. The level of political institutionalization of most other countries has declined. As a result, the political gap between them has broadened. In terms of institutional strength, many if not most of the new states reached their peak of political development at the moment of independence.

The differences which may exist in mobilization and institutionalization suggest four ideal-types of politics (see Table 1). Modern, developed, civic polities (the United States, the Soviet Union) have high levels of both mobilization and institutionalization. Primitive polities (such as Banfield's backward society) have low levels of both. Contained polities are highly institutionalized but have low levels of

[44] Computed from figures in R. W. Fitzgibbon, "Armies and Politics in Latin America," paper, 7th Round Table, International Political Science Association, Opatija, Yugoslavia, September 1959, 8-9.

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TABLE 1. TYPES OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS

SOCIAL MOBILIZATION	POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION	
	High	*Low*
High	Civic	Corrupt
Low	Contained	Primitive

mobilization and participation. The dominant political institutions of contained polities may be either traditional (e.g., monarchies) or modern (e.g., political parties). If they are the former, such polities may well confront great difficulties in adjusting to rising levels of social mobilization. The traditional institutions may wither or collapse, and the result would be a corrupt polity with a high rate of participation but a low level of institutionalization. In the corrupt society, politics is, in Macaulay's phrase, "all sail and no anchor."[45] This type of polity characterizes much, if not most, of the modernizing world. Many of the more advanced Latin American countries, for instance, have achieved comparatively high indices of literacy, per capita national income, and urbanization. But their politics remains notably underdeveloped. Distrust and hatred have produced a continuing low level of political institutionalization. "There is no good faith in America, either among men or among nations," Bolivar once lamented. "Treaties are paper, constitutions books, elections battles, liberty anarchy, and life a torment. The only thing one can do in America is emigrate."[46] Over a century later, the same complaint was heard: "We are not, or do not represent a respectable nation . . . not because we are poor, but because we are disorganized," argued an Ecuadorian newspaper. "With a politics of ambush and of permanent mistrust, one for the other, we . . . cannot properly organize a republic . . . and without organization we cannot merit or attain respect from other nations."[47] So long as a country like Argentina retains a politics of coup and countercoup and a feeble state surrounded by massive social forces, it cannot be considered politically developed, no matter how urbane and prosperous and educated are its citizens.

In reverse fashion, a country may be politically highly developed, with modern political institutions, while still very backward in terms of modernization. India, for instance, is typically held to be the epit-

[45] Thomas B. Macaulay, letter to Henry S. Randall, Courtlandt Village, New York, May 23, 1857, printed in "What Did Macaulay Say About America?" *Bulletin of the New York Public Library*, XXIX (July 1925), 477-79.

[46] Simon Bolivar, quoted in K. H. Silvert, ed., *Expectant Peoples: Nationalism and Development* (New York 1963), 347.

[47] *El Dia*, Quito, November 27, 1943, quoted in Bryce Wood, *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy* (New York 1961), 318.

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ome of the underdeveloped society. Judged by the usual criteria of modernization, it was at the bottom of the ladder during the 1950's: per capita GNP of $72, 80 per cent illiterate, over 80 per cent of the population in rural areas, 70 per cent of the work force in agriculture, a dozen major languages, deep caste and religious differences. Yet in terms of political institutionalization, India was far from backward. Indeed, it ranked high not only in comparison with other modernizing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but also in comparison with many much more modern European countries. A well-developed political system has strong and distinct institutions to perform both the "input" and the "output" functions of politics. India entered independence with not only two organizations, but two highly developed—adaptable, complex, autonomous, and coherent—institutions ready to assume primary responsibility for these functions. The Congress Party, founded in 1885, was one of the oldest and best-organized political parties in the world; the Indian Civil Service, dating from the early nineteenth century, has been appropriately hailed as "one of the greatest administrative systems of all time."[48] The stable, effective, and democratic government of India during the first fifteen years of independence rested far more on this institutional inheritance than it did on the charisma of Nehru. In addition, the relatively slow pace of modernization and social mobilization in India did not create demands and strains which the Party and the bureaucracy were unable to handle. So long as these two organizations maintain their institutional strength, it is ridiculous to think of India as politically underdeveloped, no matter how low her per capita income or how high her illiteracy rate.

Almost no other country which became independent after World War II was institutionally as well prepared as India for self-government. In countries like Pakistan and the Sudan, institutional evolution was unbalanced; the civil and military bureaucracies were more highly developed than the political parties, and the military had strong incentives to move into the institutional vacuum on the input side of the political system and to attempt to perform interest aggregation functions. This pattern, of course, has also been common in Latin America. In countries like Guatemala, El Salvador, Peru, and Argentina, John J. Johnson has pointed out, the military is "the country's best organized institution and is thus in a better position to give objective expression to the national will" than are parties or

[48] Ralph Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan," in LaPalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, 373.

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interest groups.[49] In a very different category is a country like North Vietnam, which fought its way into independence with a highly disciplined political organization but which was distinctly weak on the administrative side. The Latin American parallel here would be Mexico, where, as Johnson puts it, "not the armed forces but the PRI is the best organized institution, and the party rather than the armed forces has been the unifying force at the national level." In yet a fourth category are those unfortunate states, such as the Congo, which were born with neither political nor administrative institutions. Many of these new states deficient at independence in one or both types of institutions have also been confronted by high rates of social mobilization and rapidly increasing demands on the political system (see Table 2).

TABLE 2. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AT MOMENT OF INDEPENDENCE

INPUT INSTITUTIONS	OUTPUT INSTITUTIONS	
	High	*Low*
High	India	North Vietnam
Low	Sudan	Congo

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC INTERESTS

A society with weak political institutions lacks the ability to curb the excesses of personal and parochial desires. Politics is a Hobbesian world of unrelenting competition among social forces—between man and man, family and family, clan and clan, region and region, class and class—a competition unmediated by more comprehensive political organizations. The "amoral familism" of Banfield's village has its counterparts in amoral clanism, amoral groupism, and amoral classism. Without strong political institutions, society lacks the means of defining and realizing its common interests. The capacity to create political institutions is the capacity to create public interests.

Traditionally the public interest has been approached in three ways.[50] It has been identified either with abstract, substantive ideal values and norms such as natural law, justice, or right reason; or with the specific interest of a particular individual ("L'état, c'est moi"), group, class (Marxism), or majority; or with the result of a competitive process among individuals (classic liberalism) or groups (Bentleyism).

[49] Johnson, *Military and Society*, 143.

[50] See, in general, Glendon Schubert, *The Public Interest* (Glencoe 1960); Carl J. Friedrich, ed., *Nomos V: The Public Interest* (New York 1962); Douglas Price, "Theories of the Public Interest," in Lynton K. Caldwell, ed., *Politics and Public Affairs* (Bloomington, Ind., 1962), 141-60.

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The problem in all these approaches is to arrive at a definition which is concrete rather than nebulous and general rather than particular. Unfortunately, in most cases what is concrete lacks generality and what is general lacks concreteness. One partial way out of the problem is to define the public interest in terms of the concrete interests of the governing institutions. A society with highly institutionalized governing organizations and procedures is, in this sense, more able to articulate and achieve its public interests. "Organized (institutionalized) political communities," as Friedrich argues, "are *better adapted* to reaching decisions and developing policies than unorganized communities."[51] The public interest, in this sense, is not something which exists *a priori* in natural law or the will of the people. Nor is it simply whatever results from the political process. Rather it is whatever strengthens governmental institutions. The public interest is the interest of public institutions. It is something which is created and brought into existence by the institutionalization of government organizations. In a complex political system, many governmental organizations and procedures represent many different aspects of the public interest. The public interest of a complex society is a complex matter.

We are accustomed to think of our primary governing institutions as having representative functions—that is, as expressing the interests of some other set of groups (their constituency). Hence, we tend to forget that governmental institutions have interests of their own. These interests not only exist; they are also reasonably concrete. The questions, "What is the interest of the Presidency? What is the interest of the Senate? What is the interest of the House of Representatives? What are the interests of the Supreme Court?" are difficult but not completely impossible to answer. The answers would furnish a fairly close approximation of the "public interest" of the United States. Similarly, the public interest of Great Britain might be approximated by the specific institutional interests of the Crown, Cabinet, and Parliament. In the Soviet Union, the answer would involve the specific institutional interests of the Presidium, Secretariat, and Central Committee of the Communist Party.

Institutional interests differ from the interests of individuals who are in the institutions. Keynes's percipient remark that "In the long run, we are all dead" applies to individuals, not institutions. Individual interests are necessarily short-run interests. Institutional interests, how-

[51] Carl J. Friedrich, *Man and His Government* (New York 1963), 150; italics in original.

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ever, exist through time: the proponent of the institution has to look to its welfare through an indefinite future. This consideration often means a limiting of immediate goals. The "true policy," Aristotle remarked, "for democracy and oligarchy alike, is not one which ensures the greatest possible amount of either, but one which will ensure the longest possible life for both."[52] The official who attempts to maximize power or other values in the short run often weakens his institution in the long run. Supreme Court justices may, in terms of their immediate individual desires, wish to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional. In deciding whether it is in the public interest to do so, however, presumably one question they should ask themselves is whether it is in the long-term institutional interest of the Supreme Court for them to do so. Judicial statesmen are those who, like John Marshall in *Marbury vs. Madison*, maximize the institutional power of the Court in such a way that it is impossible for either the President or Congress to challenge it. In contrast, the Supreme Court justices of the 1930's came very close to expanding their immediate influence at the expense of the long-term interests of the Court as an institution.

The phrase "What's good for General Motors is good for the country" contains at least a partial truth. "What's good for the Presidency is good for the country," however, contains more truth. Ask any reasonably informed group of Americans to identify the five best Presidents and the five worst Presidents. Then ask them to identify the five strongest Presidents and the five weakest Presidents. If the identification of strength with goodness and weakness with badness is not 100 per cent, it will almost certainly not be less than 80 per cent. Those Presidents—Jefferson, Lincoln, the Roosevelts, Wilson—who expanded the powers of their office are hailed as the beneficent promoters of the public welfare and national interest. Those Presidents, such as Buchanan, Grant, Harding, who failed to defend the power of their institution against other groups are also thought to have done less good for the country. Institutional interest coincides with public interest. The power of the Presidency is identified with the good of the polity.

The public interest of the Soviet Union is approximated by the institutional interests of the top organs of the Communist Party: "What's good for the Presidium is good for the Soviet Union." Viewed in these terms, Stalinism can be defined as a situation in which the personal interests of the ruler take precedence over the institution-

[52] *Politics*, 267.

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alized interests of the Party. Beginning in the late 1930's Stalin consistently weakened the Party. No Party Congress was held between 1939 and 1952. During and after World War II the Central Committee seldom met. The Party secretariat and Party hierarchy were weakened by the creation of competing organs. Conceivably this process could have resulted in the displacement of one set of governing institutions by another, and some American experts and some Soviet leaders did think that governmental organizations rather than Party organizations would become the ruling institutions in Soviet society. Such, however, was neither the intent nor the effect of Stalin's action. He increased his personal power, not the governmental power. When he died, his personal power died with him. The struggle to fill the resulting vacuum was won by Khrushchev, who identified his interests with the interests of the Party organization, rather than by Malenkov, who identified himself with the governmental bureaucracy. Khrushchev's consolidation of power marked the reemergence and revitalization of the principal organs of the Party. While they acted in very different ways and from different motives, Stalin weakened the Party just as Grant weakened the Presidency. Just as a strong Presidency is in the American public interest, so also a strong Party is in the Soviet public interest.

In terms of the theory of natural law, governmental actions are legitimate to the extent that they are in accord with the "public philosophy."[53] According to democratic theory, they derive their legitimacy from the extent to which they embody the will of the people. According to the procedural concept, they are legitimate if they represent the outcome of a process of conflict and compromise in which all interested groups have participated. In another sense, however, the legitimacy of governmental actions can be sought in the extent to which they reflect the interests of governmental institutions. In contrast to the theory of representative government, under this concept governmental institutions derive their legitimacy and authority not from the extent to which they represent the interests of the people or of any other group, but from the extent to which they have distinct interests of their own apart from all other groups. Politicians frequently remark that things "look different" after they obtain office than they did when they were competing for office. This difference is a measure of the institutional demands of office. It is precisely this

[53] See Walter Lippmann, *The Public Philosophy* (Boston 1955), esp. 42, for his definition of the public interest as "what men would choose if they saw clearly, thought rationally, acted disinterestedly and benevolently."

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difference in perspective which legitimizes the demands which the officeholder makes on his fellow citizens. The interests of the President, for instance, may coincide partially and temporarily first with those of one group and then with those of another. But the interest of the Presidency, as Neustadt has emphasized,[54] coincides with that of no one else. The President's power derives not from his representation of class, group, regional, or popular interests, but rather from the fact that he represents none of these. The Presidential perspective is unique to the Presidency. Precisely for this reason, it is both a lonely office and a powerful one. Its authority is rooted in its loneliness.

The existence of political institutions (such as the Presidency or Presidium) capable of giving substance to public interests distinguishes politically developed societies from undeveloped ones. The "ultimate test of development," as Lucian Pye has said, "is the capacity of a people to establish and maintain large, complex, but flexible organizational forms."[55] The level of organization in much of the world, however, is low. "Except in Europe and America," Banfield notes, "the concerting of behavior in political associations and corporate organizations is a rare and recent thing."[56] The ability to create public organizations and political institutions is in short supply in the world today. It is this ability which, above all else, the Communists offer modernizing countries.

DEGENERATION AND THE CORRUPT POLITY

Most modernizing countries are buying rapid social modernization at the price of political degeneration. This process of decay in political institutions, however, has been neglected or overlooked in much of the literature on modernization. As a result, models and concepts which are hopefully entitled "developing" or "modernizing" are often only partially relevant to the countries to which they are applied. More relevant in many cases would be models of corrupt or degenerating societies, highlighting the decay of political organization and the increasing dominance of disruptive social forces. Who, however, has advanced such a theory of political decay or a model of a corrupt political order which might be useful in analyzing the political processes of the countries that are usually called "developing"? Perhaps the most relevant ideas are the most ancient ones. The evolution of

[54] See Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York 1960), *passim*, but esp. 33-37, 150-51.

[55] Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building*, 51.

[56] Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (Glencoe, Ill., 1958), 7-9, 15ff.

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many contemporary new states, once the colonial guardians have departed, has not deviated extensively from the Platonic model. Independence is followed by military coups as the "auxiliaries" take over.[57] Corruption by the oligarchy inflames the envy of rising groups. Conflict between oligarchy and masses erupts into civil strife. Demagogues and street mobs pave the way for the despot. Plato's description of the means by which the despot appeals to the people, isolates and eliminates his enemies, and builds up his personal strength is a far less misleading guide to what has taken place in Ghana and other new states than many things written yesterday.[58]

Plato is one of the few theorists, ancient or contemporary, with a highly explicit theory of political degeneration.[59] The concept of a "corrupt society," however, is a more familiar one in political theory. Typically it refers to a society which lacks law, authority, cohesion, discipline, and consensus, where private interests dominate public ones, where there is an absence of civic obligation and civic duty, where, in short, political institutions are weak and social forces strong. Plato's degenerate states are dominated by various forms of appetite: by force, wealth, numbers, and charisma. "Those constitutions," says Aristotle, "which consider only the personal interest of the rulers are all wrong constitutions, or perversions of the right forms."[60] So also, Machiavelli's concept of the corrupt state, in the words of one commentator, "includes all sorts of license and violence, great inequalities of wealth and power, the destruction of peace and justice, the growth of disorderly ambition, disunion, lawlessness, dishonesty, and contempt for religion."[61] Modern equivalents of the classical corrupt society are Kornhauser's theory of the mass society (where, in the absence of institutions, elites are accessible to masses and masses are available for

[57] For comments on the short time lag between independence and the first coup, see Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Military in Middle Eastern Society and Politics," in Sydney N. Fisher, ed., *The Military in the Middle East: Problems in Society and Government* (Columbus, Ohio, 1963), 10.

[58] See, in general, *The Republic*, Book VIII, and especially the description of the despotic regime (Cornford trans., New York 1945), 291-93.

[59] Perhaps the closest contemporary model comes not from a social scientist but from a novelist: William Golding. The schoolboys (newly independent elites) of *The Lord of the Flies* initially attempt to imitate the behavior patterns of adults (former Western rulers). Discipline and consensus, however, disintegrate. A demagogic military leader and his followers gain or coerce the support of a majority. The symbol of authority (the conch) is broken. The voices of responsibility (Ralph) and reason (Piggy) are deserted and harassed, and reason is destroyed. In the end, the naval officer (British Marine Commandos) arrives just in time to save Ralph (Nyerere) from the "hunters" (mutinous troops).

[60] *Politics*, 112.

[61] George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Thought* (rev. edn., New York 1950), 343.

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mobilization by the elite) and Rapoport's concept of the praetorian state where "private ambitions are rarely restrained by a sense of public authority; [and] the role of power (i.e., wealth and force) is maximized."[62] Typical of the corrupt, praetorian, or mass societies is the violent oscillation between extreme democracy and tyranny. "Where the pre-established political authority is highly autocratic," says Kornhauser, "rapid and violent displacement of that authority by a democratic regime is highly favorable to the emergence of extremist mass movements that tend to transform the new democracy in anti-democratic directions."[63] Aristotle and Plato saw despotism emerging out of the extremes of mob rule. Rapoport finds in Gibbon an apt summary of the constitutional rhythms of the praetorian state, which "floats between the extremes of absolute monarchy and wild democracy."[64] Such instability is the hallmark of a society where mobilization has outrun institutionalization.

IV. Strategies of Institutional Development

If decay of political institutions is a widespread phenomenon in the "developing" countries and if a major cause of this decay is the high rate of social mobilization, it behooves us, as social scientists, to call a spade a spade and to incorporate these tendencies into any general model of political change which we employ to understand the politics of these areas. If effective political institutions are necessary for stable and eventually democratic government and if they are also a precondition of sustained economic growth, it behooves us, as policy analysts, to suggest strategies of institutional development. In doing this, we should recognize two general considerations affecting probabilities of success in institution-building.

First, the psychological and cultural characteristics of peoples differ markedly and with them their abilities at developing political institutions. Where age-old patterns of thought and behavior have to be changed, quite obviously the creation of political institutions is a far more difficult task than otherwise. "The Tokugawa Japanese could not, as did the Chinese, put family above government," one expert

[62] Kornhauser, *Politics of Mass Society, passim*; David C. Rapoport, "Praetorianism: Government Without Consensus" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley 1959); and Rapoport in Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, 72, where the quotation occurs.

[63] Kornhauser, *Politics of Mass Society*, 125.

[64] Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (New York 1899), 1, 235, quoted by Rapoport in Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, 98.

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has observed. "The samurai was expected to be loyal to his official superior first, his family second. In mores generally the primacy of the organization over the person was constantly reiterated."[65] This difference in Japanese and Chinese attitudes toward authority undoubtedly accounts in part for their differences in modernization and development. The Japanese peacefully and smoothly created new political institutions and amalgamated them with old ones. The weakness of traditional Chinese political institutions, on the other hand, led to forty years of revolution and civil war before modern political institutions could be developed and extended throughout Chinese society.

Second, the potentialities for institution-building differ markedly from society to society, but in all societies political organizations can be built. Institutions result from the slow interaction of conscious effort and existing culture. Organizations, however, are the product of conscious, purposeful effort. The forms of this effort may vary from a Meiji Restoration to a Communist Revolution. But in each case a distinct group of identifiable people set about adapting old organizations or building new ones. "Nation-building" has recently become a popular subject, and doubts have been raised about whether nations can be "built."[66] These doubts have a fairly solid basis. Nations are one type of social force, and historically they have emerged over long periods of time. Organization-building, however, differs from nation-building. Political organizations require time for development, but they do not require as much time as national communities. Indeed, most of those who speak of nation-building in such places as tropical Africa see organization-building as the first step in this process. Political parties have to be welded out of tribal groups; the parties create governments; and the governments may, eventually, bring into existence nations. Many of the doubts which people have about the possibilities of nation-building do not apply to organization-building.

Given our hypotheses about the relation of social mobilization to institutionalization, there are two obvious methods of furthering institutional development. First, anything which slows social mobilization presumably creates conditions more favorable to the preservation and strengthening of institutions. Secondly, strategies can be developed and applied directly to the problem of institution-building.

[65] John Whitney Hall, "The Nature of Traditional Society: Japan," in Ward and Rustow, eds., *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, 19.

[66] See Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, eds., *Nation-Building* (New York 1963), *passim*, but especially the contributions of Joseph R. Strayer and Carl J. Friedrich.

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SLOWING MOBILIZATION

Social mobilization can be moderated in many ways. Three methods are: to increase the complexity of social structure; to limit or reduce communications in society; and to minimize competition among segments of the political elite.[67]

In general, the more highly stratified a society is and the more complicated its social structure, the more gradual is the process of political mobilization. The divisions between class and class, occupation and occupation, rural and urban, constitute a series of breakwaters which divide the society and permit the political mobilization of one group at a time. On the other hand, a highly homogeneous society, or a society which has only a single horizontal line of division between an oligarchy that has everything and a peasantry that has nothing, or a society which is divided not horizontally but vertically into ethnic and communal groups, has more difficulty moderating the process of mobilization. Thus, mobilization should be slower in India than in the new African states where horizontal divisions are weak and tribal divisions strong, or in those Latin American countries where the middle strata are weak and a small oligarchy confronts a peasant mass. A society with many horizontal divisions gains through the slower entry of social groups into politics. It may, however, also lose something in that political organizations, when they do develop, may form along class and stratum lines and thus lack the autonomy of more broadly based political organizations. Political parties in countries like Chile and Sweden have been largely the spokesmen for distinct classes; caste associations seem destined to play a significant role in Indian politics. The disruptive effects of political organizations identified with social strata may be reduced if other political institutions exist which appeal to loyalties across class or caste lines. In Sweden, loyalty to the monarchy and the Riksdag mitigates the effects of class-based parties, and in India the caste associations must, in general, seek their goals within the much more extensive framework of the Congress Party. In most societies, the social structure must be largely accepted as given. Where it is subject to governmental manipulation and influence, mobilization

[67] These are not, of course, the only ways of slowing mobilization. Myron Weiner, for instance, has suggested that one practical method is "localization": channeling political interests and activity away from the great issues of national politics to the more immediate and concrete problems of the village and community. This is certainly one motive behind both community development programs and "basic democracies."

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will be slowed by government policies which enhance the complexity of social stratification.

The communications network of a society is undoubtedly much more subject to governmental influence. Rapid gains in some of the most desired areas of modernization—such as mass media exposure, literacy, and education—may have to be purchased at the price of severe losses in political stability. This is not to argue that political institutionalization as a value should take precedence over all others: if this were the case, modernization would never be good. It is simply to argue that governments must balance the values won through rapid increases in communications against the values jeopardized by losses in political stability. Thus, governmental policies may be wisely directed to reducing the number of university graduates, particularly those with skills which are not in demand in the society. Students and unemployed university graduates have been a concern common to the nationalistic military regime in South Korea, the socialist military regime in Burma, and the traditional military regime in Thailand. The efforts by General Ne Win in Burma to cut back the number of university graduates may well be imitated by other governments facing similar challenges. Much has been made of the problems caused by the extension of the suffrage to large numbers of illiterates. But limited political participation by illiterates may well, as in India, be less dangerous to political institutions than participation by literates. The latter typically have higher aspirations and make more demands on government. Political participation by illiterates, moreover, is more likely to remain limited, whereas participation by literates is much more likely to snowball with potentially disastrous effects on political stability. A governing elite may also affect the intensity of communications and the rate of political mobilization by its policies on economic development. Large, isolated factories, as Kornhauser has shown, are more likely to give rise to extremist movements than smaller plants more closely integrated into the surrounding community.[68] Self-interest in political survival may lead governing elites to decrease the priority of rapid economic change.

The uncontrolled mobilization of people into politics is also slowed by minimizing the competition among political elites. Hence mobilization is likely to have less disturbing effects on political institutions in one-party systems than in two-party or multiparty systems. In many new states and modernizing countries, a vast gap exists between the modernized elite and the tradition-oriented mass. If the elite di-

[68] Kornhauser, *Politics of Mass Society*, 150-58.

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vides against itself, its factions appeal to the masses for support. This produces rapid mobilization of the masses into politics at the same time that it destroys whatever consensus previously existed among the politically active on the need for modernization. Mobilization frequently means the mobilization of tradition; modern politics become the vehicle of traditional purposes. In Burma during the first part of this century, the "general pattern was one in which the modernizers first fell out among themselves whenever they were confronted with demanding choices of policy, and then tended to seek support from among the more traditional elements, which in time gained the ascendency."[69] In Turkey a rough balance between the mobilization of people into politics and the development of political institutions existed so long as the Republican People's Party retained a political monopoly. The conscious decision to permit an opposition party, however, broadened the scope of political competition beyond the urban, Westernized elite. The Democratic Party mobilized the peasants into politics, strengthened the forces of traditionalism, and broke the previous consensus. This led the party leaders to attempt to maintain themselves in power through semilegal means and to induce the army to join them in suppressing the Republican opposition. The army, however, was committed to modernization and seized power in a *coup d'état*, dissolving the Democratic Party and executing many of its top leaders. In due course, the military withdrew from direct conduct of the government, and democratic elections led to a multiparty system in which no party has a clear majority. Thus from a relatively stable one-party system, Turkey passed through a brief two-party era to military rule and a multiparty system: the familiar syndrome of states where mobilization has outrun institutionalization. In the process, not only were political institutions weakened, but the traditional-minded were brought into politics in such a way as to create obstacles to the achievement of many modernizing goals.

CREATING INSTITUTIONS

"Dans la naissance des sociétés ce sont les chefs des républiques qui font l'institution; et c'est ensuite l'institution qui forme les chefs des républiques," said Montesquieu.[70] But in the contemporary world, political leaders prefer modernization to institution-building, and no matter who leads modernization, the process itself generates con-

[69] Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building*, 114.

[70] Charles de Secondat, Baron Montesquieu, *Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des romains et de leur décadence*, in *Oeuvres*, I (Paris 1828), 119-20.

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flicting demands and inducements which obstruct the growth of political institutions. Where modernization is undertaken by traditional leaders working through traditional political institutions, the efforts of the traditional leaders to reform can unleash and stimulate social forces which threaten the traditional political institutions. Traditional leaders can modernize and reform their realms, but, where substantial social elements oppose reform, they have yet to demonstrate they can put through reforms without undermining the institutions through which they are working. The problem is: how can the traditional political institutions be adapted to accommodate the social forces unleashed by modernization? Historically, except for Japan, traditional political institutions have been adapted to the modern world only where a high degree of political centralization was not required for modernization and where traditional (i.e., feudal) representative institutions retained their vitality (as in Great Britain and Sweden). If modernization requires the centralization of power in a "reform monarch" or "revolutionary emperor," it means the weakening or destruction of whatever traditional representative institutions may exist and thus complicates still further the assimilation of those social forces created by modernization. The concentration of power also makes the traditional regime (like the eighteenth-century French monarchy) more vulnerable to forcible overthrow. *The vulnerability of a traditional regime to revolution varies directly with the capability of the regime for modernization.* For traditional rulers, the imperatives of modernization conflict with the imperatives of institution-building.

If the traditional political institutions are weak, or if they have been displaced and suppressed during periods of colonial rule, adaptation is impossible. In societies which have undergone colonial rule, incubation can serve as a substitute for adaptation. Unfortunately, the opportunity for incubation was missed in most colonial societies, with a few prominent exceptions such as India and the Philippines. Incubation requires a colonial administration which is willing to permit and *to contend with* a nationalist movement for many years, thus furnishing the time, the struggle, and the slowly increasing responsibility which are the ingredients of institution-building. In general, however, colonial powers tend to postpone incubation for as long as possible and then, when they see independence as inevitable, to bring it about as quickly as possible. Consequently, most of the states which became independent in the 1950's and 1960's had little opportunity to incubate political institutions while still under colonial tutelage.

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Where traditional political institutions are weak, or collapse, or are overthrown, authority frequently comes to rest with charismatic leaders who attempt to bridge the gap between tradition and modernity by a highly personal appeal. To the extent that these leaders are able to concentrate power in themselves, it might be supposed that they would be in a position to push institutional development and to perform the role of "Great Legislator" or "Founding Father." The reform of corrupt states or the creation of new ones, Machiavelli argued, must be the work of one man alone. A conflict exists, however, between the interests of the individual and the interests of institutionalization. Institutionalization of power means the limitation of power which might otherwise be wielded personally and arbitrarily. The would-be institution-builder needs personal power to create institutions but he cannot create institutions without relinquishing personal power. Resolving this dilemma is not easy. It can be done only by leaders who combine rare political skill and rare devotion to purpose. It was done by Mustafa Kemal who, for almost two decades, managed to maintain his own personal power, to push through major modernizing reforms, and to create a political institution to carry on the government after his death. Atatürk has been a conscious model for many contemporary modernizing leaders, but few, if any, seem likely to duplicate his achievement.

The military junta or military dictatorship is another type of regime common in modernizing countries. It too confronts a distinct set of problems in the conflict between its own impulses to modernization and the needs of institution-building. The military officers who seize power in a modernizing country frequently do so in reaction to the "chaos," "stalemate," "corruption," and "reactionary" character of the civilian regimes which preceded them. The officers are usually passionately devoted to measures of social reform, particularly those which benefit the peasantry (whose interests have frequently been overlooked by the anterior civilian regime). A rationalistic approach to societal problems often makes the officers modernizers par excellence. At the same time, however, they are frequently indifferent or hostile to the needs of political institution-building. The military typically assert that they have taken over the government only temporarily until conditions can be "cleaned up" and authority restored to a purified civilian regime. The officers thus confront an organizational dilemma. They can eliminate or exclude from politics individual civilian politicians, but they are ill-prepared to make fundamental changes in political processes and institutions. If they turn back power to the

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civilians, the same conditions to which they originally objected tend to reappear (Burma). If they attempt to restore civilian government and to continue in power as a civilian political group (Turkey, South Korea), they open themselves to these same corrupting influences and may pave the way for a second military takeover by a younger generation of colonels who purge the civilianized generals, just as the generals had earlier purged the civilians. Finally, if the military leaders retain power indefinitely, they need to create authoritative political organizations which legitimize and institutionalize their power. Concern with their own personal authority and unfamiliarity with the needs of political institution-building create problems in the fulfillment of this task. It is still too early to say for certain what sort of authoritative political institutions, if any, will be produced by regimes led by military officers such as Nasser and Ayub Khan.

THE PRIMACY OF PARTY

Charismatic leaders and military chiefs have thus had little success in building modern political institutions. The reason lies in the nature of modern politics. In the absence of traditional political institutions, the only modern organization which can become a source of authority and which can be effectively institutionalized is the political party. *The importance of the political party in providing legitimacy and stability in a modernizing political system varies inversely with the institutional inheritance of the system from traditional society.* Traditional systems do not have political parties. Unlike bureaucracy, the party is a distinctly modern form of political organization. Where traditional political institutions (such as monarchies and feudal parliaments) are carried over into the modern era, parties play secondary, supplementary roles in the political system. The other institutions are the primary source of continuity and legitimacy. Parties typically originate within the legislatures and then gradually extend themselves into society. They adapt themselves to the existing framework of the political system and typically reflect in their own operations the organizational and procedural principles embodied in that system. They broaden participation in the traditional institutions, thus adapting those institutions to the requirements of the modern polity. They help make the traditional institutions legitimate in terms of popular sovereignty, but they are not themselves a source of legitimacy. Their own legitimacy derives from the contributions they make to the political system.

Where traditional political institutions collapse or are weak or non-

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existent, the role of the party is entirely different from what it is in those polities with institutional continuity. In such situations, strong party organization is the only long-run alternative to the instability of a corrupt or praetorian or mass society. The party is not just a supplementary organization; it is instead the source of legitimacy and authority. In the absence of traditional sources of legitimacy, legitimacy is sought in ideology, charisma, popular sovereignty. To be lasting, each of these principles of legitimacy must be embodied in a party. Instead of the party reflecting the state, the state becomes the creation of the party and the instrument of the party. The actions of government are legitimate to the extent that they reflect the will of the party. The party is the source of legitimacy because it is the institutional embodiment of national sovereignty, the popular will, or the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Where traditional political institutions are weak or non-existent, the prerequisite of stability is at least one highly institutionalized political party. States with one such party are markedly more stable than states which lack such a party. States with no parties or many weak parties are the least stable. Where traditional political institutions are smashed by revolution, post-revolutionary order depends on the emergence of one strong party: witness the otherwise very different histories of the Chinese, Mexican, Russian, and Turkish revolutions. Where new states emerge from colonialism with one strong party, the problem is to maintain the strength of that party. In many African countries the nationalist party was the single important modern organization to exist before independence. The party "was generally well organized. The conditions of the political struggle and the dedication of the top elite to the party as the prime instrument of political change led the elite to give the major portion of their energies and resources to building a solid, responsive organization capable of disciplined action in response to directives from the top and able to ferret out and exploit feelings of dissatisfaction among the masses for political ends."[71] After independence, however, the dominant political party is often weakened by the many competing demands on organizational resources. A marked dispersion of resources means a decline in the overall level of political institutionalization. "Talents that once were available for the crucial work of party organization," one observer has warned, "may now be preoccupied with running a ministry or government bureau. . . . Unless new sources of loyal organizational

[71] William J. Foltz, "Building the Newest Nations: Short-Run Strategies and Long-Run Problems," in Deutsch and Foltz, eds., *Nation-Building*, 121.

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and administrative talents can be found immediately, the party's organization—and, therefore, the major link between the regime and the masses—is likely to be weakened."[72]

The need for concentration applies not only to the allocation of resources among types of organizations but also to the scope of organization. In many modernizing countries, the political leaders attempt too much too fast; they try to build mass organizations when they should concentrate on elite organizations. Organizations do not have to be large to be effective and to play a crucial role in the political process: the Bolshevik Party in 1917 is one example; the Indian Civil Service (which numbered only 1,157 men at independence) is another. Overextension of one's resources in organization-building is as dangerous as overextension of one's troops in a military campaign. (The strategic hamlet program in South Vietnam is an example of both.) Concentration is a key principle of politics as well as strategy. The pressures for broad organizational support, however, seem to push towards the all-inclusive organization. In his efforts to create a political structure to bolster his military regime in Egypt, for instance, Nasser first created the Liberation Rally in 1953, which soon came to have from 5 to 6 million members. The organization was simply too big to be effective and to achieve its purpose. After the adoption of a new constitution in 1956, the Liberation Rally was replaced by the National Union, which was designed to be the school of the nation and also to be universal in membership (except for reactionaries). Again the organization was too broad to be effective. Hence in 1962, after the break with Syria, a new organization, the Arab Socialist Union, was organized with the advice of organizational and ideological experts from Yugoslavia. It was designed to be a more exclusive, more tightly organized body, its membership limited to 10 per cent of the population. Inevitably, however, it also mushroomed in size, and after two years it had 5 million members. In a fourth effort, early in 1964 President Nasser reportedly formed still another group limited to only 4,000 members and called the "Government Party," which would form the core of the Arab Socialist Union. The new organization was to be designed by Nasser "to enforce a peaceful transfer of power and a continuation of his policies if anything happens to him."[73] Whether this organization, unlike its predecessors, becomes an institution remains to be seen. Its likelihood of success depends upon its limitation in size.

[72] *Ibid.*, 123-24.
[73] *Washington Post*, February 9, 1964, p. A-17.

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American social scientists have devoted much attention to the competitiveness of political systems, devising various ways of measuring that competitiveness and classifying systems according to their degree of competitiveness.[74] The more parties which exist within a system, presumably the more competitive it is. Yet the proliferation of parties usually means the dispersion of organization and leadership talents and the existence of a large number of weak parties. If sufficient resources are available to support more than one well-organized party, this is all to the good. But most modernizing countries will be well off if they can create just one strong party organization. *In modernizing systems, party institutionalization usually varies inversely with party competitiveness.* Modernizing states with multiparty systems are much more unstable and prone to military intervention than modernizing states with one party, with one dominant party, or with two parties. The most unstable systems and those most prone to military

TABLE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF COUPS AND COUP ATTEMPTS IN MODERNIZING COUNTRIES SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Type of Political System	*Number of Countries*	*Countries with Coups*	
		Number	*Per cent*
Communist	3	0	0
One-party	18	2	11
One-party dominant	12	3	25
Two-party	11	5	45
Multiparty	22	15	68
No effective parties	17	14	83

SOURCE: Figures are somewhat revised and adapted from the similar table in Fred R. von der Mehden, *Politics of the Developing Nations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964), 65.

intervention are the multiparty systems and the no-party systems. The weak institutionalization of parties in the multiparty system makes that system extremely fragile. The step from many parties to no parties and from no parties to many parties is an easy one. In their institutional weakness, the no-party system and the multiparty system closely resemble each other.

[74] See James S. Coleman, in Almond and Coleman, eds., *Politics of the Developing Areas*, Conclusion; Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: Its Measurement and Social Correlates," in Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler, and Paul A. Smith, eds., *Politics and Social Life* (Boston 1963), 569-82; von der Mehden, *Politics of the Developing Nations*, 54-64.

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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND AMERICAN POLICY

The Bolshevik concept of the political party is directly relevant to modernizing countries. It provides a conscious and explicit answer to the problem of mobilization vs. institutionalization. The Communists actively attempt to expand political participation. At the same time they are the most energetic and intense contemporary students of de Tocqueville's "art of associating together." Their specialty is organization, their goal the mobilization of the masses into their organizations. For them mobilization and organization go hand in hand. "There are only two kinds of political tasks," a leading Chinese Communist theorist has said: "one is the task of propaganda and education, the other is the task of organization."[75] The party is initially a highly select group of those who have achieved the proper degree of revolutionary consciousness. It expands gradually as it is able to win the support and participation of others. Peripheral organizations and front groups provide an organizational ladder for the gradual mobilization and indoctrination of those who in due course become full-fledged party members. If the political struggle takes the form of revolutionary war, mobilization occurs on a gradual territorial basis as village after village shifts in status from hostile control to contested area to guerrilla area to base area. The theory is selective mobilization; the political involvement of masses who have not reached the proper level of revolutionary consciousness can only benefit reaction. The "opportunist" Menshevik, Lenin warned, "strives to proceed from the bottom upward, and, therefore, wherever possible and as far as possible, upholds autonomism and 'democracy'. . . ." The Bolshevik, on the other hand, "strives to proceed from the top downward, and upholds an extension of the rights and powers of the center in relation to the parts."[76]

Communist doctrine thus recognizes the need to balance mobilization and organization and stresses the party as the key to political stability. The American approach, on the other hand, tends to ignore the requirements of political organization and to deprecate the importance of party. American attitudes are rooted in the secondary, instrumental role of party in the American constitutional system. In addition, American distaste for politics leads to an emphasis on the

[75] Ai Ssu-chi, quoted in Frederick T. C. Yu, "Communications and Politics in Communist China," in Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development*, 261-62.
[76] V. I. Lenin, *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* (*The Crisis in Our Party*), in *Collected Works* (Fineberg and Jochel trans., London 1961), 396-97.

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output aspects of the political system. The stress, as Lucian Pye has pointed out, has been on the efficient administrator rather than the wily politician.[77] Aid missions advise governments on administrative organization and economic planning, but seldom do they advise political leaders on how to create a strong party. To meet the problems of interest aggregation, Americans have resorted to a variety of alternatives to political organization. Some Americans have urged that the military, as the strongest organization in many modernizing countries, should assume a major role in the responsibilities of government.[78] At times American policy has relied on individual political leaders, such as Magsaysay, Diem, or Ayub Khan. Alternatively, the American government has stressed adherence to particular structural forms, such as free elections.

All of these approaches are doomed to failure. Neither military juntas nor charismatic personalities nor free elections can be a long-term substitute for effective political organization. Charismatic leaders are reluctant to substitute party control for personal control. Military officers are usually even more explicitly anti-party. They contrast the venal party politics of the civilians with the honest devotion to the nation of the military. Military coups and military juntas may spur modernization, but they cannot produce a stable political order. Instead of relying on the military, American policy should be directed to the creation within modernizing countries of at least one strong non-Communist political party. If such a party already exists and is in a dominant position, support of that party should be the keystone of policy. Where political life is fragmented and many small parties exist, American backing should go to the strongest of the parties whose goals are compatible with ours. If it is a choice between a party and a personality, choose the party: better the Baath than Nasser. Where no parties exist and the government (whether traditional, military, or charismatic) is reasonably cooperative with the United States, American military, economic, and technical assistance should be conditioned upon the government's making efforts to develop a strong supporting party organization.

Several years ago Guy Pauker warned that "What is most urgently

[77] Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building*, 297-301; and Pye, "The Policy Implications of Social Change in Non-Western Societies" (M.I.T. Center for International Studies, Cambridge 1957, mimeo.), 69-80.

[78] Guy J. Pauker, "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade," *World Politics*, XI (April 1959), 325-45; Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in John J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton 1962), 69-90.

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needed in Southeast Asia today is organizational strength."[79] Organizational strength is also the most urgent need in southern Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Unless that need is met with American support, the alternatives in those areas remain a corrupt political system or a Communist one.

[79] Pauker, *World Politics*, XI, 343.

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PEOPLE AND POPULATION

By S. N. AFRIAT

THE human population is the base of human existence. This, when considered, seems an inescapable proposition. But in the minds of most men it must have an absurd remoteness. The process of population has seemed like primordial creation itself, hardly a thing to be touched by mere scruple. Beyond the scope of any deliberation, the peopling of the earth has, for mankind as a whole, remained unquestioned as the earth, an axiom behind which there was no going and from which all proceeded. But according to a relentless gathering of awareness, as witnessed in an abundance of recent writings, it appears that history has marched to a new point. The condition of the world is being modified by a constellation of emergencies, and any observation and reflection on them, any rough glance at the outlines of trends in the life of the world, points to the swelling flood of population as the central reality in every perspective on the future.

The astonishing statistics make a now familiar opening alarm in numerous reports on the "population explosion," and need no further repetition here. What has been pointed out especially is the appearance of another formidable curse in the world, of the order of the thermonuclear bomb. But another view is that here is a prompting, come in good time. As a parallel, the prize for successful confrontation of the existence of the bomb is ultimate military peace, a prize which would, so to speak, be the gift of the bomb—one which experience seems to suggest could not be given by any other authority. So also it can be proposed that the looming population crisis is a spur to greatly desired ends which mankind has not the fiber to approach otherwise. The confrontation of the population crisis provides the handle for taking hold of a complex of fundamental problems: it provides the compulsion and the cardinal point for approaching these problems as a whole. Without such a confrontation, it can be contended that there is no secure base for approaching these problems at all, because their entire ground is out of equilibrium in a fundamental respect.

It is in any case clear that, great as has been traditional complacency in the matter of population, this newly imposed uneasy questioning will now be undertaken with reluctance. It will bring into dispute the always accepted liberty of parenthood, where from the beginning there has existed an accord founded on general unconcern. Certainly there are codes which have had bearing on population, as we all know. But

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they look another way, and their interest has been with principles relating to circumstances of the act of reproduction, and not especially to the outcome, and, if anything, they have defended the growth of population. The tables may now be turned in a world as different from the old as is the geographer's globe from the flat which stretched apparently without limit round the ancients.

Among the elements of change in the world, any one of which is sufficient in itself to bring about a revolutionary transformation, certain things are outstanding: the attainment of the effective limit of destructiveness in the weapons of war; the automation of labor, with the possibility of massive replacement of individual human functions by efficient mechanical substitutes, with far-reaching consequences in every phase of life, along with the limitless advance of communications and data technology, and the advent of the computer; and the "population explosion." The response which is called for challenges the entire human race. In terms of problems and solutions, not only are answers hard to find; it is more particularly hard to know what are the proper questions. The scientific and statistical studies to which the enquirer easily makes recourse, and hopes to find nice objectivities, do not suffice. The realm of values is exposed—the realm we like best to leave alone, where practical reason itself has an essential point of departure. But it is certain that, as there is a general human will to survive and to pursue the values of life, these questions in all their difficult intricacies and profundities will have to be explored, with all the curiosity and pain that is inevitable in so vast and uneasy an enquiry.

As with an infant, so with the progress of the race, at first there are only immediacies, and there are no questions. But as growth leads into the world, touching further boundaries and making for new relativities, existing equilibrium is continually lost in emergencies, and it is continually regained only through new knowledge and adaptation, in laws and devices which are increasingly indirect in their cause. In the moral sphere, the focus is usually not so much on the rational ground of a necessity, as on a principle which is traditionally taught, and has authority for the molding of habitual behavior, and may be reinforced by the contingencies and incentives which come from experience. However such principles originate and are maintained, they are a germ for the pattern of life, and they have inertia through generations. So far as procreation is concerned, as with morals for the general form and conduct of life, humanity is hardly out of primordial mother's arms. But the moment has come to go to school, or there can be no welcome for a new age. Primers for study include several

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recent works that touch aspects of the population matter.[1] They signal the kind of intensive attention that the question needs, the enlargement of thought that has to be persevered with and brought uppermost in the world's intelligence. As the title of one indicates, there is a dilemma. But the nature of the dilemma is not altogether explained. A certain dilemma does, however, appear when the gathering of evidence and opinion on negative effects of the "explosion," in three of the volumes, is brought together with the view, set out in the fourth, that massive population is the decisive source of great national power. This now is a doubtful view. But almost every facet of the subject is penetrated by controversy. It is impossible to encompass in a simple statement the material in these volumes, with their many expert contributors, each dealing diversely with various facets of the subject, and making together something of an explosion of contribution to the great complexity of the matter. There is an impressive number of fingers in the population pie; economic, political, religious, military, medical, eugenic, cultural, educational, and so forth, with no clear limit. Whatever confrontation is going to be made to the problem will give an underpinning to the whole future existence of the human race, and the labor of this confrontation must certainly be one of the greatest intellectual and imaginative undertakings. The goal is convergence on a single resolve which is inherent in the situation. If a true dilemma does exist, if no such resolution can be reached, then the future is inevitably a hopeless surrender to overmastering forces which, it seems, must carry away the things valued and pursued throughout ages.

There can be no submission to such a dissolution as a fatal inevitability. A focus on the process of population in its details and intricacies, such as is presented in the volumes which have been mentioned, is essential to enliven the consciousness. But when consciousness is roused, the approach cannot be made so much by expert factual and statistical exposition as in a realm of primitive essences. For the complexity is part of an intellectual entrenchment. But with the achievement of awareness, it can fall away and leave a quite childish picture of the matter. Such is all that is wanted, and all that is fitting, and only a simple formula could make its way. Perhaps in another age, given the configuration of circumstances, an old man, in a cloud and on a

[1] Philip M. Hauser, ed., *The Population Dilemma* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963); Stuart Mudd, ed., *The Population Crisis and the Use of World Resources* (Bloomington, Ind., 1964); Katherine Organski and A. F. K. Organski, *Population and World Power* (New York 1961); and Melvin G. Shimm, ed., *Population Control: The Imminent World Crisis* (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 1961).

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mountain, surreptitiously chiseling stone, might have pulled it off. For the kind of restraint which must be entertained is not to be imposed, and perhaps capriciously played with by an arbitrary external authority, but a principle in process and in the historic moment of emerging with an innate validity.

A principle will be lost if it is not self-imposed and self-regenerating, by its own necessity. Such is the case with restraint on theft and murder. It is not dictated by a central authority; but it is in the fabric of every existing society. While it represents a tyranny over free impulse, at the same time it makes for liberation from a compulsive, absorbing involvement in threats from such impulses at large. It is a privation which is supported by virtue of a rewarding advantage, turning effort away from self-consuming exercise, such as preoccupied the proverbial caveman with his celebrated club, toward advantageous modes of endeavor. Civilization has advanced in that way, by the suppression and at the same time by the release—in other words, the containment—of fundamental modes of aggression. Aggression is inseparable from life: not much could happen without it. So there can certainly be no complete suppression of it, only its transformation, by restraint and compensating release. The suppression of aggression by theft and murder has been necessary to advance society, even an advancement demanded by competitive need; those societies have undergone subjugation or dissolution which did not achieve such suppression. What could be effectively emerging into recognition is that the same is true of aggression that takes place by a reproductive process which is multiplicative—that is, which exceeds replacement. Once this excess was not self-destructive, but was a means of confronting destructive threats from nature and man. But the raw impact of nature has receded greatly, and man, with his works and immediate presence, crowds around. He himself bears in self-attrition the brunt of this excess.

This is an inward edge to the matter, but there is another outer edge, where the reference is world-wide, giving the matter a comprehensive scope. For the question of population inwardly touches a society's direct self-interest, and outwardly it touches forces of turbulence at large in the world. There is the completely explosive condition of the world, based on the unrest of miserable populations, vulnerable to the aggression which takes place by subversion, which has misery as the lever, and all this joined with the peculiar nature of existing armaments—concerning which no comment is needed, given the vivid and familiar picture furnished by sophisticated experts of thermonuclear war. Men always ask for material welfare and secure peace, and

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make continual reference to freedom. Disarmament is proposed merely because armaments are now at the extreme of destructiveness. But there must be a price: so what is it, and where is the readiness to pay it? It may turn out to be a bargain, as apparently was felt to be the case with theft and murder. Certain modes of conduct, relished in one age, become completely foreign in another. These days cannibalism is almost entirely eradicated from our impulses: our detachment is so fine that we even look upon it with amusement, though at one time its surrender may have seemed to exact an unpleasant price. By the same token, in future days restraint on parenthood may become entirely accepted, even though today it may look like a taxation on natural rights against which many will rebel. Humanity is plastic and, given the temperature, takes the shape of the vessel into which it flows, as is shown in every facet of civilization. But a vessel need not be a prison; what is wanted is a confinement which is also a vehicle of escape.

To the need for welfare and disarmament, there seems no reply in the present order. We have found that welfare gained in one dimension is eroded in another. The machine, which was to be a servant, is more like a master. Or rather, as we have attempted to absorb the machine, it has absorbed us as parts in its functioning, permitting small tolerance in its demanding efficiencies. We have been brought to subservience by force of competition, and are spurred by the terror of replacement which must be the dread of every spare part—a dread which must increase precariously as unbridled population increase demolishes the ground of individual right and dignity. Again, in the efforts to bring abundance to destitute populations, any gains are rapidly diluted by numerical increase. Such are the crudest indications of tantalizing defects, sustained by both rich and poor. As for disarmament, it is impossible in the present order. The world disarmed would be like a knife standing on its edge: the slightest breath would make it fall over.

With such insoluble problems of need, the only course is not to hold them inch by inch as they force the pace, but to cut through to a position in which they are not resolved, but dissolved. A definite position which can be held is that restraint on parenthood, as a universal principle, is the keystone for an order in which these basic problems can be dissolved; moreover, an order in which liberty would have a new amplitude of realization, and some notion of brotherhood, which is essential to man, could be more than an incanted phrase. It could become a general essence in conduct, an influence which would elicit that

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more agreeable nature which is potential in humanity, and allow to fade those familiar barbarities which, perhaps splendid in another setting, in the circumstances and possibilities of the age are only a tedium. The destructive bomb, and the finiteness of the earth, have been in the historic distance, a threshold which must sooner or later be approached. But that threshold has now come into view, bringing the moment of truth. It is time to regather an obsolete order of things into a new shape, not by violence, but, on the contrary, by an unexcessive restraint whose burden and great advantage all would share.

This restraint cannot be achieved merely by pointing to alarming statistics and spreading news about techniques of birth control. People do not seem to concern themselves much with a distant threat, particularly if it is universally shared. Or, if they do, the threat is allayed by some distant hope—though in this case, if it is not an absurd hope like colonization of the planets, it is hard to find. The restraint has to be instituted within an encompassing perspective—the hardening of which is the essential endeavor—and by a definite principle the necessity of which is abundantly clear, as is generally the case with murder and theft. Such a principle is available: it is merely that to replace oneself is a right, a liberty without infringement; but to exceed replacement is a crime, a failing in regard to mankind as a whole, having the nature of an aggression which, if universally practiced (like the burning of coal fires in fog-bound London), brings universal loss. To gloss over simple difficulties in human arithmetic, parenthood by each individual of two children, on the average, is replacement; but parenthood of three amounts to a rapid increase, which will eventually have to be curtailed by destruction. There appears to be a choice: are children to be brought into the world, haphazardly, to contend with each other for a place to live, and be brutalized by crude struggle and valueless demands to the extinction of innocent and valuable aspirations, and in the mass often to be regimented for violence; or are they to enter in the liberty of acceptance in a kind of general family? The earth needs to be cultivated rather than consumed, and there is only dissolution in the haste and pressure of population advance.

Such a principle of restrained parenthood has as one important corollary the containment of population. It would not be a revolution in the sense of direct violence done to institutions. Nevertheless it would have revolutionary effects. But, besides the most tangible realities, such as make for popular anxiety about the "explosion" of popu-

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lation, or of bombs, it would touch far-reaching complexes of change which would be more in the sphere of evolution than of revolution.

Both explosions, of population and of bombs, in any case facets in a general explosion of imperfectly assimilated knowledge, give a good forward perspective. Without them, the age-old floundering between atrocities in war and extremities of tyranny and injustice in peace would, it must seem, drag on endlessly, and be accepted as part of a "natural" order—however fine may become the knowledge of order, as such. But that drag now has a visible end which must bring about a certain arrest. At least the turbulence may be elevated to a new sphere, which can be the stage for all kinds of drama, but without the likelihood of bringing about the dissolution or the total destruction of all inheritance. Though he will never become peaceful, the military pacification of man is bound to become a commonplace. Swords, no doubt, will be transmuted into scientific axes and metaphysical thorns, and applied to terrible argument.

Capability for war is itself in process of forcing military peace, in some form or other; and the process must certainly be completed, because the thermonuclear bomb, whether or not it is usable, is not the end of military technology. But military peace is no culmination of value. With life, always thrown on as it is, ever out of equilibrium, there must always be some kind of assault; and the enthusiasm for it is inborn in man. But the generalization of struggle and assault, beyond mere physical assertion, is a peculiar attribute of man, a great distinction, which can even be an essential definition. However, the old, now abortive modes of aggression could not be abandoned voluntarily, but from an extremity of necessity such as now exists. The bird did not take to flight out of love of the air, of which it had slight experience, but out of a fearful respect for the ground.

Economic need is often considered primary. In a mere quantitative aspect it provides a basic motive, the manipulation of which is a coercive measure inferior only to military force. With a stable population, coupled with the automation of labor, every kind of economic provision would come so amply within the bounds of resource and technique that the quantitative factor of need must dwindle to insignificance. The slackened traces of brute economic necessity would leave further pursuits unencumbered. The paradox that scientific advance has created conditions for a new bondage, instead of realizing the hope of a new vista for freedom and growth, could thus have a chance of being resolved; and also perhaps one of the main points for the gathering of tensions would have been removed.

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From population pressure many other pressures stem. Obviously there are pressures on every kind of limited resource. From their intensification and the heightening of the scramble after needs, there results a destabilization which will bring about crises of aggression. Population pressure can be the basis of imminent violence and cruelty, outwardly in the form of war, and inwardly in the texture of the life of the society. But in addition to the very tangible effects of population increase, such as a loss of physical space and resource, and perhaps even dignity, there are other effects which are just as important but more difficult to identify. It could be suggested, for instance, that there is a loss of psychological space. There is an invisible but heavy hand which brings about a psychological confinement. To elaborate on such a notion is important, but the propositions that can be found are, by their nature, only more speculative. However, the peculiar tyrannies that can be born within teeming populations must be at the heart of the interest in the "explosion."

One fundamental handicap of an exploding population is that the processes of education as we know them now will not suffice. Intensive, massive competition among unlimited candidates for limited opportunities makes for a narrowing of margins, and subordination to an ever more limited expediency. Education has become something like a military training program in preparation for an assault, which, once the strategic position is gained, can be abandoned. It is destroyed as a value continuous with the general on-going of life. But mental life is the one distinctive human attribute. It carries within it the source, and even the essential meaning, of liberty. To limit its cultivation to the gross functions imposed by competition is a significant step towards the atrophy which is the condition for tyranny. To make for liberty, a sense of play must be given rein and allowed to grow. It is the sense of play, and the capacity for pleasure, that is the index of culture in a community. Play is at the bottom of growth and originality; it is in the mode of creation. The vast multiplication of like things, as in industry, or college, or population, is not the same as creation. Perhaps in a future age, assuming that mankind emerges from the crisis of the present time, the mania for material production which is a modern predicament will be looked upon as a crippling disorder, just as we now look upon the frenzies of other ages past. Demands on energy and every resource need to be kept within bounds, lest in the overwhelming tension, gross expediency will gain the upper hand and with continual weakening the whole familiar edifice of value will drift away in a deluge of millions and billions of people, to leave a

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process of life which could hardly be called human. When Noah builds his ark again, perhaps he will be less scrupulous in taking his passengers two by two.

An actor needs a stage, a fluid has its vessel, space requires coordinates, and so forth. Nothing exists without its form. To have form, and therefore to be limited, is the price of existence. The extremity of liberty is not to exist at all. But here it is no fine philosophical matter, but an urgent choice. The preachers of nothing but liberty need to be more explicit. To many, an absolute restraint on parenthood, in the sense of a right to replication, but not to multiplication, will seem intolerable. But it can be contended that now in the scales of choice is the private freedom of parenthood against the very existence of the race. This is a contention which can call for much exploration, which can be strongly defended, and which can also always be doubted. In fact, it would seem to be a dilemma. But every child, it has to be seen, is also the world's child; for two parents to have two offspring should make for no privation, if that is the case.

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U.S. BUSINESS INTERESTS IN CUBA AND THE RISE OF CASTRO

By LELAND L. JOHNSON*

PRIVATE investment in Latin America by citizens of the United States, as well as in other less-developed areas of the world, is widely regarded as a valuable—if not an indispensable—component of the overall U.S. foreign assistance program. By quickly identifying and exploring promising new business opportunities, and by providing financial resources and human skills required to translate them into going ventures, U.S. investment activities can make a vital contribution to economic development. Recognizing the role of private investment in furthering its national interests, the U.S. government has for a number of years sought to promote the flow of new investment: a rapidly growing investment guarantee program, direct government loans to eligible private investors, and investment information services are some of the instruments employed by the government in pursuing this objective. To provide additional incentives, a bill currently before Congress stipulates that U.S. investors making certain kinds of new investments in eligible, less-developed countries would be permitted to deduct 30 per cent of the cost of the investment from their total federal income-tax obligations.

At the same time, in terms of furthering U.S. national interests, it is not enough to show that these business activities contribute to economic development. It is well known by now that no necessary causal relationship exists between economic development and the emergence of responsible political regimes friendly to the United States and responsive to the collective will of the governed. Even if the economic benefits of foreign private investment in host countries are large, the way the total gains are distributed between foreign private investors and host countries can give rise to serious conflict that may embroil the U.S. government as well. And even if aggregate benefits are large, the *kind* of economic development that emerges may or may not satisfy the rising nationalistic pressures in host countries. It makes a difference whether foreign investment serves to diversify the economic base of the host country, or serves to increase concentration on one or a few

* Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors.

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export products upon which the economy is judged to be already overdependent. It makes a difference whether the investment becomes identified in the eyes of the populace with unpopular, repressive economic, political, and social institutions, or whether it becomes identified with progressive, if not revolutionary, elements.

A worrisome aspect is that, despite its economic contributions, U.S. private capital is a source of resentment, conflict, and distrust in many areas of Latin America, and this situation is being exploited by extreme left-wing political groups. Unfortunately, we do not have a clear idea of how serious and deep-rooted is the local reaction to U.S. investment or to what extent the situation does pose a threat to our national interests. Nor do we have a clear notion about how private investment should be guided in the future to mitigate these negative side-effects.

To gain insight into some of these problems, we shall explore in this article the role that the large volume of U.S. investment in Cuba may have played in helping to shape political relations between the United States and Cuba during Fidel Castro's early years in power. Because of the extreme nature of this case, it cannot be used to generalize directly about the economic-political consequences of foreign investment in the rest of Latin America. Nevertheless, this inquiry will serve to identify and shed light on several issues of general relevance with respect to relationships between private business activity and U.S. national interests.

I. The Magnitude and Composition of U.S. Private Investment in Cuba

When Castro came to power in 1959, the *total* book value of U.S. business enterprises in Cuba was greater than in any other Latin American country except Venezuela. Table 1 indicates that on a *per capita* basis, the book value of U.S. enterprises in Cuba was over three times the value for the rest of Latin America as a whole. With respect to direct investment flows and undistributed earnings[1] during the 10-year period 1950-1959, Cuba received well over twice as much per capita as the average for the other countries, as shown in Table 2.

[1] Direct investment flow is loosely defined to include the flow of equity and loan investments from U.S. residents to foreign firms controlled by U.S. interests. The book value of direct investment enterprises includes the U.S. ownership of equity capital, loan capital, branch accounts, and intercompany accounts in foreign firms controlled by U.S. interests. For more precise definitions and a treatment of methodology, see U.S. Department of Commerce, *U.S. Business Investments in Foreign Countries* (Washington, D.C., 1960), 76-85.

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TABLE 1. BOOK VALUE—U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT ENTERPRISES IN CUBA AND OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, 1959

Industry	*Cuba* (million $)	*Cuba* ($ per capita[b])	*Other Latin America*[a] (million $)	*Other Latin America*[a] ($ per capita[b])
Petroleum	147	22	2,715	15
Manufacturing	111	17	1,285	7
Trade	44	7	592	3
Public utilities	313	47	790	4
Mining and smelting	—[c]	—[c]	1,254	7
Other (primarily agriculture)	341	51	527	3
Total	956	143	7,163	39

[a] Excludes Western Hemisphere dependencies.
[b] Population figures for 1959 used in per capita computations.
[c] Not available separately; included in "other" industries.

Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, *U.S. Balance of Payments, Statistical Supplement* (rev. edn., Washington, D.C., 1963), 207; and United Nations, *Boletín Economico de América Latina* (New York, November 1960), 8.

TABLE 2. CUMULATIVE NET DIRECT INVESTMENT AND UNDISTRIBUTED CORPORATE EARNINGS, CUBA AND OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, 1950-1959

Industry	*Cuba* (million $)	*Cuba* ($ per capita[b])	*Other Latin America*[a] (million $)	*Other Latin America*[a] ($ per capita[b])
Petroleum	115	19	1,720	10
Manufacturing	56	9	1,250	7
Trade	26	4	494	3
Mining and smelting	—[c]	—[c]	759	4
Other (primarily agriculture)	202	33	359	2
Total	399	65	4,582	26

[a] Excludes Western Hemisphere dependencies.
[b] Population figures for 1950 used in per capita computations.
[c] Not available separately; included in "other" industries.

Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, *U.S. Balance of Payments, Statistical Supplement* (rev. edn., Washington, D.C., 1963), 178-207; and United Nations, *Boletín Economico de América Latina* (New York, November 1960), 8.

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Moreover, U.S.-owned firms were especially prominent in certain industries. According to a Department of Commerce survey in 1956: "The only foreign investments of importance are those of the United States. American participation exceeds 90 per cent of telephone and electric services, about 50 per cent in public service railways, and roughly 40 per cent in raw sugar production. The Cuban branches of United States banks are entrusted with almost one-fourth of all bank deposits. This intimate economic relationship is so much the outgrowth of mutually helpful association that many of the problems that have plagued less close relationships in other areas have largely been avoided in Cuba."[2]

U.S. investment in Cuba was far greater, both in total dollar and per capita terms, than was typical in the rest of Latin America. Moreover, Cuba enjoyed one of the highest per capita incomes in Latin America. Yet, Cuba is today a member of the Soviet Bloc. Questions immediately arise about the relationships between U.S. investment and this turn of events. What was Castro's professed attitude toward U.S. business enterprise in Cuba before he came to power? What was the role of U.S. business enterprise in shaping events after he assumed power? How did the presence of U.S. business enterprise affect the bargaining positions of Cuba and the United States during the crucial days of 1959 and 1960 when Cuba was moving rapidly toward the Soviet Bloc?

II. Cuba and the United States: 1959-1960

At the time that Castro came to power, after Batista fled Cuba on New Year's Day, 1959, the U.S. business community had little basis for regarding the turn of events with grave misgivings. Castro had not expressed open hostility either to the United States government or to private business interests. On the contrary, during the preceding two years, while he was leading the rebel forces against the Batista regime, he had gone to great lengths to gain sympathy and support from the United States. The considerate treatment of Americans who came into contact with the rebels, the frequent disclaimers of Communist association, and the public pronouncements about democracy, social justice, and economic reform couched in terms of Western tradition, all served to demonstrate a friendly attitude toward the United States. According to one press account of January 8, 1959: "American Ambassador Earl Smith describes the rebels as 'friendly and courteous,' surprisingly capable in preserving order among the populace and exhibiting not

[2] U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, *Investment in Cuba* (Washington, D.C., 1956), 10.

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the slightest anti-American sentiment. An American banker confesses: 'The way their troops have behaved so far certainly throws dust on the fear that they are a bunch of Communists.' Another Yankee businessman exclaims, 'They're just nice kids.' "[3]

At the same time, the business community did have some reason to feel uneasy and annoyed. Among other things, Castro had proclaimed in 1953 that under "revolutionary law" (1) workers would have "the right to share in thirty per cent of the profits of all the large industrial, commercial, and mining companies, including sugar mills," and (2) the telephone and electric utilities would be nationalized with "return to the people of the unlawful excess that they have been charged in their rates."[4] The manifesto of the July 26th movement had condemned the colonial mentality and domination of Cuba by foreign economic interests.[5] Moreover, the rioting, sabotage, and labor strikes during the campaign against Batista had worked to the detriment, at least in the short run, of some business interests. Ruby Hart Phillips reported in 1957: "American businessmen told me that I was contributing to the ruin of the economy by stories of the rebellion. Both American and Cuban businessmen were annoyed. With Cuba as prosperous and money so plentiful, they couldn't understand why anyone would support a revolution. They wanted Batista to crush the Fidel Castro rebellion so they could 'get on with business.' "[6]

In any event, U.S. investors perceived no compelling reason to retrench or pull out of Cuba. Although Castro had left-wing leanings, to be sure, it was not clear that they posed any serious threat to the conduct of business as usual. During 1959, companies went ahead with their investment plans: ironically, U.S. net direct investment of $63 million during that year was even larger than it had been in most of the years since World War II.

Even before the end of 1959 it became apparent that Castro was more hostile towards private investment than was believed earlier. The Cuban government installed "intervenors" to oversee the operations of several large U.S.-owned companies, including the Cuban Telephone

[3] *Wall Street Journal*, January 8, 1959.

[4] These statements are from Castro's "History Will Absolve Me" speech (October 6, 1953), as quoted in Jules Dubois, *Fidel Castro, Rebel—Liberator or Dictator?* (Indianapolis 1959), 70-71.

[5] The manifesto is reproduced in Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero, *La Revolución Cubana* (Mexico City, Escuela Nacional de Ciencias Politicas y Sociales, 1959). See p. 89 for the relevant passage.

[6] R. Hart Phillips, *Cuba, Island of Paradox* (New York 1959), 335-36.

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Company and the Compañía Cubana de Electricidad.[7] Reductions in telephone and electricity rates and extensions of service were quickly ordered. After passing the Agrarian Reform Law, the government seized lands producing tobacco, rice, and coffee—including large plantations owned by Americans and Cubans. The 20-year 4½ per cent bonds offered in payment came under protest by the U.S. government as not being "prompt, adequate, and effective compensation."[8] Under new mining and petroleum laws, most of the existing claims were canceled, additional taxes were imposed, and foreign companies began closing down.

Castro's public statements became increasingly bitter about "foreign vested interests" that, being injured by the turn of events, allegedly were trying to destroy the revolution.

> The Premier declared the Revolutionary Government was being accused of communism as a pretext, because foreign vested interests do not like the revolutionary law.
>
> "All the things we do, like reducing rent, distributing land to the peasants and growing rice injure foreign vested interests," he said.[9]

In February 1960, Ernesto Guevara, one of Castro's closest associates, challenged the worth of foreign investments: "We maintain the point of view that foreign investments in Cuba, as in all countries of Latin America, under the conditions on which they are made, constitute a great business for the investor, but a bad business for the country." Only a month later he charged: "Our hardest fight is against the North American monopolies. . . . Private foreign capital comes here only for profit and does nothing for the people of Cuba."[10]

In February, Anastas Mikoyan arrived in Cuba to negotiate a trade pact covering the sale of Cuban sugar to the Soviet Union for industrial credits and crude oil. This was followed by establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China. At the same time that the Cuban propaganda line was taking on an increasingly Marxist flavor—defending the Soviet Union and condemning the United States at every turn—Soviet technicians began pouring in.

In the face of verbal attack directed at the United States, closer ties with the Soviet Bloc, and expropriation of property, agitation increased in Washington to cut Cuba's sugar quota for the American market. The 1960 quota had been set, a year earlier, at 3,119,655 tons—

[7] The government intervenors exercised management functions, while ownership remained unchanged.

[8] *New York Times*, January 13, 1960, 49.

[9] *Ibid.*, October 27, 1959, 3.

[10] *Ibid.*, February 6, 1960, 1, and March 21, 1, respectively.

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59,180 tons *more* than for 1959. According to long-standing agreements with Cuba, the United States paid about two cents a pound above the world market price for sugar coming in under quota—a premium of well over $100 million per year. Castro, bitterly assailing the prospect of a quota reduction as "economic aggression," vowed stern retaliation: "We'll take and take until not even the nails of their shoes are left. We will take American investments penny by penny until nothing is left."[11]

But before either country acted, a new crisis erupted in mid-1960: the three foreign-owned oil refineries in Cuba (two owned by American interests, one by European interests) refused to refine incoming Soviet crude oil being traded for Cuban sugar. Their refusal immediately led to take-over by Cuban authorities. This was the last straw. The Eisenhower Administration promptly cut the sugar quota by 95 per cent for the remainder of the year—a move resulting in a loss to Cuba of about $92 million in sales to the United States.

Castro lost no time in again assailing the United States for attempting to destroy the Cuban revolution. He complained that when "Cubans were being murdered in great numbers" and when the country was being "sacked" during the Batista era, it never occurred to the "Yankee Oligarchy . . . to have its press write of the horrors in which Cuba lived" or to demand a cut in Batista's sugar quota. The Yankee Oligarchy failed to do these things, Castro asserted, because it "was owner of our lands, our mines, our factories, our commerce, most of our banks, our public services, and withdrew millions of dollars from our economy yearly."[12]

A month later, in early August, Castro made good his earlier counter-threat when he announced a new expropriation decree covering the telephone and electric utilities, oil refining and marketing facilities, and all U.S.-owned sugar mills on the island. The properties, valued at about $750 million, represented about two-thirds of the total value of U.S. private investment in Cuba. The announcement marked the beginning of the "Week of Jubilation." Immediately the Cuban press and radio hailed the nationalization as marking the "final independence of Cuba": "In Havana, repair trucks of the Cuban Telephone Company . . . one of the concerns nationalized, raced through the streets filled with celebrating employes. The workers blew the horns of the vehicles, beat on the sides of the trucks with sticks and kept up a shout of, 'Cuba yes! Yankees no!' "[13]

At the close of the "Week of Jubilation," the Confederation of

[11] *Ibid.*, August 21, 1960, Section III, 1. See also June 24, 1960, 1.
[12] *Ibid.*, July 8, 1960, 1.
[13] *Ibid.*, August 9, 1960, 3.

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Cuban Workers called for the enlistment of workers' and peasants' militia against any aggressor who, by means of direct intervention or counterrevolution, sought to destroy or subvert the Revolutionary Government. The meeting called for renewed vigilance against counterrevolutionaries, propagandists, saboteurs, and conspirators, and promised "to silence them with our reply or deliver them to revolutionary authorities."[14] Simultaneously, the Popular Socialist Party (the Cuban Communist Party) announced the first national assembly since it had been forced underground by the Batista regime. Foreign observers from around the world were invited to attend.

A few weeks later, while foreign ministers of the Organization of American States were meeting in Costa Rica to consider the threat of the Soviet presence in the Western Hemisphere, Castro affirmed his friendship with the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic. In a lengthy speech, broadcast by radio and television, he again assailed the OAS and the United States, declaring that the strength of the revolution would carry the nation to final victory over its enemies. Among other factors of strength, Castro pointed out that the revolution "took away the lands of the big property owners and the American companies."[15] Addressing the United States, he declared that the people of Cuba ". . . no longer believe in your philosophy of exploitation and privilege, or in the philosophy of gold, the gold that you rob from the work of other people; no longer are we disposed to follow the orders of your ambassador. . . . [Nor] do we believe in your false Pan Americanism with which you cloak the system of oppression and abuse, the system of domination that you have introduced among our divided peoples of America. . . . [No longer will Cuba be] an appendage of your economy nor will Cuba ever again vote in the United Nations as you indicate but will vote as our dignity and conscience indicate."[16]

Facing the increasing hostility of the Cuban regime, with its closer ties to the Soviet Bloc, the U.S. government contemplated new measures to reduce the threat of a Communist-oriented Cuba in the Western Hemisphere. In late August, the Senate voted to cut off foreign aid funds to any nation supplying arms or economic assistance to Cuba. In October, the United States imposed an embargo on exports to Cuba, covering everything except food and medicine.

The Cuban government then seized most of the remaining large private properties on the island. These included banks, and commercial, industrial, and transportation enterprises—about 20 of which were

[14] *Ibid.*, August 14, 1960, 1.
[15] *Ibid.*, August 25, 1960, 12.
[16] *Ibid.*

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owned by U.S. interests. Only about 200 small U.S. enterprises were left in the hands of their owners.

In short, the year 1960 saw a rapid deterioration in relations between the United States and Cuba. Threat was met by counterthreat, punitive action by counteraction, and all the while Cuba drew closer to the Soviet Bloc. In the words of Tad Szulc: "From the time the Cuban sugar quota was cut, a physical clash between the United States and Cuba, directly or indirectly, was unavoidable. As it began to run out of its patience and tolerance toward Castro, the Eisenhower Administration, in the late spring, 1960, set up training camps in Guatemala for a rebel Cuban force to be used in a contingency of one sort or another. Soon, it was tacitly accepted on both sides that an invasion was inevitable sooner or later, and that it was only a question of time before it came."[17]

III. U.S. Business Enterprise and the Events of 1960

A critical aspect of the revolution involved Castro's ability to transfer the hatred his followers felt for Batista to hatred of the U.S. government and its business interests. In the beginning, the revolution was directed against the brutal suppression and terrorism of the Batista regime. Although the rebels resented U.S. support of that regime, they did not wage a strong anti-American campaign. On the contrary, they vied with Batista for sympathy and aid from the United States. Castro's early support among Cuban intellectuals and professional classes was not predicated on the notion that Cuba must follow the Soviet economic pattern or that the United States was an implacable enemy. It was their hope of freeing Cuba from Batista and achieving a measure of political democracy, social justice, and sound economic reform within the framework of Western ideology that served as a primary source of revolutionary strength.

When Castro mounted his anti-American campaign in late 1959 and 1960, he lost support among the intellectual and professional groups, as the flight of thousands to Miami would suggest. But he was able to maintain influence, especially among the poorer classes, during that critical period within which the character of the revolution was radically transformed. In depicting the United States as the "aggressor," as the "rapacious and exploiting imperialist" in league with Batista, he was able to keep his hold over the masses through 1960, consolidate his power, and move firmly into the Soviet Bloc.

[17] Tad Szulc, *The Winds of Revolution* (New York 1963), 135.

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For our purposes, a fundamental question relates to the role that U.S. business enterprise may have played in the anti-American campaign. To what extent did the composition and level of U.S. business investment make it vulnerable to Castro's assaults? More specifically, what was it about the character of U.S. enterprise, if anything, that made its interests easily identifiable with those of the Batista regime? In 1960, to what extent did the apparent hostility of the U.S. government to the revolution seem (to Castro's supporters) to be motivated by the desire to defend U.S. private business interests? To what extent was U.S. enterprise vulnerable to the charge that it contributed to foreign economic domination of Cuba?

INVESTMENT IN PUBLIC UTILITIES

An examination of the composition of U.S. investments in Cuba may provide some clues to the answers. In the first place, note in Table 1 above that the book value of U.S. public utilities investments comprised about one-third the total value of U.S.-owned Cuban investments in 1959; on a per capita basis, U.S. investments in public utilities were over ten times larger in Cuba than in other Latin American countries. The concentration of U.S. investment in public utilities may have been unfortunate from the standpoint of U.S. national interests, insofar as investment in public utilities industries became intimately associated in the minds of Castro's supporters with the Batista regime. These industries by their very nature are ones of large, noncompeting firms that must operate essentially as monopolies if they are to be economically efficient. Because competition cannot be relied upon to ensure performance in the public interest, governments typically step in to regulate the industries directly. In some cases, especially in the United States, governments establish regulatory agencies to supervise privately owned utilities. In other cases, governments both own and operate the utilities. In Cuba, the role of the Batista government as regulator of the foreign privately owned utilities made the industry vulnerable to accusations that it was in league with the Batista regime, and that it was an enemy of the revolution. Purely by matter of coincidence, a regulated public utility can appear to be embroiled in local politics and scandal, through no fault of its own, simply because of its special relationship with the host government.

A specific case in point involves the rate increase granted in 1957 by Batista to the Cuban Telephone Company. On economic grounds the rate increase may have been long overdue and entirely justified in

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terms of promoting new investment in the industry.[18] Yet, certain evidence suggests that the environment in which the increase was granted created an unfavorable psychological effect that was conveniently exploited by Castro in later years.

On March 13, 1957, a poorly planned and coordinated attack was made by Cuban rebels on the presidential palace in an unsuccessful assassination attempt against Batista. The president escaped, reinforcements of loyal troops were rushed to the scene, and by the time the firing had ceased, 25 rebels were dead. A few hours later an opposition leader, Pelayo Cuervo, was brutally murdered. According to some writers, the order for the murder had come from Batista himself on the heels of the palace attack.[19] Cuervo had been "an honest, respected, and courageous lawyer."[20] He had achieved widespread recognition in filing a brief against former President Grau, alleging that he had stolen over a hundred million pesos from the public treasury. And not long before he was murdered, Cuervo had declared that he was about to start similar proceedings against Batista. Moreover, about a year before his assassination, Cuervo had filed another suit "to block a proposed increase in the rates of the American-owned Cuban Telephone Company. . . ."[21] According to one account:

> The murder of Cuervo shocked the people of Havana. There was no statement from the palace or from any government official condemning it. . . .
>
> On the morning of March 14, hours after the attack on the palace and the reprisal murder of Pelayo Cuervo, American Ambassador Arthur Gardner entered the still bullet-marked palace with officers of the economic staff of the embassy, to be present at Batista's signing of a new contract with the Cuban Telephone Company. The effort of Gardner to help Batista convey an impression both at home and abroad that things were normal in Cuba at that moment neither ingratiated him and the State Department with the people of the country nor enhanced the popularity of the Cuban Telephone Company. . . .[22]

[18] Many economists have observed that rates of return to public utilities are typically held to very low levels by Latin American governments. On the one hand, these enterprises face criticism for the poor service they render; on the other hand, they cannot render better service because the rates they are allowed to charge consumers are too low to cover an expansion of investment. (See D. F. Cavers and J. R. Nelson, *Electric Power Regulation in Latin America*, Baltimore 1959.) According to one source, the rate of return of the Cuban Telephone Company over a 38-year period was only about 4 per cent—far below the rate generally allowed in the United States. (*New York Times*, October 13, 1960, 34.)

[19] Robert Taber, *M-26: The Biography of a Revolution* (New York 1961), 124; Dubois, 154.

[20] Dubois, 153.

[21] Taber, 125.

[22] Dubois, 155-56.

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In all likelihood, the new telephone contract had been negotiated long before the palace attack. It was undoubtedly a coincidence that the formal signing came just after the time of the attack and Cuervo's murder. But that is the point—simply by being closely associated with a host government, as is necessary with regulated public utilities, the company can become a victim of circumstances.

When Castro accused the United States and its vested economic interests of supporting Batista, the association between the public utilities and the Batista government lent plausibility to the argument. And when he accused the United States and its business interests of trying to destroy the revolution, this was also a plausible argument; since the companies were presumably being hurt by Castro's early decrees, it was only natural (so Castro's supporters easily could be led to believe) for these business interests and the United States government to be hostile toward the revolution.

Besides their special association with the Cuban government, the public utilities were in a sensitive position simply because the services they supplied *were* so basic both to the industrial development of the economy and to the direct satisfaction of consumer needs. Being vital in both urban and rural areas alike, they were a conspicuous, though perhaps unjust, target for consumer complaint about services and rates. The political sensitivity of the utilities and the vital character of their services made them convenient focal points for attack during the revolution itself. It is notable that even as early as 1953 Castro had called for nationalization of the telephone and electric companies and a reduction of rates. After he came to power, his first actions against U.S. companies included intervention in the Cuban Telephone Company (in March 1959), cancellation of the telephone rate increase that had been granted by Batista, and reduction of electric utility rates.[23]

THE SUGAR ECONOMY

Table 1 also discloses that a large proportion of U.S. investment in Cuba was also concentrated in agriculture—primarily sugar production. Although U.S. participation in Cuban raw-sugar production had declined from the levels of the 1930's, it still amounted to about 40 per cent of the total in the mid-1950's. Moreover, seven of the ten largest *latifundias* were owned by U.S. interests.[24] In 1955, the total sales of

[23] For a discussion of these events, see Freeman Lincoln, "What Has Happened to Cuban Business?" *Fortune* (September 1959), 110ff.

[24] Samuel Shapiro, "Cuba: A Dissenting Report," *New Republic*, September 12, 1960, 12.

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U.S.-owned agricultural enterprises in Cuba were responsible for nearly one-half the total sales of *all* U.S.-owned agricultural enterprises in Latin America.[25]

From the standpoint of comparative advantage in international trade, Cuba's advantage may very well have been in sugar. By exporting sugar, which could be produced cheaply, and importing goods that other countries could produce more cheaply, Cuba may have been able to enjoy a higher aggregate national income than would otherwise have been forthcoming. If so, it was only natural for U.S. capital to be attracted to sugar, as the operations of the market mechanism, presumably reflecting national comparative advantages, would make sugar production relatively profitable in Cuba.[26]

Of course, the major difficulty with this point of view is that aggregate national income is only one measure, and frequently a poor one at that, of a nation's economic welfare, and it may have little to do with the nation's political welfare. Long-run *growth* rates of income, income distribution, unemployment levels, and the level of perceived social justice are just a few of the factors that cannot be disregarded in any meaningful appraisal of the Cuban revolution. Although concentration on sugar production may have been a wise choice from the standpoint of Cuba's aggregate national income, it also generated a serious employment problem because of the seasonal nature of the crop, and it made Cuba's prosperity greatly dependent on its export trade. The U.S. Department of Commerce reports that in 1953, for example, Cuban unemployment fell to a minimum of 8.4 per cent of the labor force during the height of the sugar harvesting season, but then rose to 20 per cent of the labor force during the rainy or dead season—as compared with the U.S. unemployment rate of 2.4 per cent in that year.[27] Cuba's exports, of which sugar products comprised almost 90 per cent in 1952, contributed between 30 and 39 per cent of its national income in 1952-1954: ". . . almost all the activities of the island are geared to the rise and fall in the volume and value of export crops. When demand and prices abroad are favorable, all sectors of the Cuban economy

[25] U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, *U.S. Investments in the Latin American Economy* (Washington, D.C., 1957), 47.

[26] One might argue that in terms of dynamic comparative advantage, as distinguished from the static case, perhaps Cuba's advantage was not so clearly in sugar. But we need not treat the possibility here. Rather the point made below is that even if concentration in sugar *was* in Cuba's economic interests (measured in terms of aggregate gross national income), it raised political problems and may have worked to the detriment of the United States during the revolution.

[27] U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, *Investment in Cuba* (Washington, D.C., 1956), 5.

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are prosperous, but when conditions abroad are unfavorable, the economy has very little to cushion the effects."[28]

Moreover, Cuba was highly dependent on the United States both for her export markets and for imports into Cuba of other products. In 1951-1953 about 59 per cent of the value of Cuban exports went to the United States, and about 76 per cent of the value of its imports came from the United States.

When Castro complained about the domination of the Cuban economy by the United States, and when he declared that Cuba would no longer be an "appendage" of the U.S. economy, the existing pattern of economic activity gave his argument an air of plausibility in the eyes of his followers. The economic dependence of Cuba on the United States, the one-crop seasonal nature of the Cuban economy, the discontent and misery of the unemployed, all contributed to a frustration and resentment exploited by Castro in his battle with the United States.

To take a case in point, the theme of land reform appears throughout the literature of the revolution. Constant reference is made to the alleged maldistribution of land in Batista's day and the plight of the landless peasant. One writer observes: "Seventy-five per cent of an agricultural country the size of England, with a population half again that of Ireland, was owned by eight per cent of the property holders, a few dozen rich Cuban families and the giant U.S. and Cuban sugar and cattle companies. Tens of thousands of rural Cubans lived in misery on marginal lands, in swamps and in the trackless mountains where their fathers and grandfathers had been driven by the ruthless expansion of the sugar monoculture, which produced sugar to rigid quotas and let millions of acres of land lie fallow to become overrun by brush and weeds."[29]

During Castro's expropriation program, it may have been politically disadvantageous to the United States to have so much of Cuba's sugar production in the hands of U.S.-owned firms. Inasmuch as the land reform did injure U.S. agricultural interests in Cuba, and inasmuch as the U.S. government did seek to protect these interests (by protesting the inadequate measures of compensation), it was not difficult for Castro to make a plausible and (superficially) convincing case that the "State Department" and "Wall Street" were in league to defeat the revolution. The problem here, as in the case of public utilities, is that a good deal of U.S. investment was concentrated in an area that

[28] *Ibid.*, 7 and 139. [29] Taber, 303.

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would be especially affected by the basic reforms being preached even before Castro came to power in 1959. When the time came for the anti-American campaign, it fitted in nicely with Castro's purposes to argue that the agricultural interests owned by foreign "monopolists" stood in the way of reform—if reforms were instituted, these interests would be hurt and, naturally, they would fight back. All the more reason, he argued, to seek help and friendship from the sympathetic Soviet Bloc in struggling against these "enemies of the revolution."

Even the favorable price and tariff treatment accorded Cuban sugar was attacked. Besides paying the price premium of two cents a pound, the United States accorded preferential tariff treatment to imports of Cuban sugar. Altogether the sugar premium and the preferential tariff were worth about $150 million a year to Cuba. At the same time, Ernesto Guevara condemned the sugar price and quota system as "economic enslavement" because these benefits were allegedly offset by reciprocal demands by the United States for preferential Cuban tariff treatment towards U.S. manufactured products, "making it impossible for native products of the manufacturers of other countries to compete."[30]

INVESTMENT AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

In conclusion, the foregoing discussion suggests that the presence and character of U.S. investment in Cuba did play a role in Castro's ability to maintain a measure of popular support while simultaneously waging his propaganda campaign against the United States and moving toward the Soviet camp. But we should note that there were many sources of friction between Cuba and the United States that are not obviously related in a direct way to the presence and composition of U.S. investment. And these sources, too, Castro sought to exploit. For example, the following are notable as factors that generated resentment and distrust toward the United States:

(1) The sale of arms by the United States to Batista until 1958 and maintenance by the United States of a military training mission in Cuba until Batista fled the island.

(2) The U.S. denial of the sales of arms to Castro and attempts to prevail upon European governments to do likewise.

(3) The apparent friendliness of U.S. ambassadors to Batista that lent an "official" stamp of approval to the Batista regime.

(4) The shock expressed by the American press toward the political

[30] *New York Times*, March 5, 1960, 1.

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executions carried out by Castro during his early months in power, while the press had paid little attention to the countless murders committed during the Batista period. Why were these executions any different, many Cubans reasoned, from the executions of German war criminals after the Nuremberg war trials?

(5) The haven given to numerous "Batistiano" refugees by the United States, and the alleged freedom they were given to plot counter-revolutionary activities.

(6) The scattered bombings of Cuban properties by small private planes flying out of Florida, and various covert counterrevolutionary activities that were alleged to have the approval of the U.S. government.

One could maintain that these sources of friction existed quite apart from U.S. private investment activity and that they also contributed to Castro's propaganda campaign. While private investment may also have played a role, it was only one of many factors—and it is impossible to weigh the importance of each factor in the whole chain of cause-and-effect relationships.

At the same time, we could ask why, in the minds of Castro's followers, the United States seemed to be motivated to undertake these measures that appeared so hostile to the revolution. For Castro, the answer was easy: the motivation stemmed from the desire to protect U.S. business interests that were being hurt by the revolution, and to protect the dependent colonial status of Cuba that allegedly had worked to the economic benefit of the United States at the expense of Cuba. In this sense, the factors listed above *were* related to the presence and nature of U.S. business activity in Cuba. *Quite apart from the question as to whether this explanation was actually the basis for U.S. government policy at the time*, the critical point to remember is that the objective nature of relations between the United States and Cuba made it easier for Castro's followers, at his prodding, to *believe* that the motivation of the United States stemmed from a desire to protect its economic interests.

IV. Issues Raised by the Cuban Experience

The Cuban experience raises several interrelated issues. Although we make no attempt to treat them definitively here, perhaps this summarization of the issues will stimulate further consideration by others of relationships between private investment and U.S. national interests.

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First, to what extent do U.S. business enterprises identify themselves with the aspirations of the host countries? To what extent do they strongly support reforms of the type envisioned under the Alliance for Progress, or to what extent do they support a *status quo* economic, political, and social structure? Or, more specifically, to what extent would particular U.S. business enterprises be *injured* (at least in the short run) by thoroughgoing attempts of the host economy to engage in land reform, fiscal reform, and other measures so frequently mentioned in the press and elsewhere as being "necessary" for the rapid development of Latin America? What about the dilemma involved when such reforms harm certain kinds of existing U.S. business enterprise, but at the same time make more attractive the long-run, overall investment climate for both U.S. and local business enterprises? In Cuba, some U.S. enterprises were harmed by the early laws and regulations of the Castro regime. But U.S. government protests facilitated an identification of U.S. government policy with U.S. business interests in a manner that suggested, to some observers, that both were opposed to any major change from the economic, social, and political structure of Batista's regime.

Second, to what extent can the United States depend on the market mechanism to allocate its foreign investment in a way that serves both economic and political national objectives? We have seen that while investment in Cuba may well have contributed to Cuba's aggregate national income, it also contributed to unstable economic conditions arising from seasonal crop production. It is true that in the 1930's and 1940's U.S. investment gradually shifted away from agriculture into activities that contributed to some diversification of the Cuban economy. Table 3 shows that investment in agriculture dropped from about two-thirds to about one-third of total U.S. investment from 1929 to 1959. Yet, the remaining large holdings in sugar and the relative increase in public utility investment lead one to ask whether the composition that did prevail in 1959 was appropriate in terms of U.S. political objectives.

It is interesting to speculate whether a different distribution of U.S. investment, *even with the result of a smaller aggregate national income in Cuba*, might not have contributed to the rise of a more moderate regime, more kindly disposed towards the United States and the West, as well as to an economy that in the eyes of its own people would have been more viable and stable. More specifically, one might speculate as to (1) whether a concentration of U.S. investment in import-substituting manufacturing and foodstuffs and a concentration in new

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TABLE 3. BOOK VALUE—U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT ENTERPRISES IN CUBA, 1929 AND 1959

Industry	*1929* (million $)	*1929* (per cent of total)	*1959* (million $)	*1959* (per cent of total)
Petroleum	9	1	147	15
Manufacturing	45	5	111	12
Public utilities	215	23	313	33
Trade	15	2	44	5
Other (primarily agriculture)	635	69	341	36
Total	919	100	956	100

SOURCES: Table 1 and U.S. Department of Commerce, *Investment in Cuba* (Washington, D.C., 1956), 10.

industries that would have diversified Cuba's export base, at the expense of traditional sugar agriculture and public utilities, would have generated a more stable employment pattern, and would have reduced economic dependence on the United States; (2) whether this might have pulled the teeth of some of Castro's arguments and made it much more difficult for him to maintain popular support against the United States in 1959-1960; or (3) indeed, whether such a structure of investment in Cuba during the 1930's and 1940's might have given rise to a quite different pattern of political change such that a Castro, or at least so hostile a Castro, would not have appeared in the 1950's.

Third, what role does U.S. private investment play in strengthening or weakening the position of the U.S. government in international bargaining? U.S. capital in Cuba may have served to reduce the credibility of the U.S. threat to cut the sugar quota in 1960. Because U.S. investors had very large holdings in sugar and related industry, some observers believed that the United States would not carry out such a threat because it would be harming its own business interests.[31] To the extent that Castro and his advisers felt this to be the case, the presence of U.S. investment in sugar may have blunted U.S. bargaining power at this most critical point in U.S.-Cuban relations. More generally, the question arises as to the credibility of threats against host countries in other circumstances where U.S. private interests would be

[31] Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy, *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution* (New York 1961), 180.

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injured. In addition, the presence of private U.S. enterprises may increase the host country's bargaining strength to the extent that it can credibly threaten to expropriate them. On both counts, the bargaining power of the United States would be impaired vis-à-vis the host country. On the other hand, the presence of U.S. business activity provides the United States also with a bargaining tool—for the United States can threaten to restrict operation of the activity in a manner that would harm the host economy. However, since this threat, if carried out, would endanger the U.S. private interests themselves, the credibility of such a threat would be in question.[32]

Fourth, what role do private investors play in affecting the course of U.S. foreign policy? It is notable that the refusal of the petroleum refineries to process Russian crude was the immediate—though perhaps not the fundamental—reason (or excuse) for Castro to expropriate them. The question arises about the motivation of the refineries, as their refusal was, for better or worse, a factor that preceded retaliation and reprisals in the struggle and led to the final complete break between the United States and Cuba. Was their refusal a completely private act or did it have the support of the State Department after thoughtful government study of the potential consequences? One might suppose that it was a private act in that the international petroleum industry is composed largely of a relatively few highly integrated firms, each of which engages in crude production, transportation, refining, and marketing. Typically, the refineries owned by each firm process only the crude sold by its own subsidiaries or branches. When Cuba decided to bring in Soviet crude, it would have been quite consistent with accepted business practices for the refineries to refuse to cooperate.[33] This is *not* to say that refusal to process Soviet crude was necessarily inconsistent with U.S. government policy pursued at that time. But the general question about the relationship between private acts and government policy remains.

Beyond exploring some of the economic-political aspects of U.S. investment in Cuba, we cannot offer more definitive treatment here of these issues. In proceeding further in this direction, it would be desirable to examine the economic-political environment of U.S. capital in other countries. One might, for example, explore the situation

[32] This is true unless, of course, the threat is believed to be so effective that the hostile government would quickly fall and little injury would be inflicted on these U.S. business interests.

[33] A brief discussion of this issue appears in a letter to the editor by Professor Alfred Kahn, *New York Times*, July 10, 1960, Section IV, 10.

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of petroleum in Venezuela, copper in Chile, and manufacturing in Argentina, where the experience undoubtedly varies a good deal from that of Cuba. In any case, it is hoped that issues raised by the Cuban experience will be useful in stimulating and guiding further analysis of relationships between private investment and political change.

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Review Articles

THE PROGRESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

By ELLEN FREY-WOUTERS

Walter Hallstein, *United Europe: Challenge and Opportunity*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1962, 109 pp. $2.75.
U. W. Kitzinger, *The Politics and Economics of European Integration*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963, 246 pp. $2.25.
George Lichtheim, *The New Europe: Today—and Tomorrow*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963, 232 pp. $2.25.

ON June 15, 1964, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development adopted its Final Act. General Principle 10 of this Act contains the following recommendation: "Regional economic groupings, integration or other forms of economic co-operation should be promoted among developing countries as a means of expanding their intra-regional and extra-regional trade and encouraging their economic growth and their industrial and agricultural diversification."[1] The Act expresses the discontent of the developing nations with the existing state of affairs and their readiness to experiment with new forms of regional economic cooperation.

Not only in the developing world, but on all continents there is a growing awareness that areas now artificially divided, politically and economically, in reality form natural economic units. The establishment of existing common markets and the planning of future ones demonstrate that the distribution of functions and sharing of authority within regions have already become facts of international life. They also exhibit the diminishing importance of the nation-state.

The new impetus given to the issues of economic integration also have given rise to a considerable amount of scholarly discussion concerning the features, aims, effects, and general rationale of economic groupings.[2] There is general agreement that these organizations are revolutionary in nature. We do not yet thoroughly understand their character, their structure, their probable development. We know very

[1] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Final Act, Doc. E/Conf. 46/L. 28 (16 June 1964), 19.
[2] For the most up-to-date review of the main issues at stake, see Sidney Dell, *Trade Blocs and Common Markets* (London 1963).

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little about the effects of these groupings on the prospect of world integration or disintegration. Will the regional economic systems now emerging in many parts of the world become disruptive factors in the world economy, separating groups of countries from one another? Or will these groups seek closer ties with one another? It is far from self-evident that economic regionalism will bring about decisive progress toward the evolution of an effective world economic system. Much will depend upon the capacity of the United Nations to reconcile the practices of economic regionalism with its own actions in the field of world economic order and development. Regional economic groupings will contribute toward a larger, world-wide economic community only if they support the growing powers of the central structure, not if they resist such development.

I

New concepts and techniques are now available for studies of the integration of regional political communities. Several pioneer works have appeared in recent years.[3] But most of the contributions to the literature on regional organizations lack depth and are purely descriptive. The need exists for continued research on the underlying forces that give rise to the regional form of organization. We need a great deal more investigation of the political processes within the regional organizations. Attention should also be devoted to an analysis of the impact of these organizations upon the regional political climate, and upon the world community in general. It is important to obtain new insights into the process of regional integration, and for this large-scale empirical inquiry is urgently required.

Political scientists who focus on regional organizations are beset by many problems. The study of comparative regionalism has not yet been divided into one part devoted to the industrialized states and another oriented toward the developing countries. Previous research on regional integration has been conducted generally under the assumption that no separation is needed, since we have no reliable knowledge that the phenomenon of regionalism is substantially different in the two settings. The various groupings, however, manifest great diversity in aims, institutions, powers, and procedures, making it extremely difficult to develop a genuinely comparative framework for political analysis.

[3] See, e.g., Karl W. Deutsch *et al.*, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton 1957); Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford 1958).

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Another fundamental problem is the definition of the subject matter. Just what is regional political integration? What kinds of ties are necessary before a political "community" can be said to exist? What factors have an influence in producing integration or inhibiting it? Is political integration at the level of the nation-state essentially the same process as integration on a regional level? Many different answers have been given to these questions; even an agreement on the meaning of the term "regional integration" is not in the offing.

An attempt to analyze the system of decision-making or the power structure within a regional community introduces a further set of problems. One encounters institutions that do not have a highly structured pattern of political organization, making it difficult for analysts to identify and depict the decision-making system.

Systematic, comparative studies of regional political organization might yield better results if they concentrated on organizations in the economic field, since these are more inward-looking than the regional security organizations, which exist to provide protection against potential enemies on the outside and have proved to be insignificant as promoters of regional integration.

Because of the complexity of research on regional political integration, it was to be expected that many alternative concepts and approaches would develop. Various models of the integration process have already been proposed. While most of these models are fragmentary, consisting of isolated concepts, hypotheses, or generalizations, rather than forming coherent images of the regional integration process, they can nevertheless contribute to our understanding. A few of the more promising approaches should be selected to permit testing of certain aspects of regional integration.[4]

II

The road to supranational unity may well be long and winding. In this respect, the evolution of constitutional and organizational forms of European cooperation is instructive. Careful analysis of the European Economic Community should provide a more solid basis for studying the many opportunities and problems associated with regionalism in general. The increasing flow of works on the EEC expresses the growing interest in European integration. Most of these works, however, make little contribution to a better understanding of the Community. They attempt to provide a comprehensive survey of all

[4] For an excellent conceptual framework, see Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, eds., *The Integration of Political Communities* (Philadelphia 1964), 14.

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aspects of the EEC, including a historical account of the economic and political antecedents of present-day European institutions, a description of the Community organs, and an up-to-date account of particular developments in the EEC. As a result they are both too condensed and too dispersed to be other than superficial, impressionistic, and oversimplified. Most of these works are written by defenders of the cause of European federalism, and exhibit an enthusiastic and optimistic attitude toward the already existing "supranational" institutions. These books are written at great speed in a situation of rapid change, and are out of date almost as soon as they appear.

Occasionally, a cry against the EEC is heard. Most of the critics attempt to demonstrate that the Community is in reality a gigantic supercartel of big-business interests served by reactionary politicians. According to this contention, entry into the Community entailed a sellout of the workers of the member countries to Continental business and financial interests that are more concerned with securing a high level of investment than with advancing the well-being of either labor or the majority of consumers. In addition, these authors argue, the founders of the EEC were unwise in failing to recognize that, since in any customs union the strongest state will dominate, West Germany is bound to control the Community unless compensating forces are introduced. The case against the EEC is too often colored by emotion and prejudice in its presentation to be considered as seriously as it deserves. Most books in this category are disturbing rather than convincing in their discernment of contradictions and uncertainties that are too often ignored by the champions of European integration.[5]

Among the general surveys least vulnerable to these lines of criticism are two of the books under consideration here. One is U. W. Kitzinger's *The Politics and Economics of European Integration*, and the other is George Lichtheim's *The New Europe*.

Of these two books, Lichtheim's is the more interesting. Lichtheim is a penetrating observer who has kept in close touch with political and intellectual currents on the Continent. He gives an extensive description of the various ideological forces that play a role in the decision-making process of the EEC. An interesting chapter is devoted to the new Europe, the Europe of tomorrow. Lichtheim presents an excel-

[5] See William Pickles, *Not with Europe: The Political Case for Staying Out* (London 1962); Michael Barratt-Brown and John Hughes, *Britain's Crisis and the Common Market* (London 1961). For a more moderate statement, see Emil Strauss, *European Reckoning: The Six and Britain's Future* (London 1962).

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lent argument supporting his thesis that this new Europe will most likely develop into a "managed economy" run by technicians and will result in a fully industrialized mass culture. The planning policies of the future EEC will overstep the limits of both socialism and classical liberalism, he believes, and will present a challenge not only to the Soviet bloc, but also to whatever is left of the laissez-faire ideology in the United States.

Kitzinger's study is more comprehensive and factual and thus more suitable as a general text. He devotes detailed attention to a description of the institutions of the Community, but he is less original than Lichtheim and adheres more closely to the federalist line of thought. He seems to be totally unaware of the present ideological conflict between the planners and the defenders of a market economy. This deficiency prevents him from making a clear exposition of the forces working for and against European political integration.

For those interested in a clear, short exposition of the "official" ideology of integration among the Six, the best available treatment is Walter Hallstein's *United Europe*, a book based on the Clayton Lectures delivered by the author at Harvard in 1962. For the last twenty years, the leaders of the European integration movement have made a point of explaining their ideas, hopes, and aims to American audiences. Inevitably, Hallstein's lectures cover ground familiar to those who have followed the development of the European federalist argument. Though not a critical commentary, they are nonetheless valuable as an exposition by the man who, as President of the Commission of the EEC, heads the European bureaucracy—a federalist who has contributed much to what has been achieved so far.

III

A review of the recent literature on the European Economic Community indicates that very little attention has been paid to the integration process itself. The question of how and why political integration develops or is inhibited is in most cases ignored or superficially treated. Previous research indicates at least eight factors that may exert an integrative influence: (1) geographical proximity; (2) shared values and attitudes; (3) mutual knowledge; (4) previous integrative experiences; (5) shared functional interests; (6) interaction among persons and groups; (7) regional system of power and decision-making; and (8) effectiveness of the regional system.[6] It is extremely

[6] See Jacob and Toscano, eds., 11.

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difficult, at this stage of the development of European integration, to analyze the relative impact of each factor, since much of the necessary data is not yet available. Data on the various indicators should be gathered in sufficient volume to permit a factor analysis of the relative impact of each variable. Comprehensive research on the interaction of the factors influential in producing integration should be undertaken.

To reach a better understanding of the struggle between divisive and cohesive tendencies, an analysis of the values and attitudes that shape Community decisions is crucial. This analysis has to take place on both the national and Community level. On the national level, values and attitudes of pressure groups, parties, and political leaders bear significantly upon the problem of integration by shaping the public policies that either promote or hinder Community action. On the Community level, attention should be paid to the social norms, the interests of special groups, the role values, and the personal values that motivate European executives.

One of the problems encountered in attempting to analyze the attitude of various powerful groups toward the EEC is the vague formulation, in the Rome Treaty, of the economic philosophy that is supposed to animate the entire process. Plan-minded socialists, free-enterprise liberals, and agrarian conservatives have all given their own interpretation of the economic logic that underlies the treaty, and no consensus has been or is likely to be established.

For Walter Hallstein, however, this is not a problem. In his Clayton Lectures he states: "The EEC Treaty . . . represents a consistent philosophy. In some ways it resembles the classical philosophy of free trade; but it is not . . . merely a monument to Adam Smith. Nor, on the other hand, is it wholly or even in large part a *dirigiste* philosophy; it is much more flexible, and in important ways more liberal, than that" (p. 48). According to Hallstein, a sophisticated balance exists between the principles of the free market economy and the need for positive state action to achieve integration and steady expansion, and this balance expresses itself in harmonious working relations between the various agents involved in the decision-making process.

A careful reading of the Rome Treaty shows that no such careful balance exists between the two opposing economic ideologies. By setting up regional agencies with power to direct the economic life of the Community, the Treaty satisfied the wishes of the planners. But, at the same time, the liberal demand for a destruction of internal barriers to free trade was fully gratified. No effective com-

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promise between the two aims was reached and the Treaty leaves the meaning of "integration" undefined as between the liberal goal of free competition and the planners' belief in constant surveillance by government.

In principle, all parties agree that an entirely new type of compromise between conflicting aims has to be found on the European level. But in practice this agreement breaks down over a dispute about the role and rationale of economic planning. The result has been that the institutions of the Community—foremost among them, the Executive Commission—have been continuously engaged in an ideological battle with the strong liberal market forces.

The Commission is dominated by men who are aware that "an economic order based on freedom can only exist in the world of today at the price of constant state intervention in economic life."[7] Yet capital and management offer strong resistance to such control. The power of business has increased greatly since the establishment of the EEC. The very process of concentration—through mergers, constitutive agreements providing for an interlocking relationship between companies, and cartel agreements—makes it easier for the big companies to come to an understanding with one another. It is partly because of the opportunities for further concentration that European business concerns have expressed their strong support for continued economic integration.[8] But this does not mean that they are in favor of long-range central planning or the establishment of stronger central institutions. The growing outcry against the "excessive powers" of the Executive Commission is evidence of the business world's attitude. On both the national and the Community level, they present a joint front against an enlarged independent role for the European Executive. In Brussels, the Union of the Industrial Federations (UNICE) and the Conference of the Chambers of Commerce have become the strongest, best-organized, and most effective pressure groups on the Community level. Their opposition, and not de Gaulle's concept of *l'Europe des patries*, has become the major force working against the establishment of stronger federal institutions.

Hallstein and Kitzinger are so devoted to the federalist cause that they disregard this real conflict in contemporary European politics. Both authors also seem overly confident that the Commission will succeed in preventing market domination or cartelization. Unfortu-

[7] "Introduction to the Action Program for the Period 1964-1968," *Bulletin from the European Community* (Brussels, December 1962), 1.

[8] See Piero Malvestiti, "Enterprise and the Common Market," in *ibid.* (September 1959), 5.

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nately, not even the recent decision governing the Grundig-Consten exclusive distribution agreement provides a guarantee that the Commission has finally started an effective antitrust enforcement program.[9] The Commission is faced with a very complex situation. As *Patronat Français* and similar journals have recently proclaimed, European business is not big enough to compete with the American corporate giants. The road to survival may very well be for European companies to combine forces, by one means or another. The Commission encourages the growth of bigger business, as long as it develops in a "proper, nonmonopolistic form." Since it is not easy to encourage one and prevent the other, the Commission will probably remain cautious when dealing with these matters in the near future.

Lichtheim presents an excellent analysis of the liberal-socialist dispute as it affects the European Community.[10] He recognizes that there are elements in Europe's social make-up that favor the evolution of a Europe dominated by an oligarchy of bureaucrats manipulated by the great corporations and their political spokesmen. There are, in his opinion, at least two factors that work against domination by big business and the emergence of the corporate state: ". . . democracy as such, and the drive to plan the European economy in terms of social goals set by the technocrats of the Brussels Commission. . . . Democracy will continue to find its bulwark in the national parliaments, in labor movements and other popular organizations" (p. 82). It is in order to avoid the degeneration of a European government into some form of fascist oligarchy that "Europe's labor movements and socialist parties have from the start tried to control the European bureaucracy and establish strategic positions inside the political structure: so far with success" (p. 82).

One can only agree with Lichtheim that the danger of a Europe dominated by big business and uncontrolled bureaucrats is real. He may even underestimate this danger. He seems too optimistic about the role played by European labor in keeping this process under control. The European unions remain disunited and are thus unable to negotiate for Western Europe as a whole. Labor union cooperation in the Community institutions occurs mainly in the Economic and Social Committee, which is an advisory body only. Labor is not represented on some of the other important committees. The unions have not suc-

[9] See European Economic Community, Decision on the Grundig-Consten Agreement, Doc. IP (64) 149 (25 September 1964), 1-3.

[10] For the best analysis of this dispute, see Paul Streeten, *Economic Integration: Aspects and Problems* (Leyden 1961).

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ceeded in making effective use of the informal machinery that is available to pressure groups. Moreover, the Commission often forgets that continuous cooperation and mutual confidence are preferable to calling for labor's support after suffering a defeat. The labor unions have learned that it is presently impossible to influence the Council of Ministers or call it to account. As a result, the trade unions have not been successful in protecting the interests of European workers in the Community setting and even risk being excluded from the fields in which, at national levels, they share responsibility.[11] The trade union movement is disturbed about this lack of influence, and "it is beginning to ask itself anxiously whether it can continue to support the European institutions in view of the sparse record of achievement in a sector to which it has given priority."[12]

The question even arises whether on the national level, as a consequence of the establishment of the EEC, the power of labor may decline. New pressures are being brought against the unions, and restraints placed on their demands for better wages. The growth of big business does not seem to have been accompanied, so far, by a comparable growth in the power of labor, and this lack of balance may soon threaten some of the achievements of the welfare state.[13] The outcome of the present conflict remains uncertain. The course that the Community will follow is likely to depend upon the democratic response to the challenge inherent in the present situation.

IV

The institutions of the European Economic Community have often been described as "supranational agencies." There is no consensus among observers on the exact meaning of the concept of supranationality. Some emphasize the capacity of the Council of Ministers to make binding decisions on important matters by majority vote; others stress the substantial power assigned to the Commission, or the development and functioning of transnational party politics in the European Parliament. But there is general agreement that the European "supranational" institutions stand somewhere between a conventional international organization and a truly federal governmental form.

One of the best analyses of the political character of the EEC is

[11] See Resolutions adopted at the Fourth General Assembly of the Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), Paris, March 1964.

[12] H. Buiter, Secretary-General of the European Trade-Union Secretariat, *Letters to the EEC Commission and Council of Ministers, European Community* (May 1964), 15.

[13] For a good discussion of this problem, see Dell, 75-83.

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that of Kitzinger. He differentiates between the governmental type of supranationality and the Community type. "With the power of initiative the monopoly of the Community institution, and the power to legislate the monopoly of the governmental institutions, the two are effectively interdependent, and policies must be evolved in a dialogue between them" (p. 69). "This procedure is more than purely international negotiation, for the Commission is there in a leading role . . . to represent the interest of the whole against the parts. But it is less than Community supranationalism, and on questions on which unanimity is required it is of course less than governmental supranationalism, too" (p. 77).

I would hesitate to accept Kitzinger's description of the relationship between the Council and the Commission as a kind of partnership between equals. The Commission is almost completely dependent on and controlled by the national governments. The process of intergovernmental consultation and agreement remains the primary driving force in the Community. The Commission has not made full use of the limited power which it has been given to operate independent of governmental approval. This policy of moderation in the exploitation of supranational possibilities reflects the awareness of the Commission that the cooperation and approval of governments are indispensable. Hallstein never stresses the notion of supranationality and seems to be free of supranational illusions. According to him, "the European Community is *sui generis*, a new kind of political animal" (p. 28). It is not national, federal, confederal, or supranational, and the exact term to describe this innovation does not yet exist.

There is a general tendency among observers of the EEC to present the European Parliament as a powerful and efficient body, acting as the real motor for further progress toward political integration. Lichtheim states that "since its inception in 1958, it has tended to develop in the direction of a true legislature, encroaching steadily on . . . the two executives established by the Treaty" (p. 60). Kitzinger points out that the Executive has had to take Parliament very much into its confidence and adapt its policies to the latter's demands, while the Council consults the Assembly before it takes decisions. Both authors are in favor of direct election of the Parliament by universal suffrage and also support an extension of its powers.

It is true that the Parliament has played a useful role in the process of European integration. But this most "European" organ of the Community remains an advisory body only, and its recommendations are often ignored. The relations between the Parliament and other

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institutions of the Community have shown little growth. Effective liaison between the Parliament and the Commission has been established, but its rapport with the Economic and Social Committee and the Council remains inadequate. Not enough contact exists between the European parliamentarians and the national parties, and within the national parliaments the "Europeans" tend to become a slightly alienated group.

It is by no means self-evident that a directly elected Parliament would function better than the present one. Most observers tend to lose sight of the implications for the whole Community of having a "true" Parliament. Would Community procedures improve if Parliament had real control over the other organs of the Community? Achievement of the aims of the Rome Treaty presents great political and administrative problems, requiring unending consultation. It would be difficult for the Commission and Council to take the many necessary decisions if they were to grow more dependent upon the approval of Parliament.

V

The present commitment of the Western Europeans to the European Economic Community has not been a subject for investigation in any depth. Kitzinger presents a glowing picture: "The establishment of the Community . . . is opening up channels for new men to take charge of new and formidable tasks. At times it may assume the form of a mystique; but this liberating experience is one that must have been lived through on the spot . . . for its significance to be fully grasped. The spirit of passive resignation has fled from the center of the Continent: An awareness of their great workshop in which new shapes are being forged, a sense of achievement, . . . a sense even of world mission has come over the new generation of Frenchmen and Germans, Dutchmen and Italians . . ." (pp. 58-59). Other observers of the mood of the "new Europe" give similar rosy but undocumented descriptions.

It is necessary to have more knowledge of the degree to which individuals and groups are willing to make an effort to build the Community. Among the questions to be answered are: How has the average European reacted to the EEC? Has the gradual disappearance of barriers created greater homogeneity and a new sense of belonging to the larger Community? To what extent are Europeans aware of each other and what kind of knowledge and understanding do they

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have about one another? To what degree have increased communications, mobility, and trade strengthened cohesiveness among Europeans? What benefits do Europeans expect from greater integration?

But far more important are studies that put the searchlight on the governing elites. Their changing attitudes should be kept under observation, and an attempt should be made to identify the groups that move the Community toward or away from integration.[14] How strong, for instance, is the gratitude of groups that have benefited from integration—notably, European big business? How deep is the alienation of groups that have made sacrifices—farmers who lost subsidies, businessmen who had to close small, inefficient factories? Does European labor still believe that the advantages of integration will exceed the costs? How do European intellectuals, civil servants, and political leaders respond to the present Community system?

There has been little attempt to determine the impact of the EEC institutions on the regional environment. Analysis can be concentrated on various facets: the changing relations between national political systems and the organs of the Community; the effects of organizational decisions on the pattern of behavior of member-governments; the role of regional officials in influencing and transforming the values and attitudes of national bureaucracies; and the impact of the European parliamentarians upon national parties and parliaments.

VI

The relations of the European Economic Community with the rest of the world have been receiving increased attention. Both Hallstein and Kitzinger emphasize the federalist line of thought, speaking of the benefits that will accrue to the outside world from the growth of the Community and the willingness of the six member countries to pursue policies helpful to other states. Lichtheim points out, more realistically, that the nature of Europe's foreign relations will be largely determined by the nature of its political system. A socialist Europe would follow a policy different from that of a capitalist Europe.

The question of whether cooperative relations among the Atlantic nations should be developed further and, if so, for what ends and by what means has been examined by many specialists from Europe as well as the United States. Hallstein's discussion of the present and future relations between the United States and Western Europe has

[14] The studies by Ernst Haas of the functional bases of integration in Western Europe are a good example of what can be done in this direction.

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helped substantially in the current task of clarifying the issues in the argument about the Atlantic Community. Hallstein favors a European "partnership" with the United States, but specifically rejects the term "Atlantic Community" (pp. 87-88). His support for a strong and independent Europe is not profoundly different from the views of President de Gaulle.

To Lichtheim, the Atlantic Community is an artificial creation, imposed upon Western Europe by a factor beyond its control: the Soviet threat. The Atlantic Alliance, he says, is reluctantly accepted by the Europeans as a political necessity. But "if the U.S.S.R. ceased to appear as a constant threat," the underlying impatience with the United States as a temporary overlord "would soon translate itself into a determination to have done with America's physical presence in Europe" (p. 217).

Lichtheim's analysis points to a fact often ignored in the United States: European suspicion of American motives. Most American observers present United States policy as having consistently supported the consolidation of European political integration. But many Europeans realize that the United States has sought to protect its interests by alternating its support between the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Association, throwing its weight against whichever one seemed at the moment to pursue policies detrimental to American interests. As long as the United States is unwilling to accept a strong independent Europe, pursuing foreign policies sometimes at variance with American interests, Europe will continue to be an irritant to the United States.

The impact of the European Economic Community upon the developing nations has recently received considerable attention. The association of eighteen sovereign African countries with the EEC has given rise to more misunderstanding than perhaps any other aspect of Community activity. To some observers the association involves some new and subtle kind of colonial subjection of the African states, making it impossible for them to industrialize and achieve the needed diversification of their economies. In the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, as an example, most non-associated members have expressed suspicion of the present relationship and are in favor of its termination. But an agreed "African attitude" on the issue does not exist.

To other observers, the second Association Convention, signed in Yaoundé, Cameroon, on June 20, 1963, is an unmixed blessing. Hallstein states: "Our generation must meet the challenge and the oppor-

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tunity represented by the emergence of the proud new nations. . . . By agreeing to their association with the Community, the member states acknowledged a joint responsibility for these countries' development" (p. 62). Both Kitzinger and Lichtheim come to the conclusion that the present relationship represents something radically new rather than a continuation of the old, unequal colonial relationship. "The Association . . . recognizes the need for Europe to . . . give away money for infrastructure and social investment in the poorer countries in order to allow their economies to reach take-off level" (Kitzinger, 115-16).

Which of these two arguments is closer to reality? In the first place, the effect of the association on the industrial development of the associated members is closely connected with the powers that they retain to protect their infant industries. The applicable provisions of the Convention do not restrict, a priori, the scope of tariff and quota protection that can be put into practice by the associated members in favor of their industries. Nevertheless, the procedure of consultations to which the application of tariffs and quotas is subjected, and the balance of political and economic power within the association, make it very difficult for the associated members to take full advantage of the theoretical possibilities inherent in the Convention.

Secondly, this type of preferential arrangement tends to have a trade-diverting effect unless there is no requirement of reciprocity included, as the efficiency of the less-developed partner is hardly stimulated by the preferences. The effect of opening its domestic market to imported manufactures is more important than the extent to which its export industries can benefit from preferential treatment.

Thirdly, the Convention grants nationals of EEC member states establishment rights in African associated states, and provides for the free flow of capital. As Deutsch has pointed out: "Economic colonialism is involved if ownership of capital import remains geographically or socially insulated from the bulk of the population."[15] In the case of the associated states, it has proved almost impossible for Africans to buy into the ownership of certain European corporations operating on their soil. The managers of these corporations have also insulated themselves from the Africans; at the same time, they are able to exert varying degrees of influence over the national economic policy of the countries involved.

Fourthly, as far as raw materials are concerned, the participating developing countries have been able to obtain price and volume advan-

[15] See Jacob and Toscano, eds., 160.

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tages in their export of raw materials to the EEC. But as long as the EEC discourages the establishment of processing facilities in developing countries, these advantages are not very significant. In addition, most of them accrue to the benefit of European nationals and companies that operate in the beneficiary developing country.

The second Convention of Association differs very essentially from the first, both legally and in its economic meaning, taking into account much of the criticism expressed against the first Convention. But the effects of some of its provisions are extremely dubious, and the real advantages and disadvantages of the new system will depend on the conditions under which it operates. Unless some appropriate new policy measures are adopted, the Association will continue to benefit its European members primarily and, in the long run, have mostly negative implications for the associated states.

In a sense the major problem is, however, the impact of the Association Agreement upon the economic development of Africa as a whole. Both Kitzinger and Lichtheim are of the opinion that the African associated members benefit considerably from the Agreement. But they oppose the association from the long-range point of view, since it would keep Africa divided into two separate preferential areas, very much along the lines of former colonial affiliation. Kitzinger points out that broader development plans, without regard to past colonial connections, might well be healthier for the political evolution of the world. Lichtheim argues that pan-Africanism does nothing to help the Africans solve their most pressing economic problems and proposes the establishment of "a free-trade area embracing the enlarged EEC and most of the African countries formerly controlled by London, and Paris, plus the ex-Belgian Congo" (pp. 165-66). But it is doubtful that this model of a "Eurafrica" could solve the pressing economic problems of the Africans. As the Economic Commission for Africa has pointed out, regional economic integration is a matter of vital concern to Africa.[16] If the Africans could form larger unified markets of their own, the incentives to establish new industries would be correspondingly greater, and substantial economies of mass production and regional specialization could be realized.

It is not clear whether the present Convention of Association will prevent the creation of a regional market that includes non-associated as well as associated countries. The formal provisions of the Convention appear rather definite as regards the participation of the asso-

[16] See, e.g., Economic Commission for Africa, Doc. E/CN.14/253 (6 December 1963) and Doc. E/CN.14/284 (21 February 1964).

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ciated members in customs unions and free trade areas. Article 9 permits customs unions and free trade areas that include non-associated countries, "in so far as they neither are nor prove to be incompatible with the principles and provisions of the said Convention." Since Article 7 provides for most-favored-nation treatment for the Six, it may be impossible to establish a genuine customs union—that is, one that also discriminates against the Six. In practice, this question can be settled only by referring to the Council of Association an actual test case that involves discrimination against the EEC as a group.[17]

At this point in the development of the EEC, it is extremely difficult to give an overall assessment of the impact of this regional grouping upon the rest of the developing world. Hallstein, Kitzinger, and Lichtheim have not attempted such an evaluation. In most cases it would hardly be possible to demonstrate conclusively whether developing third countries fare less well or better as a result of economic integration in Western countries. More useful than seeking to demonstrate the presence or absence of general harmful effects are studies of the relative positions of particular commodities and countries so as to ascertain the extent to which the EEC promotes or hampers an adequate increase in the export earnings of developing countries.

EEC aid policies to developing countries deserve special attention. It was stated in the Action Program that the Community is aware of the responsibilities of industrialized countries to aid developing countries.[18] Some elements of the Action Program suggest at least a partial acceptance of the universal approach, whereby the system of association would be only a special case of the participation of the Community in the aid programs of the industrial countries. But it will be almost impossible to put this "universalistic" approach into action, since this would require a radical change in the existing aid programs of the members of the EEC. The directions in which European bilateral aid has flowed have been determined by previous colonial links, or calculations as to economic, strategic, or political advantage, rather than by estimates of the need or potentialities for development.

The considerable suspicion and anxiety that exist in the developing countries as a result of Western European integration mirror their fear that the EEC, by reinforcing the overall position of some important developed countries, will tend to emphasize the lack of balance in the world economy. The developing countries cannot fail to observe that

[17] A statement to this effect was made by the EEC observer at the second session of the ECA Standing Committee on Trade (see E/CN.14/STC/33, para. 25).

[18] Memorandum of the Commission on the Action Program of the Community for the Second Stage (Brussels, December 1962), 72.

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the establishment of the EEC has weakened their bargaining power, thereby making their own position even more insecure than before. This fear was reflected in the pressure put behind the acceptance of General Principle 8 of the Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. This principle was passed by 78 votes to 11, with 23 abstentions (including all EEC members). The principle reads as follows: "Developed countries should grant concessions to all developing countries and extend to developing countries all concessions they grant to one another and should not in granting these or other concessions require any concessions in return from developing countries. Special preferences at present enjoyed by certain developing countries in certain developed countries should be regarded as transitional and subject to progressive reduction. They should be eliminated as and when effective international measures guaranteeing at least equivalent advantages to the countries concerned come into operation." In another recommendation of this Final Act, it is proposed that these measures should be introduced in such a way that they become operative before the end of the Development Decade.[19]

It must be borne in mind that the relations of the European Economic Community with the rest of the world are continually changing, as a result of policy decisions and pressures from non-member states. Policies already adopted may be modified and new common policies that would differ from current national policies may be agreed upon. This continuing process of change should be kept under close observation.

VII

The future of European political integration is unclear. Hallstein has little to say about what may be the next political steps in Europe, in spite of his constant reminders of the essentially political nature of the aims of integration. Kitzinger and Lichtheim are convinced that the development of a political community becomes inescapable once countries have started on the road to economic integration. However, the question arises as to whether the process of economic integration will automatically lead toward a politically and militarily unified Europe. The theory advocated by some European federalists, and adopted by Kitzinger and Lichtheim, rests on the assumption of the "expansive logic" of functional integration. This theory, however, exaggerates the "automaticity" of the spill-over process in integration.

[19] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Final Act, Doc. E/Conf. 46/L.28 (16 June 1964), 18-19.

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As Hoffman has noted, the broader the spectrum of functions, the more vital become the interests at stake, and the more reluctant will member states be to let supranational policies operate.[20] The logic of functional integration works only for relatively non-controversial functions, when the transfer of powers from national governments to Community authorities tramples on no serious prerogatives. Whenever more critical problems arise, affecting organized vested interests, pressure group conflicts and interstate disputes develop and block the path toward continued integration. When the functions to be integrated are related to vital national interests, the EEC institutions seem completely paralyzed and traditional interstate politics take over.

The Community system has proved itself capable of achieving some degree of coordination that has been beneficial to the member states. But the system has also created many new tensions: between the Commission and each member state, between the member states themselves, and within each member state. Disagreements exist about what form integration should take and about the sequence of stages by which it is to be achieved. Compromises have to be made daily between parties who are often suspicious of each other. Existing economic and political values and attitudes are shifting, but slowly, in response to the open confrontation of contending groups. Central institutions that exercise anything approaching the economic powers of a federal government are not likely to get off the planning boards for many years.

Unless a new loyalty to the European idea can be fostered more rapidly than has thus far proved possible, the difficulties and conflicts arising from the attempt to integrate Western Europe may grow rather than diminish. Only by consolidating success in specific fields can the Community arouse enough confidence to succeed in the vastly larger task of overall European economic integration. Otherwise, the Rome Treaty will not lead Europe to anything more spectacular than the formation of a regional bloc that has been able to maintain certain restricted functional arrangements among its member states; if this is the case, then the sovereign state will continue to dominate the European scene whenever vital interests are at stake.

[20] Stanley Hoffman, "Discord in Community: The North Atlantic Area as a Partial International System," *International Organization* (Summer 1963), 530.

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LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, REALISM, AND THE SEARCH FOR MINIMUM WORLD ORDER

By RICHARD S. MILLER

Kenneth S. Carlston, *Law and Organization in World Society*, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1962, 356 pp. $6.50.
C. Wilfred Jenks, *Law, Freedom and Welfare*, Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana Publications, Inc., 1963, 162 pp. $6.00.

IN recent years the parlous state of public order in the world community has become an irresistible goad to creative energy by legal scholars. Unfortunately, the significance of many potentially valuable contributions to an improved order has been diluted by the tendency of writers to approach their thesis from the limited perspective of their own discipline as a more or less closed system, or to develop their views while suffering from what Harold Lasswell has referred to as the "syndrome of parochialism."[1] In an era characterized by intensive professional specialization and mounting chauvinism, the international lawyer who can surmount the parochialism of his own profession and his own cultural predispositions is a rarity indeed; the paragon who can do so consistently is even rarer.

Yet the intricacies of disarray in the decentralized, horizontal system of world public order[2] will obviously not yield in any significant degree to the blandishments of positivistic rule manipulators—no matter how broadly international their perspectives may be—nor to recommendations constructed from the vantage point of the policy and value preferences of only a fraction of the participants in the global community. Proposals for bringing the world's legal order beyond its current state of near anarchy tend to be merely precatory unless they are firmly grounded in the realities of international life. Such realities include all the relevant features of the dynamic and complex decision-

[1] Myres S. McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano, *Law and Minimum World Public Order* (New Haven 1961), xxi.

[2] For descriptions of the structure of legal organization in the world community, see Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, *The Political Foundations of International Law* (New York 1961), 19-29; Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell, "The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order," *American Journal of International Law*, LIII (January 1959), 1; and Richard A. Falk, "International Jurisdiction: Horizontal and Vertical Conceptions of Legal Order," *Temple Law Quarterly*, XXXII (Spring 1959), 295.

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making processes in which such proposals are to be implemented, as well as the external and internal conditioning factors which influence decision-makers and other participants in those processes.[3]

The two works under consideration in this article differ markedly in the extent to which they take account of these realities and in their methodology as well. C. Wilfred Jenks, in *Law, Freedom and Welfare*, has collected a series of seven of his lectures and papers which proceed further along the lines of his earlier work, *The Common Law of Mankind*.[4] Essentially, Jenks's approach is that of the experienced international lawyer working within the framework of legal positivism[5] to increase respect for rules of international law and thereby to encourage states which are members of the international community to submit their conduct to the application of those rules. He directs his scholarship to international lawyers and seeks to enlist their aid in promoting the growth of the scope of international law into areas of human concern such as freedom and welfare, which hitherto have been left largely in the domain of intrastate or regional competence. His aim is to encourage optimism (and "faith and creative vision") for this task by reporting the formidable advancements made by international and regional organizations in prescribing new norms and recommending new standards in these areas, and to foster a climate of urgency by calling attention to the grand scale of the risks thrust upon all states by innovations of modern technology and to the desperate need for mastery of these newly perceived "laws of nature."

Jenks attempts to create new bases for cooperative effort in the prescription and ultimate subjection of all states to new norms of international conduct by locating an acceptable common morality—"the product of an enlightened self-interest"—by proving the existence of a new basis of legal obligation—"the will of the world community"—by finding that "interdependence of states" has replaced independence as a basic concept of international law, and by calling for a universality

[3] Cf. McDougal and Lasswell, "Identification and Appraisal."

[4] London 1958.

[5] Critics of *The Common Law of Mankind* have referred to Jenks as a legal positivist who has regressed. They assert that he not only fails to consider law as operating within the context of its "social environment," but also has lagged behind those "progressive" positivists who study law as it is applied to concrete cases. See Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz, "Some Criticisms of C. Wilfred Jenks' Approach to International Law," *Rutgers Law Review*, XIV (Fall 1959), 1. This writer finds that the perceptive criticism of Jenks's approach contained in the Rutgers article is equally applicable to *Law, Freedom and Welfare*.

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of perspective which will encompass all the legal systems of the world in searching out "general principles of law."

As an appeal to lawyers and jurists of the Austinian school and others of a cynical disposition to discard their debilitating view of international law as "not-law," *Law, Freedom and Welfare* is unexceptionable, and indeed praiseworthy. As an antidote to pejorism in international relations it represents "the power of positive thinking" in its highest form. And many internationalists will join Jenks in his attack on parochialism. But insofar as this work purports to be "a positive programme of bold but practical action" (p. ix) to broaden the scope and applicability of the rule of law in international affairs,[6] it tends to overlook a host of factors the consideration of which is essential to its success. Jenks apparently eschews the policy-science approach to scholarship urged upon him by some of his earlier critics[7] which would have required him to consider in a systematic way all of the relevant configurations of the processes of interaction with which he dealt before arriving at his formulations. This is not to suggest that the carefully reasoned recommendations of a distinguished legal scholar of international reputation are not entitled to earnest consideration, nor that we are entitled to presume that Jenks, a lawyer with more than thirty-three years of acquaintance with international organizations, did not rely heavily upon his vast experience with international decision-making and his understanding of global conditions, including the predispositions of the decision-makers themselves, in developing his proposals. Indeed, it is the disordered state of these conditions which provided the impetus for his writing. Rather, it is to suggest that his unwillingness to consider systematically the ways in which all of the relevant features of the world community bear upon the process of decision has seriously limited the feasibility of his recommendations. This is especially true with respect to situations of high value intensity,[8] the very situations which Jenks believes must be subjected to authoritative control by international law.[9]

[6] Jenks is somewhat disdainful of legal scholarship in international law which does not motivate action. (*Ibid.*, 11.)

[7] See, e.g., Florentino P. Feliciano, book review, *Yale Law Journal*, LXVIII (April 1959); and Falk and Mendlovitz, "Some Criticisms."

[8] By "high value intensity" I simply refer to situations in which the participants tend jealously to guard their interests, their values, and their freedom of action. Arms control, disarmament, and the status of West Berlin are classic examples. However, any situation in which important resources or institutions are sought to be subjected to international control or agreement can become of high value intensity once a relationship to cold war politics becomes publicized.

[9] E.g., "The primary function of international law in the contemporary world is to outlaw recourse to armed force" (p. 53).

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For example, his proposal for the development of a universally applicable body of rules through comparative study and synthesis of diverse legal systems (chap. VII) fails to take into adequate account the complementarity of legal doctrines which provides a choice to decision-makers to select among competing rules based on value preferences and policy.[10] The supposition that such universality will promote submission to international adjudication ignores the historical datum that states wedded to the civilization and culture out of which modern international law has sprung have at times refused to commit themselves unconditionally to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.[11] It also pays insufficient attention to the major reason for such refusals: deeply rooted adherence to concepts of sovereignty and independence which provide protection, or which national decision-makers *believe* provide protection, from external control and manipulation of highly esteemed interests and values of the domestic society. In short, the proposal for universality, in which Jenks calls for a massive research effort and a heavy commitment of resources and scholarship to the study of comparative law, seriously overemphasizes the value of rules over the rule of values.[12]

Jenks's view that interdependence has replaced dependence as a basic concept, that there is a common morality upon which international law can be based, and that the collective will of the world community is the emerging basis of obligation in international law, while ennobling, are unfortunately subject to similar criticism. It is curious that in seeking support for the last proposition Jenks turns to psychol-

[10] The complementarity of legal rules and their "normative ambiguity" are discussed in McDougal and Feliciano, *Law and Minimum World Public Order.*

[11] The most notorious example is the Connally reservation. Declaration by the President of the United States of America, August 14, 1946, Respecting Recognition by the United States of America of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, para. 2(b), 61 Stat. 1218, T.I.A.S. No. 1598.

[12] The criticism is not that Jenks fails to recognize the effect of national interests of a non-legal nature on the acceptance of international law, for he states: "National attitudes toward questions of public international law have frequently been, and continue to be, influenced by national conceptions of public policy which have generally had more of the flavour of interests than of that of legal conceptions" (p. 142). Rather, it concerns his failure, in recommending research toward a synthesis of legal traditions, to give sufficient weight to this factor.

Professor Carlston, on the other hand, is fully cognizant of the impact of national policies and values. He states, as essential propositions: "The orientation of a state official toward a rule of international law as a factor in his decision making will be to take action at the outer limits of rationality in the application of the rule when it conflicts with national policy and values" (p. 165). And, "Decision making in the international system is predominantly made by those in authoritative roles who view situations of an international character in the light of their respective national cultures, value systems, and goals" (p. 141).

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ogy and the "sociology of politics" (p. 94),[13] whereas he scrupulously avoids interdisciplinary consultation in placing his own recommendations for action within the framework of global processes of decision. What is being criticized here, of course, is not his classical erudition, but rather his failure to come to grips with the discouraging but nonetheless vital fact that a multitude of factors—political, economic, sociological, ideological, and psychological—coupled with serious divergences of value goals and premises and further exacerbated by distorted images of world affairs on the part of the power elites of nation-states, account for the continued reluctance to submit major issues of peace, freedom, and welfare to authoritative and effective decision-making on a global scale. Thus, his emphasis on the importance of formulating moral and philosophical bases for new prescriptions is largely misplaced, reflecting a dangerously oversimplified perception of why international adjudication and legislation have been ineffective.[14]

As compared with Jenks, Kenneth Carlston, in *Law and Organization in World Society*, exhibits far greater willingness to contend with the realities of international life. Two major differences are evident. First, Carlston displays the skepticism of the American legal realist regarding the role which legal rules play in international decision-making, recognizing that policy with respect to value objectives is ordinarily the decisive factor (p. x).[15] Like Jenks, he believes that perspectives of universality are important to the advancement of law and organization in the world community, but his conception of universality emphasizes the need to identify and then develop practices and institutions designed to maximize *universally shared values*, not just to synthesize and discover universally shared legal norms. Secondly, his research and his theory rely heavily upon the collected wisdom

[13] Specifically, he refers to Walter Lippmann, *The Phantom Public* (New York 1925).

[14] The relative ineffectiveness of finding a moral basis of obligation as a means of explaining conformity or non-conformity to international law has been asserted by Professors McDougal and Feliciano: "Amorphous, transcendental notions of an 'inherent binding force' and 'basis of obligation' may be useful in the exhortation of the conscience of peoples. Propositions cast in the solemn terms of 'binding obligation' probably do in measure commit and engage peoples' consciences. The suggestion we make, however, is that the clarification of fundamental policy and the explicit relating of specific alternatives in decision to the basic demands, expectations, and identifications of peoples constitute, again because of the postulate of maximization, much the more effective way of organizing, channeling, and harnessing their perspectives to the implementation of minimum order and as well of international law generally" (p. 278).

[15] Professor Carlston has had better than thirty years of experience in the practice and teaching of international law.

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of disciplines other than law, frequently drawing support from studies of political scientists, economists, sociologists, and others.

For these reasons alone, one is entitled to expect a less romantic perception of the province and function of law in global relations from Carlston than from Jenks. This expectation is heightened by the fact, made explicit in Carlston's foreword (p. vii), that he is adopting a scientific approach to his inquiry, wherein a specific problem, a microcosm of global conflict, will serve first as a seeding ground for the author's theory of law and organization in world society, and then as a laboratory for testing some of the propositions which compose his theory.

As his core problem Carlston selected the nationalization of concession agreements. The features of this problem were then explored, not solely for the purpose of analyzing the legal doctrine which regulates the problem, but in order to determine "its factual aspects and ramifications, the values and perceptions of the actors involved, the nature of its social, economic, and political setting, and the function and ends which the relevant rules of law should serve"(p. 8).

Unfortunately, the failure to adopt a more systematic approach to the factual features of the problem detracts somewhat from the fulfillment of Carlston's objective.[16] Nonetheless, he draws a vivid picture of the important role of the concession agreement in serving the needs of the economies of both the industrially developed and the developing states and of the international, as well as the national, role which such agreements play. His examination of the economic implications of trade relationships between the have and have-not states and international commodity problems underlines not only the factual interdependence of states but the phenomenon that interdependence, when it works unfavorably toward the developing nations, as it has since the Second World War, is a cause of frustration which often results in resort to nationalization and unrealistic demands for autarky. His perception of the fact that interstate symbiosis is not necessarily a basis for "international solidarity or integration," but can become so only in conjunction with the simultaneous realization of valued goals (p. 99),

[16] A more systematic methodology, which would have ensured that no relevant stone was left unturned, has been developed by Professors McDougal and Lasswell of the Yale Law School and applied, with variations, by a number of contemporary legal scholars. Briefly, it requires examination of all participants, their value objectives, the situations in which they are functioning, their base values, their strategies, the specific outcomes of the process, and the longer-term effects on the participants, their values, and the various communities which are affected. See Myres S. McDougal, "Some Basic Theoretical Concepts About International Law: A Policy-Oriented Framework of Inquiry," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, IV (September 1960), 337.

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points out the fallacy in Jenks's approach to interdependence as a basic concept of international law replacing that of dependence. For, in the current state of international relations, it appears to be the chafing of the developing nations at the ill effects of their *factual* dependence upon the industrialized nations which has contributed to their assertions of rights of *legal* independence and sovereignty.

Turning from economics to examination of the societal structures of states engaged in nationalization, Carlston hypothesizes, and then seeks to prove, that such structures exhibit consistent patterns. He refers to such states as "veneer states," which fail to exhibit in all their cultural patterns the characteristics of more highly developed societies, but contain a large population segment that does not share widely in the realization of important values monopolized by the elite (chap. IV). The lesson which Carlston draws from this part of the study, and indeed the major thesis of his book, is that submission to the authority of law and the creation of a stable world organization are predicated upon the requirement that "law . . . should secure the conditions necessary for effective interaction in the system with a view to realizing commonly shared values by the actors, as well as adherence to ideal and valued norms of behavior" (p. 285).

Having examined the factual and historical patterns of nationalization, its causes, and its effects on international economic relations, Carlston then proceeds (after first expounding upon the detailed propositions which compose his theory of law and organization) to an examination of the juridical aspects of nationalization. The technique adopted is to state and examine the technical legal doctrine as it has been applied and manipulated by various decision-making bodies and then to find a norm. That norm's validity is tested by determining the extent to which it affects the realization of values shared by the actors who are to submit themselves to such norms and, in addition, the extent to which it meets other criteria of authoritativeness and effectiveness prescribed by the author in his theory of the province and function of law. He draws the conclusion that

> The international law norm governing a premature termination by a state of a concession agreement with an alien effected by an act of nationalization is that such action will entail international responsibility to the state of which the alien is a national to make prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.
>
> The above legal norm represents an ideal and valued norm of behavior by virtue of the fact that it embodies an acceptable composite or adjustment of the values involved in the situations to which the norm is applicable (pp. 283-84).

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The sections of the author's work described above,[17] which deal explicitly with the various contextual and juridical features of nationalization of concession agreements, are deemed by Carlston to "illustrate the functional manner in which international legal questions should be investigated and stated" (p. ix).

The remainder of the book contains Carlston's elaborate theoretical formulation of the organizational structure of world society and the province and function of law within that society. Through a series of interdependent propositions and recommendations, drawing heavily on the work of behaviorists and social scientists as well as on his own earlier work,[18] he develops the thesis that successful world organization and the advancement of law and authority in international relations will depend greatly on the extent to which the organization and the law tend to maximize the realization of values shared by the participants at all cultural levels.

Depending, as it does, both on "empirical observation of human behavior" reported by the behavioral sciences and on a realistic view of jurisprudence, Carlston's value-oriented theory represents a substantial contribution to the understanding of the basic postulates of world public order. In many ways, Carlston has explicitly taken into account those vital factors the importance of which Jenks has only dimly perceived.[19]

It is the writer's view, however, that the merit of both works must ultimately be judged by the extent to which their conclusions and recommendations are the product of a realistic conception of *all* of the *relevant* features of the process of decision in the world society, and by the degree to which they convincingly orient the reader toward such reality. Traditional patterns of global interaction, which as a result of technological advance have become suicidal, cannot be altered if

[17] I.e., chaps. I-IV and propositions 9 and 10 of chap. VII.

[18] *Law and Structures of Social Action* (New York 1956).

[19] It would not do Jenks justice to suggest that his enthrallment with doctrine entirely excludes concern for underlying policy. Thus, the common law of mankind toward which he directs his effort is seen as a body of law which will advance the widely shared values of "human dignity, economic stability and growth, and the enlistment of technological change in the service of man" (p. 57). Furthermore, his concept of universality is unquestionably premised on the view that submission to supranational authority by emerging states is dependent upon the degree to which the norms applied by such authority incorporate values shared by such states. In his lecture, "The Challenge of Universality," for example, he grudgingly agreed with Professor McDougal that "the effective authority of any legal system depends in the long run upon the underlying common interests of the participants in the system" (p. 148). It is, however, his response to the foregoing that is disappointing; he calls merely for "a rigorous analysis of the *concepts* being compared" as "the first step towards any synthesis [of legal doctrine] of real value" (*ibid.*, italics added).

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those guiding the action do not perceive the changes of conditions which require a changed response. This perception, in turn, must be at a high level of consciousness, and must be accompanied by an equally conscious recognition of the immediate and consequential effects of such changes, both actual and potential, on the value structure of the decision-maker himself and those for whose well-being he is responsible.

While the scope of this article does not permit a restatement of the work of the few distinguished legal scholar-scientists who are working feverishly against time to develop a creative role for law within the framework of the decentralized, partially polarized, world society, it may serve a useful purpose to rehearse here some of the global conditions which must be taken into account in developing that role.

(1) *The decentralized, non-judicial nature of decision-making at the transnational level.* Professor McDougal and others have pointed out that the global society is made up of diverse systems of order in which those who possess formal authority for making decisions that have the greatest impact on the entire society are usually officials of nation-states who also occupy the role of claimants on behalf of their own states.[20] When such officials believe that particular claims bear heavily on the prominent values of their own state—whether such belief is justified or not—the effect of legal doctrine as a factor in decision-making becomes minimal, while considerations of policy become decisive. As modern history clearly indicates, doctrine is often manipulated to justify policy ends,[21] and as Carlston suggests, in the long run the norms are adhered to only to the extent that they assist, directly or indirectly, in the realization or preservation of desired values.

But, and this is crucial, the fact that adherence to a particular norm (or to international law in general) will serve important value goals

[20] Cf. Myres S. McDougal and Associates, *Studies in World Public Order* (New Haven 1960), 276.

[21] This practice is evident in every phase of international legal relations from claims to exercise the right of self-defense, claims to exercise jurisdiction or competence over persons and resources, etc., up to claims relating to the basis of obligation and sources of international law. The writings of some of the Soviet legal theorists, for example, indicate the way in which the sources of international law can be manipulated to serve national policy. See, e.g., G. I. Tunkin, "Remarks on the Juridical Nature of Customary Norms of International Law," *California Law Review,* XLIX (August 1961), 419; and Tunkin, "Coexistence et Droit International," Hague Academy of International Law, *Recueil des Cours,* XCV (1958), I. Incidentally, these articles also point up the almost insurmountable difficulty of getting the Soviet Union to accept, at a doctrinal level, Jenks's views that the will of the world community is replacing consent as a basis of obligation in international law or that interdependence is being substituted for independence as a basic international legal concept.

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of the state will not result in its application by the official unless its relation to such goals is clearly perceived both by the official and by those participants in the process of decision who influence his action.

(2) *The effective, as distinguished from the formal, decision-makers within the various orders which compose the world community are widely dispersed.* Depending upon the nature of the society involved, the official in whom formal decision-making authority reposes is controlled and influenced to varying degrees by other participants—individuals and groups—both within and without his own society. In a pluralistic democratic society, the power and influence of such participants are widely dispersed. Nonetheless, their perspectives, myths, and valued institutions exercise considerable influence upon decision-making by those in formal authority.[22] In a totalitarian society the dispersion of authority is not as great, but the formal decision-maker is still compelled to consider not only the demands and expectations of other members of the power elite within his own state, but external pressures as well, if he is to retain his power position. It follows, therefore, that before those officials with the formal authority to make decisions of international import can be expected to adhere to universally accepted norms, those who influence them must also be convinced that adherence to such norms will maximize their own esteemed values, or at least not erode them.

(3) *The "reality gap."* The failure of the states which comprise the world community to submit themselves to the application of universal norms applied by independent judicial organs, or to move at anything more than snail's pace toward the creation of effective institutions designed to control the unilateral resort to force, may thus be ascribed to a pervasive blindness to the dangers and opportunities of the modern world. Whatever the causes—and the social psychologists, sociologists, and even psychiatrists have contributed a great deal to our understanding of such causes[23]—there is a gap in reality of cataclysmic proportions between the popular myth—appropriate for a bygone era—that a powerful nation-state is the ideal vehicle for value

[22] Official statements to the contrary notwithstanding, it is interesting to speculate whether President Johnson's decision of August 4, 1964, to retaliate against North Vietnamese bases for the torpedo boat attacks on United States destroyers would have been of the same intensity if his opponent in the next presidential election had not been urging greater bellicosity against the Communists. To what extent can decision-makers, acting under the pressures of a demand for immediate decision in a situation of high crisis, exclude such factors from their consideration?

[23] See, e.g., Roger Fisher, ed., *International Conflict and Behavioral Science: The Craigville Papers* (New York 1964), and Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, *Psychiatric Aspects of Prevention of Nuclear War* (New York 1964).

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protection (and creation) and the facts of the real world, which inexorably lead to the conclusion that organization and collective security present the only viable alternatives to total destruction and that transnational cooperation and mutual assistance are the best avenues to the solution of the world's economic and social problems.[24] Thus, as the danger of nuclear war between the United States and the USSR has diminished slightly because of the deterrent effect of the balance of terror, the centrifugal forces of irresponsible nationalism have been released in every corner of the globe and grow apace as if the danger of nuclear war had disappeared entirely. As part of this development, the growth of the interdependence of states—upon which Jenks based his new concept of interdependence—is retarded by demands for political and economic independence on behalf of practically all states. Even the paragon of regional economic cohesion, the European Common Market, displays growing signs of difficulty in both its political and economic aspects by virtue of reluctance to sacrifice national interests for the greater good of the entire region.[25]

In this context, what McDougal and Feliciano have suggested, in discussing sanctioning processes in the world community, becomes of wider relevance: "The most immediately relevant tasks of scholars and others concerned for the establishment of inclusive sanctioning processes appropriate to a world public order of freedom, security and abundance would thus appear to lie, not so much in the invention and evaluation of specific new legal techniques, as in the design and execution of appropriate alternatives in communication and collaboration for promoting the necessary changes in the perspectives of the effective decision-makers of the world."[26] International lawyers and legal scholars of the stature of Jenks and Carlston can bring skills and knowledge to these tasks far beyond mere talent for manipulating legal doctrine and theory.

In the first place, *they can reorient the perspectives of their audience.* They can utilize their understanding of the realities of conditions in the world community, coupled with their influence and skills in communication, to shatter the anachronistic illusions of the influential per-

[24] Cf. J. W. Fulbright, *Prospects for the West* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963).

[25] Cf. P. H. Spaak's comment in *European Community*, LXXII (June 1964), 7: "Even if we leave aside the problems of Great Britain's possible entry into the Common Market, and the increasingly grave and important question of our relation with the United States, we must accept the fact that at present there is little chance of further progress towards political unity in Europe. The difference in approach is so great and so profound that it is difficult to conceive of anyone proposing a compromise, let alone accepting one. This is just not the time."

[26] McDougal and Feliciano, *Law and Minimum World Public Order*, 375.

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sons who make up their audience. This calls for a description of interaction in the world community which gives ample attention to such realities as the cold war, nuclear weaponry, major technological and scientific advances, the so-called "revolution of rising expectations," the "population explosion," the emergence of new states, the rise of socialism, demands for autarky, and especially the demands, expectations, and identifications of world decision-makers, and which attempts to test the impact of these realities upon the trends of world decision-making. While Carlston has considered many of these factors in developing his thesis, Jenks has apparently found contemplation of most of them too depressing to warrant an examination of their impact upon the effectiveness of his proposals.[27]

They can create an awareness of the impact of such realities upon the preservation, destruction, and production of values and, in turn, upon global decision-making processes. Although it is idle to suggest that the world's effective decision-makers are not aware, for example, of the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons, the extent to which there is full appreciation, at a high level of consciousness, of the degree to which nuclear arms immediately threaten all values is open to question. So it is, to an even greater extent, with the potentialities inherent in the other mentioned conditions. Scholars of international law, therefore, can contribute much through their writing and personal influence toward fuller comprehension of the relationship among conditions, values, and decisions. What is especially required is the fullest exposition of the possibilities for the maximization of all values through modern science and technology, leading to widespread recognition of the fact that the cold war and nationalism are primitive, inefficient, and dangerous instrumentalities for achieving value goals as compared with international organization, cooperation, and stable conditions of world order. Here of course, as in describing conditions, the legal scholar will have to rely heavily on the lore of other disciplines, but it is the characteristic of the great lawyer that

[27] Mr. Jenks recognizes that "on major questions of personal freedom, political organisation and economic policy, and above all on matters involving relative power and the strategy of self-protection and self-aggrandizement, there are cleavages of view which it would be idle to minimise" (p. 95). It seems to this reviewer, however, that he does minimize them when he adds: "These divisions within the world community inevitably limit and weaken the substantial content of its laws and make the continued existence of the community itself precarious, but they do not in themselves deprive it of its character of a community with a law derived from and supported by its common will." Or, "The problems which confront the world community, grave as they may be, do not impair its character as a community or the binding nature and potentially reasonably comprehensive ambit of its law" (pp. 95-96).

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he can absorb and comprehend the non-legal technical aspects of the problem with which he deals. Had Jenks carefully examined the relationship between world conditions and value maximization he might have discovered that his "common morality" could be made more appealing and ultimately more acceptable[28] if based on realizable universally held aspirations for the good life, coupled with realistic fears of total value destruction, rather than merely being "the product of an enlightened self-interest which does to others as it would be done to primarily because an accepted code of conduct eliminates some of the uncertainty of life and makes it less 'nasty, brutish and short'" (p. 66).[29]

For Carlston, however, the success of organization and law depends upon the degree to which they provide a vehicle for the protection and realization of widely shared values. Unfortunately, in developing his study of nationalization he falls short of the suggested objective by reason of his failure to treat adequately such elements of his subject as investment guarantee insurance, the ability to pay adequate compensation promptly and its economic effect on the developing nation, and the degree of tenacity with which perspectives leading to confiscation are held.[30]

Lastly, *international legal scholars can develop realistic alternatives for decision-makers.* There can be little doubt that harassed political leaders of the major power-wielding states are looking for, but not finding, courses of action which will enable them both to lessen international tensions without sacrificing national interests and to get

[28] Jenks asserts that "we must seek a basis of obligation which will hold effectively the allegiance of mankind" (p. 88) and "a concept which has the simplicity, the authority and the dynamic quality necessary to establish the obligation of international law in the hearts and minds of the people" (p. 89).

[29] The quoted phrase is deemed to be the basis of a "commercial morality" which is similar to "the morality necessary to sustain an effective system of international law" (*ibid.*). While it is no doubt true that the desire for certainty and order plays a large part in the development of universal norms of commercial law, the realizable hope for profit or, in the behaviorist's terms, the maximization postulate is probably the major factor.

[30] Careful examination of these factors might have led to a more realistic conclusion that the norm which uniformly requires "prompt, adequate and effective compensation," as those terms are generally defined by lawyers in developed countries, is not necessarily the norm best designed, in the current state of world conditions, to result in the widest realization of values. Compare Frank G. Dawson and Burns H. Weston, "Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino: New Wine in Old Bottles," *University of Chicago Law Review*, XXXI (Autumn 1963), 63; and "Prompt, Adequate and Effective: A Universal Standard of Compensation?" *Fordham Law Review*, XXX (April 1962), 727.

A more comprehensive methodology for exploring difficult legal problems of contemporary importance is applied in McDougal, Lasswell, and Vlasic, *Law and Public Order in Space* (New Haven 1963).

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on with the business of economic and cultural development. In large measure, the failure of many of the current proposals to win their approval is attributable to the disorientation of the leaders themselves and those who influence them, as suggested above. This aspect of the problem will not yield to short-term solution; reorientation in perspectives of reality requires a committed elite working over a span of time with every available instrument of communication. In the meantime, however, there are opportunities for scholars to develop specific proposals of varying degrees of modesty for moving toward the goal of minimum order even within the framework of a "reality gap." For such proposals to succeed, they must not irritate the raw nerves of global conflict—the cold war, colonialism, intervention, aggression—nor violate the current taboos of internal politics of the participating states—appeasement, loss of sovereignty, recidivism, etc.[31] On the positive side, they must enhance some recognized value goal shared by the participants—some common interest—no matter how modest. The more effective proposals will fulfill widely shared and frequently articulated desires for rapprochement among cold war rivals, and will have as their objective the restoration of order or the advancement of scientific, technological, cultural, and economic goals. The major gains of the last few years, such as the Antarctic treaty, the nuclear test ban treaty, the mutual, voluntary limitation on the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and the sale of wheat to the USSR by the United States, have all exhibited these characteristics.

It is in the area of techniques for developing such proposals that Jenks's broad experience as an international civil servant in the ILO yields up his most valuable theory. He recommends that in areas where broadly drawn agreements, such as the Draft Conventions on Human Rights, fail to secure wide adherence, a piecemeal approach can be more fruitful. Similarly, with respect to the growth of international organization, he recognizes the practical difficulty of developing the United Nations into a centralized organization along the

[31] It does not matter much if the proposals actually do constitute intervention, in any of the senses in which that term has been used, or do entail a limitation of freedom of action (loss of sovereignty), etc., so long as this is not publicized and exploited to the point where the authoritative decision-maker is forced by political pressures to abandon them. Thus the way in which words, slogans, and symbols are manipulated becomes relevant. For example, chances for ratification by the United States of the consular treaty with the USSR will be improved if it is popularly treated as "a gain for democracy and the open society" rather than as a "strengthening of diplomatic ties between the United States and the Soviet Union." Unfortunately, the latter approach has already been inaugurated by opponents of the treaty. See *New York Times*, June 12, 1964.

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lines of familiar national patterns, and recommends instead the decentralization of responsibility for the functions of international government along lines which have already appeared, toward "a new form of functional federalism" (p. 31). And Carlston, though less directly concerned with decentralization, has stated: "The task of establishing a viable international organization, in which authority is exercised as a means of coordinating action to maximize value realization by the members of the organization, is one of establishing a set of conditions in which the members, as actors in the organization, will move fluidly through a sequence of situations in which they accept authority, at first minimally, with slight commitment of time, action, and resources, and low risk of value impairment, and thereafter, in successively larger commitments of time, action, and resources and higher risk of value impairment. Such a set of conditions involves planning a sequence of goals embodying a desired pattern of value realization" (p. 115).

Both, therefore, seem to share a healthy skepticism about the possibility of attaining Utopian schemes of international organization overnight, and both seem to recognize the need for limiting goals to negotiable proportions.[32] Yet techniques alone are not enough, and neither work contains specific proposals for meeting the most immediate needs of the times—the inclusive sharing of force and the prevention of escalation. Other legal scholars, however, have developed such proposals. Professors Falk and Mendlovitz, for example, have recommended "precautionary intervention" by the United Nations to resolve situations of social conflict existing within developing states while such situations are relatively depoliticized and remote from the paralyzing effects of the cold war.[33] If their proposal gains acceptance and proves effective over time, its success will be mainly attributable to the fact that they frankly faced up to the obstacles as well as to the benefits which could be expected.

Finally, to mention an emerging possibility, the recent proposal of the USSR for the establishment of a standing international peacekeeping force through the Security Council of the United Nations[34] may have within it the seeds of an acceptable plan for inclusive shar-

[32] Their views seem to be in general accord with the sophisticated but practical technique of "fractionating conflict," recently developed by Professor Fisher. (Roger Fisher, "Fractionating Conflict," *Daedalus* [Summer 1964], 920.) He proposes that the scope of the issues submitted to international negotiations can be narrowed or broadened in order to enhance the possibility of agreement.

[33] Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz, "Towards a Warless World: One Legal Formula to Achieve Transition," *Yale Law Journal*, LXXIII (January 1964), 399.

[34] See *New York Times*, July 5, 1964, IV; July 7, 1964.

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ing of force by all nations to prevent the growing demands of arrant nationalism from disrupting world order. It is suggested that this proposal may be more than a mere propaganda effort and, if so, may have a greater chance for successful implementation than has generally been recognized. While this article cannot serve as the vehicle for lengthy exposition of the reasoning in support of this view, it may be useful to point out that the proposal may be born not only out of dissatisfaction with the Uniting for Peace Resolutions and unwillingness to pay for earlier peace-keeping operations, but also out of a recognition by Soviet leaders that their own ability to manipulate and control global conflict to their own ends has declined substantially in a relative sense vis-à-vis the lesser powers as a result of the paralyzing effect of the balance of deterrent power, and that the danger of uncontrolled and undesired escalation has therefore increased substantially.[35] It is not unreasonable, therefore, to suggest that the Soviet Union may now be prepared to cooperate in the creation of an international force designed to prevent escalation in situations where its influence would otherwise prove ineffective to bring a conflict under control, as in Laos and Vietnam and possibly in Cyprus.[36] That such a force and its operation would be subject to the veto in the Security Council would not seem to undermine its effectiveness if the basic premise—that the use of such a force would serve Soviet policy—has any validity.[37] It will be recalled that cooperation among major states based on mutual interests in preserving peace is what the framers of the United Nations had in mind in 1945.

[35] Cf. Grayson Kirk, "World Perspectives, 1964," *Foreign Affairs,* XLIII (October 1964), 1. Mr. Kirk suggests that, partly as a result of the nuclear "balance of frustration," the relative status of the United States and the USSR in the world has been declining. He takes support for his position from Senator Fulbright's statement in *Old Myths and New Realities* (New York 1964), 54: "By their acquisition of nuclear weapons the two great powers have destroyed the traditional advantages which size and resources had placed at their disposal." Other knowledgeable commentators have also noted this phenomenon. See, e.g., Joseph C. Harsch, "Changing Times at Berlin Wall," *Christian Science Monitor*, September 21, 1964; James Reston, "Saigon and U.S. Power," *New York Times*, August 31, 1964; and Edward Crankshaw, "East and West Enter a New Phase," *New York Times Magazine*, August 30, 1964.

[36] The establishing and financing of a United Nations peace force through the General Assembly, rather than the Security Council, might seem to be a simple solution, but the Soviet Union's recorded opposition, based on legal and political factors, is too well known to permit a reversal in the near future. Furthermore, it is probably true that exercise of the Security Council veto against peace-keeping operations, at least in situations in which the danger of escalation is not serious, will remain an important strategy of the Soviet Union.

[37] Cf. Roger Fisher, "Should We Veto the Troika?" *New Republic*, August 21, 1961, 11-14, reprinted in *Legal and Political Problems of World Order*, ed. by Saul H. Mendlovitz (New York 1962), 276.

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It is the irony of this era that the effective decision-makers of the global community maintain the self-destructive perspectives of the lemming while available knowledge and resources bring near-Utopian goals of peace, human welfare, and dignity within reach. Much of the cause can be attributed to a "reality gap" of cosmic proportions. It is an important task of scholars, therefore, to discover and then to describe to all those who participate in decision-making in the global arena the real conditions of the world society and the relationship between these conditions and the values of human dignity. This is essentially a task of communication for the purpose of changing perspectives. It is far from hopeless; history has already proved that perspectives held by entire societies can be changed almost overnight, and the instruments of global communication have never been more effective than they are today.

Then, building upon a foundation of reality, legal scholars can develop programs, plans, and proposals which offer alternatives for decision-makers that not only promote the values of human dignity, but are tailored for acceptance under existing conditions. Most immediately, the need is for specific proposals to bring the alarming recent development of lesser-power irrationality, conflict, and resort to coercion within a system of international authority and effective control.

The needs and possibilities of order and international organization to promote the advancement of human welfare on a global scale are perceived by both Carlston and Jenks. They do not suffer from the paralysis of parochialism or the pessimism of myopia. The merit of Jenks's work lies in its persuasiveness in urging international lawyers to enlist in the cause of an international law for human welfare and freedom and in its observations drawn from a rich experience. Its failures are the consequence of the tendency, perhaps natural in a lawyer steeped in the tradition of the common law, to elevate the importance of doctrine over the search for agreement on underlying policies. Kenneth Carlston, on the other hand, has given us a carefully drawn view of the role of law in world society which furnishes more than a little light in the search for global institutions to serve human dignity.

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THE USSR, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE GENERAL WELFARE

By LEON GORDENKER

Harold Karan Jacobson, *The USSR and the UN's Economic and Social Activities*, Notre Dame, Ind., University of Notre Dame Press, 1963, 309 pp. $6.95.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *The Soviets in International Organizations: Changing Policy Toward Developing Countries, 1953–1963*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1964, 380 pp. $7.50.

I

INTERNATIONAL organizations have long been called "forums" and "sounding boards" for national governments. But these facile metaphors have less often been followed with careful accounts of what was being argued in the international marketplace and what tones and reverberations the resonators were projecting. Yet international organization activities clearly do provide national governments with opportunities and encouragement to exhibit the substance of their foreign policies. The international organizations might well be treated as useful indicators of governmental aspirations and intentions. Readings from such indicators could have particular importance in understanding the policies of governments whose decision processes are shielded by difficult communications or deliberate secrecy.

The Soviet Union is one such government. For all its prestige, vast diplomatic corps, and even more encompassing propaganda facilities, its policies can be difficult to describe, let alone understand. Its decision processes remain hidden. Key personnel often are unknown in the international environment. No legislative committees obligingly report the detailed reasoning which underlies specific policies. Nevertheless, the influence of the Soviet Union is such that a tone sounded in Moscow vibrates through a score of intergovernmental agency headquarters and in widely scattered field posts. From the vantage point of the United Nations and its sister organizations, Soviet policy can be heard in an endless series of declarations. It can also be seen in the engagement of Soviet resources and personnel in an expanding program of operations.

Despite the accessibility of the international organization vantage point, the two books to be discussed here can fairly be called pioneer-

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ing.[1] Each in its way genuinely contributes to knowledge both of the United Nations system and the USSR. Both are meticulous, scholarly, and searching. Both possess a remarkable timeliness, having appeared when the general welfare operations by the United Nations and its sister agencies were breaking through old limitations of scope and when the UN system was entering upon an intense financial crisis; moreover, this was shortly before the Soviet government, having discarded Khrushchev, may perhaps have begun a revision of its policies.

II

The two books complement each other remarkably well. Jacobson's *The USSR and the UN's Economic and Social Activities* has both a longer time span and a broader subject matter than Rubinstein's *The Soviets in International Organizations.* Jacobson analyzes Soviet behavior in the United Nations in terms of substantive programs to promote the general welfare, beginning with the initial constitutional issues. He deals with the major efforts by the United Nations and its associated agencies in assisting refugees, relief and reconstruction, social and economic welfare, international trade, and economic development. Each of these topical headings covers massive documentation and a tangle of organization relationships. Jacobson concentrates on discussions and decisions in the United Nations organs, referring to regional subsidiaries and specialized agencies as necessary to explain and illustrate his analysis. He relies mainly on United Nations documents, which he interprets with sensitivity, and on scholarly materials. He does not use Russian-language sources. A heavy schedule of interviews with participants appears to have contributed to the balance and dispassionateness of his interpretations.

Rubinstein concentrates his study on a single decade of United Nations experience and moves farther afield from United Nations headquarters. His account lacks the comprehensiveness of Jacobson's but has the virtue of fixing on the efforts by the USSR to build up influence among the developing countries. After sketching the rigidity

[1] In general, the flooding stream of words from national governmental representatives in international organizations has been accompanied by only a trickle of scholarly studies. These include the Carnegie Endowment's valuable series of studies of national policies in the UN, most of which are now outdated. The series does not have a volume on the USSR. The most extended and valuable recent attempt to fathom Soviet policy in the United Nations is Alexander Dallin's *The Soviet Union at the United Nations* (New York 1962). It deals with broader subject matter than the two books discussed here and gives much consideration to Soviet policy in relation to the maintenance of peace and security.

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and barrenness of Soviet policy in the general welfare field during the Stalin era, Rubinstein examines Moscow's policies on United Nations technical assistance, its positions on four issues with interesting implications (SUNFED, the International Health and Medical Year, volunteer workers in UN technical aid, and financing economic development), and its performance in one regional subsidiary, the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), and one associated body, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To some extent, these chapters cut across Jacobson's work, but they do so in such a way as to provide additional perspectives and information. In dealing with Soviet personnel in the United Nations system, the Soviet image of the international organizations and the role of ideology in Soviet policy toward the United Nations, Rubinstein goes well beyond the boundaries of Jacobson's study and moreover contributes novel and important new insights into Moscow's policies and maneuvers. Throughout his book, the results of his extensive interviews take the reader behind the official materials into the attitudes and conclusions of national delegates and international civil servants, including some of Soviet nationality. Rubinstein also employs with skill and utility a wide knowledge of Russian-language materials on the United Nations.

Both books seek to explain the nature of Soviet policy in the general welfare sphere and to sort out, as far as that is possible, its determinants. Rubinstein emphasizes the paramount interest of the Soviet leadership in the alignment of international power, and deals with the USSR's activities in international organizations as tactics on "legitimate battlegrounds for advancing Soviet objectives" (p. 317). At the same time, he concludes that the sharp change in the tone of Soviet tactics after the death of Stalin still leaves international organizations in "a marginal place in the Soviet design for security and expansion" (p. 346). Lastly, Rubinstein puts forward policy suggestions for countering Soviet tactics. His concentration on Soviet strategy and tactics tends to attribute to Moscow a higher degree of rationality and singleness of purpose than a skeptical mind might easily accept. The USSR's policies, like those of all governments, are framed in a competitive international environment where actions by other governments may also be successful. Moreover, the ideological framework of Soviet policy, for all that it contributes to consistency, also can distort the factual basis of decisions.

Jacobson does less than Rubinstein with the ideological and strategic preoccupations of the USSR and more with the significance of

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Soviet policy in the operation and development of international institutions. He frames his study around three problems: the meaning and rationale of changes in Soviet policy; the impact of Soviet participation on general welfare activities of the United Nations institutions; and the implications of this experience for the theory of functionalism, the doctrine which holds that international collaboration on economic and social problems can overcome political differences (pp. 14-15). These questions provide a broader framework of analysis than Rubinstein's and have implications well beyond the limits of political warfare. They tend to reinforce Jacobson's determination to remain dispassionate and perhaps encourage him to rather more bland phrasing than Rubinstein employs in his analysis of intrinsically colorful political infighting. Jacobson hesitates either to give easy answers to his questions or to project policy prescriptions. He certainly refuses to take either the position that the participation of the Soviet Union in United Nations discussions relating to the promotion of the general welfare has been an unmitigated disaster, or that Soviet insistence on the politicization of economic and social issues has done no more than meddle with orderly progress toward a world pacified by functionalist cooperation (pp. 278-79).

III

The Soviet Union, as Jacobson (pp. 12-13) and Rubinstein (pp. 30-31) make plain, has sharply shifted from a position in its United Nations participation of almost exclusive preoccupation with security matters to one of at least some concern and sharing in efforts to foster the general welfare. Rubinstein attributes the change to the Soviet government's realization during and after the Korean War that the international organizations could serve to define its interests in the cold war and that the emerging Afro-Arab-Asian bloc had aims complementary to its own. Soviet leaders, he declares, "realized the positive way in which the international organization could be used, in concert with the neutralist nations, to keep the West on the defensive and to strengthen the international position of the Soviet Union" (p. 31). The international organizations nevertheless "hold a marginal place in the Soviet design for security and expansion" (p. 346). Jacobson agrees that changes in the United Nations, especially in its membership, fitted with changes in Soviet strategy (p. 271), which continues to regard the international organizations as combat arenas (p. 278). But he suggests that Soviet participation has also had the bene-

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ficial effects of focussing attention on important substantive problems (pp. 279-83). What the Soviets have not been able to do, Jacobson points out, is to control majority sentiment or prevent its expression in programs opposed by Moscow (p. 281).

If the indicators employed by Jacobson and Rubinstein give accurate readings of the aims of Soviet policy in the United Nations, what is striking is not the effort by Moscow to conduct political warfare or to foster national interests, as it defines them. The whole world is accustomed to the former behavior, which innumerable Communist tracts and speakers proclaim as correct and virtuous for revolutionaries. Nor is a policy of fostering national interest any novelty in the international organizations, where hundreds of national delegates pass their days doing nothing else. What is remarkable is the mastodonic reactions of Soviet policy to developments in the general welfare field. Moscow's political warriors have often seemed laden with traits that no longer have value for survival. Like the latter-day mastodons, they find themselves very uncomfortable indeed in the new climate.

It was after all not until 1953 that the USSR managed to see a possibility of developing influence in the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (EPTA). A Soviet delegate then dramatically displayed a new policy of contributing to EPTA, already well established as a result of cooperation between Western and less developed countries. But the Soviet contribution was in tied rubles, which cannot easily be spent in the USSR in a manner the less developed countries favor and which are useless for hiring the Western experts who are most in demand. The USSR participates in every stage of EPTA work and acts as a gadfly, a role Rubinstein believes produces some effect (p. 89). So no doubt do its attacks on United Nations Resident Representatives, who frequently have close, cordial, and influential relations with host governments. So do its recurring campaigns to undermine the idea of an international civil service, which has much more successfully incorporated personnel from the underdeveloped countries than it has Soviet nationals, who take up their posts in a reserved and uncommitted way (Rubinstein, chap. 4). Some governments in the less-developed world have certainly noticed that by 1963 the number of Soviet nationals serving as Resident Representatives had never totaled more than one. But there has been no surging demand on the part of prospective host countries for Soviet international civil servants. Their ineffectiveness, which Rubinstein documents (p. 287), has perhaps become notorious. Moscow may have learned to act more tactfully in EPTA over the years, as Rubinstein suggests, but

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it is still difficult to believe that the underdeveloped countries have forgotten all of the gaucheries of the Moscow mastodon. It is therefore hard to accept Rubinstein's remark, which is not necessary to his argument, that Soviet participation in EPTA "has produced an impressive harvest" (p. 88).

Indeed, in the probably more important area of United Nations Special Fund operations, Jacobson's comment that despite repeated efforts the USSR failed to do more than "prevent its exclusion from a popular program" (p. 251) seems better to capture the significance of the mastodonic reaction. Jacobson's general conclusion that the Soviet Union's impact on United Nations activities in the field of economic development seems to have been slight therefore appears justified (p. 264). If it is, it points to a failure by the USSR to develop maximum influence by the relatively inexpensive means that devoted, systematic revolutionaries could be expected to favor. It is a mockery of Moscow's pretensions, which Dag Hammarskjöld publicly punctured during the Congo operations, to be the spokesman of the small nations.

IV

Yet Soviet policy did change. The fact raises the question as to whether participation in the United Nations process caused the change. This question has great significance for the future development of international organizations. If Soviet policy did in fact eventually respond directly to the recommendations of the United Nations and the dynamics of participation in a cooperative venture to foster the general welfare, it would be strong evidence that even governments which insist on guarding broadly defined sovereign prerogatives cannot escape entanglement in the sticky web spun by the intergovernmental agencies. Once entangled, such a government would find it difficult to escape without causing a disturbance that might damagingly expose hitherto unsuspected aspirations and methods of achieving them. The gains of earlier successful strategies would be lost. But while such a government remains ensnared, its policies are limited and its tactics inhibited by the accepted norms of the international organization. On this question of the influence of international organizations on the policies of member governments and particularly of the USSR, Jacobson's test of the functionalist theory in the flame of Soviet policy has particular relevance.

Jacobson's conclusions on the determinants of Soviet policy in the economic and social field are neither flat nor simplistic. He rejects the

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bald hypothesis that the sources of Soviet policy can be found in international economic and social cooperation and indeed cautiously tends to favor the opposite conclusion (p. 286). But he balances this with the observation that the Soviet leadership may have been helped to political decisions by becoming more aware of the nature and aspirations of the non-Communist world through participation in economic and social programs. Finally, he reaches the important conclusion that even if cooperation has not been institutionalized, conflict has been, and that this result has spurred international economic and social cooperation, both within and without the United Nations (p. 287).

While Rubinstein also shows sensitivity to the constructive effects of competition, he emphasizes the consciousness of purpose of the Soviet leaders, who are guided by ideological principles that run directly contrary to the long-range purposes of international organization (p. 348). "Prospects are bleak," he predicts, "for a change in the Kremlin's attitude toward the United Nations" (p. 317). If any changes in the Soviet attitude are to come about, it will not be Western persuasion that achieves them, but rather a cold assessment of tactical advantage in a struggle to gain wider influence in the less-developed parts of the world. In an underscored passage, Rubinstein implicitly rejects the possibility that the international organizations have created any permanent bonds whatever with the Soviet Union: "Only Moscow's conviction that increased participation would facilitate closer relationships with the neutralists, indeed that it was necessary for such a development, might bring about a modification of Soviet attitude and behavior" (p. 356). Rubinstein recognizes the implication that the neutralists may in fact identify their interests with international organizations and that the Soviet Union would have to act accordingly.

Two possibilities for development of Soviet policies remain open, if the analyses discussed here are correct. Their verification, incidentally, might be achieved by continuing studies of Soviet policies in the international organizations and by complementary attention to the policies of the developing countries, which deserve more intense treatment than they have received. Soviet leaders may continue to learn the ways of a world in which, despite their best efforts, their influence has met with much opposition and has remained limited. Or they may have to bow to a stronger commitment to international organizations on the part of the underdeveloped countries. Whether that commitment will indeed develop is not yet certain and Soviet policy

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could be directed to restricting its possible growth. But such a move, as Rubinstein's policy recommendations suggest, probably would not go unchallenged. (In any case, the process of commitment and competition in the general welfare field demands scholarly attention.) Merely to feel dimly that the world is altering would profit Soviet leadership as little as it helped the mastodon, but a sharper perception would open the way to further policy changes on the part of the USSR. If these changes should include further participation in international organization activities, all except perhaps the Soviet government would expect certain limited and defined patterns of behavior from the USSR. The price the Soviet Union would have to pay for acting outside of those patterns could well become very high. Then, even without embracing the happy predictions of functionalist theory, one can imagine that the Soviet Union, for all of its elaborate tactics and ponderous strategy, may yet find itself increasingly caught in the international organization web.

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THE PROBLEM OF TRANSFORMING TRADITIONAL AGRICULTURE

By LORAND DABASI-SCHWENG

Theodore W. Schultz, *Transforming Traditional Agriculture* (Studies in Comparative Economics, No. 3), New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964, 212 pp. $6.00 (cloth); $1.75 (paper).

FOR some time it has been common knowledge that it is in traditional agriculture that most of the world's agricultural producers are engaged. It has also been known since FAO began publishing its annual reports on the world agricultural situation, if not before, that the rate of progress of agriculture in the advanced countries of the world differs from that in the less-developed countries. In the advanced countries, where agriculture is a minor industry in terms of the number of people engaged or in its contribution to the GNP, it has been making progress and has been producing more per person or per unit of land. In the less-developed countries, where it is a major industry, it has been registering little, if any, advance. People with experience in less-developed countries know that such increase as there has been has occurred principally in the more or less commercialized large-farm sector; and that the traditional sector, composed chiefly of small farms, has had little share in it. Considering all this, and the fact that the development of the poor countries has become of international concern, it is rather surprising that so many years have had to pass before a leading agricultural economist published a book dealing with one of the major problems of these countries: the transformation of traditional agriculture.

As an agricultural economist with experience in underdeveloped countries, I have read Professor Schultz's book with great interest. I had long been convinced that the poor countries were wrong in neglecting their agriculture and shortsighted in overlooking the possibilities of agricultural development; and I have been disappointed by their failure, when they attempted to improve the situation, to effect or even to accelerate the transformation of traditional agriculture.

Professor Schultz's study covers a large and controversial subject. Some of its chapters and arguments will make difficult reading for anyone not well-versed in economics. Others will make at least some

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readers wish for a clearer and more precise statement of the author's views. Those interested in the transformation of traditional agriculture will regret that his positive suggestions are not more specific. Professor Schultz explains his omission of a bibliography on the grounds that the literature is in general "not germane to the basic economic issues which are the core of the study," but a bibliographic compilation of his many footnotes would have been extremely helpful.

It is surprising that so many of the references should be to theoretical studies and studies dealing with American agriculture, and relatively few to those dealing with traditional agriculture in poor countries. A small range of such countries is mentioned and only two case studies are analyzed in some detail: Panajachel in Guatemala (with which I happen to be familiar) and Senapur in India. It is worth noting that both studies were written by anthropologists.

I agree with Professor Schultz in believing that traditional agriculture can be made into a powerful motor of growth and that to do so requires investment in farm people as well as, or even more than, in reproducible capital. I also share his belief that, in addition to education, opportunity and incentive play an important part in the process. But I do not agree with much else that Professor Schultz has to say about traditional agriculture. My disagreement is based upon personal observation in the dozen less-developed countries in different parts of the world in which I have worked and in the several dozen more which I have visited.

Low-income countries have, indeed, tended to be more interested in industrial development than in transforming their traditional agriculture. But even when they have given some thought to it, have built elementary schools in rural areas and vocational schools of agriculture of different types, and have supplied incentives, they have not been particularly successful.

Experience has shown that very few students from countries with traditional agriculture who were sent to the United States or other countries with highly developed agriculture have utilized the skills acquired abroad in farming at home. Often they have not returned to their native lands at all; and when they have, they were not capable of formulating new agricultural policies. Until recently, agencies of national and international aid have made few attempts to strengthen local centers of agricultural instruction and research, and not all of these attempts have been successful. One could perhaps attribute the lack of success to the lack of sufficient implementation, and I would

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readily agree that the funds made available for agricultural development, education, and research have been far from adequate. Or one might say that the incentives were not effective because they were not made persuasive enough. But one could also argue that the efforts to initiate or to accelerate a change in traditional agriculture have failed because they were wrongly conceived and directed; and this quite definitely because the nature and characteristics of traditional agriculture were not understood.

According to Professor Schultz's study, farming based wholly upon the kinds of factors of production that have been used by farmers for generations can be called traditional agriculture. In modern agriculture there is only a small time-lag between the development of any new factor of production and its adoption, provided it is profitable. Any country or community in which agriculture acquires a supply of one or more profitable non-traditional factors of production enters the transitional class, lying between the traditional and the modern (pp. 3 and 108). It seems to me that, if interpreted strictly, this classification would place in the transitional class many communities which would commonly be regarded as traditional, because progress stopped after they adopted one or more non-traditional factors of production.

Institutional arrangements, whether ownership is resident or absentee, and public or private, whether farms are large or small, and production is for sale or home consumption, are held not to be relevant criteria for distinguishing between traditional and other types of agriculture. Taken singly, they are indeed not relevant, but a combination of these criteria is characteristic of traditional agriculture, and their compounded effects make traditional agriculture what it is. Small farms operated by squatters, or tenants for absentee landlords, and producing mostly for home consumption, are not commonly found in modern or transitional agriculture. Nor are large, chiefly self-sufficient, farms operated for the benefit of absentee owners, and worked by laborers tied to the farm and paid with the produce of the small parcels of land they are allowed to cultivate for themselves. Nor are small subsistence farms whose location continually changes because of periodic reallocation of the communal lands among the families of the community.

Actually, transforming traditional agriculture presents two distinct problems for analysis and two different sets of problems to solve. The small farms engaged in traditional agriculture are a world apart from the large farms of similar type. They differ in location and nature as well as in organization and management. What applies to one sort

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does not necessarily apply to the other. The current tendency to settle the problem of the traditional large farms by breaking them up disposes of a problem without solving it. It makes the transformation of traditional agriculture even more difficult, because it results in the replacement of a small number of large traditional units by thousands of small ones. It would be folly to think that giving land to traditional farmers will turn them *ipso facto* into modern or even transitional farmers. Professor Schultz makes no distinction between the problems of the large and small traditional farms, but his frequent references to "penny capitalism" seem to imply that his concern is the traditional small farms. My comments deal exclusively with them.

Whatever views we may hold about the importance of the institutional factors, we cannot overlook that of the physical factors. Indeed, without taking them into consideration, unless we limit the discussion to the world's favored regions, I believe no informed discussion of the transformation of traditional agriculture is possible. There are communities practicing traditional agriculture that are located in regions where modern agriculture is feasible. In such locations it is sometimes the small size of the farms and their fragmentation that present a physical obstacle to the adoption of modern farming methods; other unfavorable factors, like the lack of transport, can be remedied without extraordinary cost. But many communities which practice traditional agriculture are located in unpropitious regions. The topography is unsuitable, the slopes steep, the climate unfavorable, the soil poor, and the markets far away and difficult to reach. In these cases the correction of the unfavorable factors, if at all physically possible, would require an outlay quite out of proportion to the ultimate benefits to be derived. It would be interesting to ascertain how much of the acreage of the world's lands now farmed by traditional farmers would be farmed at all if sound methods of land use were observed, and how much of this acreage would be suitable for modern farming.[1]

Another point worth noting is that a traditional farm is not an individual enterprise similar to a commercial venture in modern agriculture, in which the owner is free to make his own decisions. Even when the land is individual property—which is not always the case—farmers engaged in traditional agriculture live in close communities

[1] Estimates are available of the distribution of the world's lands by quality. Cf. L. Dudley Stamp, *Our Developing World* (London 1960), 37-64. Carrying the classification one step farther to show the quality of land farmed by traditional methods should not be an insurmountable task.

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which limit the farmers' choice of decision and action. In a lecture about Africa's means of entrance into the modern world, the Archbishop of Jaunde (Cameroons) placed great emphasis on this fact: "The individual African who is tied to his 'clan' has little possibility of making independent decisions. The individual must subordinate himself to the laws and views of the majority. He simply cannot question them without risking being looked upon as a heretic. This is the reason for the dogmatic character of traditions and custom and the belief that they are immutable."[2]

The same observation can be made, in varying degrees, about many communities in the Far East and Middle East and in Latin America. Instead of trying to change his community, a man with differing views and motives will frequently seek a solution by leaving to try his luck in new surroundings, possibly also saying goodbye to agriculture. But there are cases where even in new surroundings farmers have held to agriculture; and it would be interesting to learn, for example, how East Indians who were moved to Trinidad as indentured laborers behaved when they became independent farmers, and to compare their farming methods and economic behavior with those of their countrymen who remained in India.

Professor Schultz believes that traditional agriculture can be explained in purely economic terms, without reference to cultural factors. In his study he treats it as representing a particular type of equilibrium which comes about when both the "state of the arts" and the state of preferences and motives for holding or acquiring sources of income remain constant long enough so that marginal preferences and motives for acquiring them arrive at an equilibrium with the marginal productivity of sources of income viewed as investments, while net savings approach zero (p. 30). There is, he says, a logical economic basis why traditional agriculture, employing only the factors of production at its disposal, is incapable of growth except at high cost, and why the rate of return to investment in modern agricultural factors can be high by past growth standards (p. 5).

Admittedly, without the help of science, and learning only through the laborious process of trial and error, the "state of the arts" can advance only very slowly and there are limits even to that advance. But it seems to me wrong to think that what we look upon as sources of income are looked upon in the same way by traditional farmers. For them land, cattle, or cocoa trees are *not* primarily sources of income,

[2] Jean Baptiste Zoa, "Afrikas Weg in die moderne Welt: Kulturelle und religiöse Probleme," *Europa Archiv* (Bonn), XIX (May 10, 1964), 301.

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the value of which is determined by their yield. Instead they are symbols of prestige, measured by the number of units possessed, without reference to economic return. If land were regarded primarily as a source of income, traditional farmers would be more interested in maintaining and improving its fertility. In that case, it would not be as difficult as experience has proved it is to consolidate fragmented holdings or to move traditional farmers from one area to another, even to another with similar physical characteristics. Because land is looked upon not primarily as a source of income but as a symbol of prestige, traditional farmers are not interested in buying land indiscriminately as an investment. Even in the next village, a few miles away, they are looked upon as strangers. If they want to buy land, they want it in their own village where it will add to their prestige. As land is sold only as a last resort, the plots that occasionally come up for sale always find ready buyers. The price of land realized at such rare sales cannot be regarded as a true market price. For the buyers, economic calculation comes not in deciding whether to buy land rather than some other source of income, but only in comparing different plots of land in the same village if the plots can be had at the same time or if their owners want to exchange them. Thus, a different way of looking at land—a cultural trait—makes people value it differently and accounts for the high prices of land in traditional communities, a fact which economists living in a different culture find difficult to explain in terms of economic returns.

In a study dealing with Ecuadorian Indians, the following passage occurs: "The supreme ambition of the Indians is to become owners of land; towards this goal are directed all their efforts, and by carrying saving to incredible extremes they may achieve their ambition. They make no great cause of the size of the parcel and even less of the quality of the soil of the land they covet; it is sufficient that it should be in their area for them to pay a price for it which is very much higher than the real value of the land, because the Indian loves the region in which he was born. For this reason he never settles in other areas, and even when he absents himself from his region for many years, he finally returns to it."[3]

Lest the Ecuadorian Indians might be considered a special case, the observations of an anthropologist working in the Dominican Republic

[3] Nicolás G. Martínez, *La condición actual de la raza indígena en la provincia de Tunguragua*, Talleres de Instituto Luis Martinez (Ambato 1916), 28. Cf. Leonidas Rodriguez Sandoval, *Vita Economico-Social del Indio Libre de la Sierra Ecuatoriana*, Estudios en Ciencia Social, No. 32 (Washington, D.C., Catholic University of America, 1949), 33.

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can be cited: "As a cultural note I should add that the difference in outlook and attitude between an individual with a few unproductive 'tareas' and one who has no land is remarkable. Small as his plot may be, and of questionable quality, it represents, for him and his peers, a prestige and security symbol indicative of the fact that he has attained the goal of all Dominicans—he has 'donde trabajar'—a place to work. His family may be on the border of starvation, it may be suffering from very poor health, but he and they are happier than those who do not have a plot of land. All of my data indicate that a man who, not having land, works as a 'jornalero' and who may, by the way, actually be better off financially, will indicate his willingness to 'change places' with the owner of the tiny unproductive plot."[4]

In his lecture on Africa's entrance into the modern world, the Archbishop of Jaunde made many references to economic development and said that as long as a herd of cattle represented a religious value and was not looked upon as a factor of production, there could be no economic development in Africa.[5]

Farmers engaged in traditional agriculture are in most cases subsistence or near-subsistence farmers. Even when they sell part of their produce or grow commercial crops for sale, a considerable part of the value of the total output is consumed by the household. The food habits of the family determine which crops are grown, and not considerations of price and profit. Such considerations, if they exist at all, affect only the commercial crops and that part of the subsistence crops that are grown for sale. Cultivated land and food crops are treated with a reverence unknown to commercial farmers and it is considered a crime not to cultivate the land or to destroy food crops. Prices may induce traditional farmers to cultivate crops with greater care, but certain operations are carried out without consideration of price or profit because the farmers are aware that badly neglected fields or permanent crops are difficult to bring back into production. This is why traditional farms, and to some degree even transitional ones, are relatively depression-proof. Professor Schultz notes that during the depression European agriculture did not collapse, but he does not attribute sufficient importance to the factors that saved it and to the even greater importance of these factors in traditional agriculture.[6]

[4] John T. Westbrook, "Social and Economic Factors in Individual Family Success and Failure in an Agrarian Reform Project: Caracol, Dominican Republic" (unpublished manuscript).

[5] Zoa, 300.

[6] Since this review article was written, another important book about subsistence agriculture has been published: Colin Clark and M. R. Haswell, *The Economics of*

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For the reasons mentioned, the type of calculations which occupy modern commercial farmers who strain to make a profit and to keep on improving their financial position and level of living is alien to traditional farmers. Their aspirations are limited and are fixed by the traditions of the community they live in. They will not make an effort to acquire goods that would bring them into conflict with the standards and mores of the community. As the principal aim in farming is to assure the food the family needs for sustenance and some surplus for necessary purchases, they want to play safe. They will try to minimize risks, husband carefully their most precious resource, cash, and use physical effort to make up for whatever deficiencies they suffer in reproducible capital. There are few resources to combine and little freedom of combination. What freedom there is, is used to achieve not a maximum value of output or maximum profit with the best combination of all resources, but a more modest one—i.e., to assure in addition to the food needed by the family an adequate cash income from what one may call the commercial operations of the farm. Kusum Nair, whom Professor Schultz quotes in a different context, came to the conclusion that in India one of the principal assumptions on which present planning for the economic development of the rural sector was based—i.e., that the desire for higher levels of living was inherent and more or less universal among the masses planned for—was not valid. She found that the level of living was static, with a ceiling rather than a floor, and was socially determined.[7]

Actually Panajachel, which Professor Schultz uses as an illustration of a very poor but efficient community, lends, in my view, support to the conclusions of Kusum Nair rather than to those of Professor Schultz. The data and information used by Professor Schultz came from a study by Professor Sol Tax, who had lived in the community off and on from the autumn of 1935 to the spring of 1941. He came to the conclusion then that the reaction of the Indians of Panajachel to new factors of production was active and strong. When Professor Tax had occasion to visit the community after a lapse of twenty years, the overwhelming impression of his brief visit was that life and the economy had remained virtually unchanged (Schultz, 41-44 and 90-94). Yet in that period the accessibility of Panajachel from the capital

Subsistence Agriculture (London 1964). The findings of this study, whose approach is different from that of Professor Schultz, could not be taken into consideration here and would, indeed, merit separate discussion.

[7] Kusum Nair, *Blossoms in the Dust: The Human Factor in Indian Development* (New York 1962), 193.

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had been greatly improved by the construction of a paved highway, the place had become a much-frequented tourist resort, providing a ready market for agricultural products, and had been given a school, a health center, etc. It is difficult to reconcile the recent statement of Professor Tax with his earlier observation.

Israel, another of the illustrations used by Professor Schultz, can also be mentioned here. The Israeli achievement in agriculture has been remarkable, he says, even though "the people who entered agriculture were not skilled at farming, for they were mainly non-farm people, but most of them had a good deal of schooling" (pp. 18-19). But the point that needs to be emphasized is that they desired to have more material wealth sufficiently to strive for it. This is why they had studied, why they had interest in new techniques, and why they were ready to innovate. The fact that they were non-farm people was an advantage, because it made them receptive to technical advice. They were not hampered by the shackles of farming traditions that traditional farmers cannot help acquiring in the process of growing up on parental farms.

If traditional farmers were as strong in intuitive economic thinking as Professor Schultz believes they are, it would be difficult to explain the great differences (hidden by the averages) in the degree of success of farmers in the same community. The material I have on hand refers to Jamaica, where agriculture is transitional rather than traditional, but I am sure similar data could be found in traditional communities. In Jamaica a farm economic survey found that the range between the best and the worst farm in one area was £354 and £43 in capital investment per acre, £120 and £5 in gross output, £52 and £15 in farm income, and £44 and −£22 in farm profits.[8]

Lack of vigor and stamina due to undernourishment and disease are certainly limiting factors which prevent traditional farmers in many communities from doing more hard work. But the other limiting factor is *not* the low marginal return of additional work, as Professor Schultz believes. It has been shown over and over again that traditional farmers could profit from additional work devoted to the better cultivation of their crops or from adding to their stock of reproducible capital. In view of their admitted poverty and lack of opportunities for paid farm or non-farm work, even a small return might represent a substantial percentage increase of their small in-

[8] Division of Economics and Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture and Lands, *The Economic Organization of Small-scale Farming Based on Citrus, Ground Provisions and Livestock, Brokenhurst, Manchester, 1958-59* (Kingston, Jamaica, 1962), 61.

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comes. One reason why traditional farmers cannot do more hard work is that to operate as they do with very crude implements uses up a great deal of energy and requires a great deal of time. Seeing them at work, one can only marvel at their superhuman endurance. A further reason why they have no time for additional work is their inability to organize. Traditional farmers do not make a clear distinction between constructive and ineffectual effort. For them, walking to their scattered fields is part of the job of cultivation. Once at work, in the fields or in the house, the task itself is performed sometimes with supreme craftsmanship but often with great waste of time. The rational organization of work to reduce time and effort is not part of their skills. Another reason for their lack of interest in adding to their stock of reproducible capital or in making permanent improvements is their limited time horizon, which makes them reluctant to invest efforts—or funds—in work and improvements when the benefits are not immediately apparent but take a long time to mature. These traits show that traditional farmers are not aware of and do not weigh carefully the marginal returns of their labor. One further reason for their lack of time—and even lack of strength—for more hard work is their predilection for leisure, which people of our own culture are apt to confuse with resting or idleness or loafing.[9] About this more will be said later.

In the case of savings, the hypothesis advanced by Professor Schultz is that traditional farmers do not save because the rate of return on savings when invested in traditional factors of production is exceedingly low. But in speaking of wasteful consumption as an impediment to savings, he surprisingly brings in a cultural factor and says that "the consumption incurred when marriage or death occur and when festivities come along can only be called wasteful by an odd twist of language, because without such consumption traditional farmers could hardly tolerate their otherwise harsh and drab existence" (p. 27).

I have mentioned above the severe limitations which the crude implements in current use impose upon the work performance of traditional farmers. It is difficult to believe that the substitution of the hoe and spade for the planting stick and the machete, or of the scythe for the sickle and machete, or of the axe and saw for the

[9] For a very illuminating discussion of these concepts and different attitudes to work and leisure, cf. Josef Pieper, "El ocio y la existencia humana," *Humboldt* (Hamburg), 1, No. 2 (1960), 46-47. See also Pieper, *Leisure, the Basis of Culture* (New York 1964).

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machete, or of shears for scraps of sheet tin would not bring substantial dividends. My observations on the point of investments are confirmed by those of others, notably Dr. A. L. Jolly, who in writing about the Caribbean area had this to say: "Lack of capital is not primarily due to lack of investment possibilities on the small farm. . . . It is true that the possibilities are more restricted than on a large-scale highly specialized estate, but the small farm is usually so deficient in capital that there should be a handsome return from the initial investment that can be made. The problem is not one of absolute lack of capital but rather the unwillingness of farmers to make agricultural investments. . . . the most urgent investments on a small farm are not power machinery or special buildings that from their attractive appearance are obviously good value for money; they are well cultivated and well fertilized crops, systems of farming (probably including livestock) that will maintain and increase soil fertility. These are rather intangible and easily eroded assets."[10]

One plausible explanation of the lack of savings is that it is difficult to save when one's income is very low and one leads a hand-to-mouth existence. A very real obstacle to saving is also the traditional farmers' distrust of money, coupled with their distrust of savings institutions—which in many cases are not easily accessible to them—and the risks of hoarding money in the type of house in which the traditional farmers live. Last but not least, there are the temptations they are exposed to for spending their money in the market town where they sell their produce. They often sell it to shopkeepers who are out to push their wares and are not concerned with what the farmers buy. In several countries the sale of alcoholic liquor is an important source of public revenue and, apart from its other effects, its purchase discourages savings.[11]

As my last point, I come to the social obligations in traditional society. Traditional societies are not dominated by our ideal of an ever-increasing level of material wealth and living and have different ideas about work and thrift. For them the annual festivities and those that accompany marriage and death are not social overheads but an essential part of the content of life that make it worth living. The consumption on such occasions puts the traditional farmers under a strong moral obligation to save or, in want of sufficient savings, to

[10] A. L. Jolly, "Small-scale Farm Management Problems," *Tropical Agriculture,* XXXII (April 1955), 82.

[11] Misión Economía y Humanismo, *Estudios sobre las condiciones del desarollo de Colombia* (Bogotá, Aedita Editores, Cromos, October 1958), 71-72.

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contract debts. The savings tie up funds that may be badly needed for improving the farm, and the debts may cripple a man for many years and prevent him from investing in his farm. The eating and drinking that goes on at these festivities and the other expenditures that they involve are excessive and wasteful because the feast is, by custom, a way of showing off. In recent times, increasing poverty in some rural areas has begun to force the level of expenditure down. If poverty can do it, perhaps one day rational considerations may have the same effect. Be that as it may, if one believes—as Professor Schultz does—that traditional farming is an activity governed by economic considerations similar to ours and that traditional farmers are as careful in their economic calculations as are modern farmers, it does not seem logical to condone wasteful consumption and expenditure at festivities on the ground that without it traditional farmers could hardly tolerate their otherwise harsh and drab existence. Their existence may look harsh and drab to an outsider, but it is not necessarily felt to be so by people who have no concept of a different way of life and, even if they do, may not prefer it to their own.

Bernard Mishkin, writing about the contemporary Quechua of Peru, has this to say: "A glance at the financial note accompanying the catalogue of offices shows the enormous cash outlay the religious careerist must provide. The total costs of participation in all the offices of the yearly calendar of fiestas is put at about 700 soles. This, of course, takes no account of time expended, of obligations incurred as a result of receiving help from relatives, and of the weeks of free service given to the priest. This sum is, moreover, a modest estimate; many men double and triple their expenditure in an effort to outdo others and gain more prestige."[12]

The Archbishop of Jaunde, in the lecture to which references have been made above, commented on the festivities that go with marriage in Africa: "Marriage must always be an extraordinary occasion. A man who has a yearly income of 15,000 francs puts on a feast that costs him 150,000 francs. When [I was] talking about it with the fiancé, the young man [said]: 'You are right when you say that these expenses are madness. But if I refuse to make them, people will say that I am a niggard. All the people of my tribe will make fun of me.' "[13]

[12] Bernard Mishkin, "The Contemporary Quechua," in *Handbook of South American Indians*, ed. by Julian H. Steward (Washington, D.C., Smithsonian Institution, 1947), 415.

[13] Zoa, 301.

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The attitude and pattern of behavior of traditional farmers are summed up admirably by Harold Osborne in a passage which refers to Aymara and Quechua Indians in Latin America—and *cholos* living in Indian areas—but is actually of much wider application. *Mutatis mutandis,* it applies to traditional farmers in many different parts of the world: "The Indian has no more tendency now than he had before the coming of the Incas to accumulate material or monetary wealth, which means nothing to him. The rich man is the man who has much land on which to labour and who eats well. The Indian who obtains money, perhaps by working a spell in the mines, dissipates it immediately by treating his friends to a drinking bout, by gambling or by paying for an elaborate fiesta. The Indian—or for that matter the cholo—who is honoured by being chosen as a 'patron' (or *alfarez*) of an annual fiesta, and who is expected to bear the major part of the costs, will save for a year in advance and pledge himself for several years to come. Otherwise he has no motive to save and economize. He does not desire social insurance but only the security that he may continue to enjoy the fruits of his own labour and that he may not be deprived of adequate land to supply the necessities of his family."[14]

The hypothesis put forward by Professor Schultz that the acceptance of new factors in traditional agriculture depends upon its profits, with due allowance for risk and uncertainty, and that in this respect the response of traditional farmers is similar to that of modern farmers (pp. 33 and 162-68) is not borne out by general experience. I think that the cases he mentions are rather special ones. Often the acceptance of one new factor is not followed by other changes, and agriculture remains traditional. Indeed, if there were no difference between the reactions of traditional and modern farmers, traditional agriculture—or rather its transformation—would present no problems. But one of the principal difficulties with traditional agriculture is that it is *not* profit-motivated. One must also consider that the traditional farms are usually small and often barely assure the maintenance of the family at some conventional low level of living. There is no room for experiments, and a small but safe return is preferred to a possible larger one that carries with it not only the element of risk but also the element of the unknown. David Edwards in his study of small farming in Jamaica, an advanced area in comparison with traditional

[14] Harold Osborne, *Indians of the Andes: Aymaras and Quechuas* (London, International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction, 1952), 210-11.

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farming areas, gives illuminating examples of the attitude of the small farmers to technical improvements and risks.[15]

Experience has also shown that, contrary to the assertion made by Professor Schultz (p. 32), the rise of the value of farm products, new transport facilities, irrigation facilities, etc., are in themselves rarely enough to make traditional farmers invest more in reproducible capital and increase their production. The farmers in Panajachel did not react to a rise in coffee prices or to the improvement of transport in the way they should have reacted according to the hypothesis. The Indian farmers described by Kusum Nair did not make use of irrigation water even when it was brought to their farms and fields at no expense to them and was offered free.

The response of traditional farmers becomes similar to that of farmers in modern agriculture only when their motivations become similar, when they begin to desire to have greater wealth and better living and the desire becomes strong enough to make them strive for it. It seems to me that agricultural economists from countries with traditional agriculture delude themselves when they try to prove that traditional farmers behave very much as modern farmers do. If this were the case, traditional agriculture would change into transitional agriculture as soon as the efforts to industrialize and urbanize that go with it begin to offer expanding markets.

Professor Schultz is on firmer ground when he argues against the doctrine of labor of zero value and proves that in communities which practice traditional agriculture no part of the agricultural population that is capable of working could be diverted without detrimental effects on production. The example he gives of India is interesting and enlightening (pp. 53-70).

Considering the time and effort that have been spent on arguments about the extent of unemployment or underemployment in agriculture in less-developed countries, it is surprising that a method of measuring underemployment or, rather, underutilization of the agricultural populations which was tried in Hungary some time ago has not been tried elsewhere.[16] Given the area of cultivated land, the cropping pattern, and the standards of cultivation, estimates were made for each month of the year of the amount of time required for the preparation of the land, planting, cultivation, and harvesting of the different crops;

[15] David Edwards, *An Economic Study of Small Farming in Jamaica* (Kingston, Jamaica, University College of the West Indies, 1961).

[16] Matolcsy Mátyás, *A mezögazdasági munkanélküliség Magyarországon* [Agricultural Unemployment in Hungary], A Magyar Gazdaságkutató Intézet Különkiadványai (Budapest, Magyar Gazdaságkutató Intézet, 1936).

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the time required for tending the pastures and farm animals and for carrying out the routine operations on the farms. Comparing the available working time during the year and the time required to carry out the necessary operations, a measure was found for the underutilization of labor. At the peak period of farming operations all available time was used; but, taking the year as a whole, utilization was between 60 and 70 per cent. There were significant differences between regions and between large estates and small farms. Without a change in technology and investment in reproducible capital—machinery—no labor could be diverted without endangering the performance of the necessary operations in time and therefore in production. Similar estimates would give a very much better idea of the situation in less-developed countries than the now-fashionable labor force surveys, which under the conditions prevailing in these countries cannot provide meaningful answers.

Owing to its nature, in traditional agriculture no farm records are kept. When outsiders, usually anthropologists, try to obtain data about the operations of farms, they encounter great difficulties because the farmers are unable to give accurate answers to questions involving quantities. To get an accurate answer requires measurement, provided the farmer lets a stranger measure. Agricultural censuses are less inquisitive than farm economic surveys, yet even census-takers incur risks in traditional areas, and the answers they collect are not always worth tabulating. There is the further difficulty of interpreting the answers and putting them together into a coherent whole. The questioner's concepts are derived from a capitalist economy and modern farming, and he is imposing them on farming of a different type. It is rather like translating from one language into another, unrelated language which represents a different way of thinking. Considering these difficulties and the extreme paucity of information, I think it is rather hazardous to attempt calculations of the price of income streams and factor shares in traditional agriculture. Interesting as the studies of Panajachel and Senapur are, I should feel very reluctant to draw general conclusions from them on such tricky and difficult points.

Given the importance of traditional agriculture, it is really surprising that so little effort has been made as yet to collect information about the operation of traditional farms or even to compile and analyze the information found in scattered surveys and studies.

Professor Schultz sums up the central argument of his study in the following words: "The economic basis of the slow growth of a penny

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economy is not to be found generally in observable inefficiencies in the way traditional factors of production are allocated; nor is it explained by sub-optimum rates of savings and investment in such traditional factors because the rate of return at the margins is generally too low to warrant additional savings and investment, given anything like normal preferences and motives. The key to growth is in acquiring and using effectively some modern (nontraditional from the point of view of the experience of the people in a penny economy) factors of production" (p. 176).

The argument hinges on the phrase "given anything like normal preferences and motives." My experience in less-developed countries has led me to believe that traditional farming is traditional just because the traditional farmers' motives and preferences are *not* normal by our standards, and I have become convinced that the efforts to bring about the transformation of traditional agriculture have failed precisely because it has been assumed that the preferences and motives were "normal." Sophisticated planners in these countries, native and foreign, are reluctant to accept the farmers as they are because they do not fit into the conceptual framework of the planners' theories and, rather than change those theories, they attribute to the farmers motives and preferences that do not agree with their observed behavior.

If I am right in my interpretation of the characteristics of traditional farmers and traditional agriculture, and in the diagnosis of the failure of the efforts that have been made to bring about its transformation, it seems to me that it is not enough to suggest that the key to success is investing in farm people and in teaching them how to use modern factors of production effectively. Before doing so, education must make people desire to have more material wealth and make them desire it strongly enough to strive for it. This means changing their value system, their attitude to life and work. A different value system cannot be transplanted wholesale, except by sustained coercion and perhaps not even then. But it can be changed piecemeal if the approach is thoughtfully and tactfully planned. It should be directed at the points of least resistance. It should start by helping the people to get what they want (instead of foisting on them things they not only do not want but are opposed to) and of adjusting ideas and methods to their beliefs and ways of thinking. Once confidence is gained, moves can become bolder and, between the things the people want, can be sandwiched also things they do not want, but which, according to our ideas, would be good for them. Meanwhile, their receptivity to new

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ideas and techniques will slowly increase, the walls of tradition will begin to crumble, and the transformation of traditional agriculture will begin, very slowly at first, but, as time goes on, with increasing speed.

Vocational schools are interested in teaching skills, and not in changing attitudes and values. This is the task of the rural elementary school. But the schools would have to proceed without alienating their pupils from their rural surroundings and agricultural interests. Kusum Nair gives examples which show how difficult this is to do, and how easily the educational effort can backfire. Once the rural elementary schools have done their part well, the vocational schools will find it easier to teach skills to their pupils. Given the large number of farmers, obviously only a small minority could benefit from vocational schools. But the purpose of these schools should be not only to help the boys who attend them to farm better, but also to induce through them those who could never get near a school to improve their farming practices.

It is sad that on the other side of the fence of most agricultural schools one can see no influence of the school; and that the boys who attend such schools tend to get government jobs instead of going back to their people's farms. It is also to be regretted that most schools do not make a practice of following up their students to see how much they have profited from the years spent at school, and learn from the experience.

In making recommendations for the agricultural development of the Mantaro region in Peru, A. B. Lewis assigned an important role to education: "General education in the elementary schools is perhaps the best instrument for breaking the fetters of the traditional way of thinking just as it is for teaching the people to read, write and count and interpret cause and effect in nature. The elementary school is the place where one could succeed in destroying superstitions, where first of all one could stimulate ordered thinking and where one could impart knowledge of a new and better life. Agricultural experts find a greater understanding and a greater confidence in their advice amongst people who have had the benefit of good elementary education than amongst people who are ignorant."[17]

Professor Schultz is right to place emphasis upon the need for investing in farm people and in farm education, but just spending more money on schools and multiplying the prevailing type of school is not

[17] A. B. Lewis, "El fomento de recursos agrícolas," in *El Desarollo Agrícola y Económico de la Zona del Mantaro en el Peru* (New York, International Development Services, Inc., December 1954), I, 145 (mimeographed).

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

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enough. What is needed first is a fresh look at agricultural—and general—education in the less-developed countries and in their rural areas. More perhaps can be learned from failure than from success, and a critical appraisal of the educational programs might point to ways of successful reform. But surely, in addition to this, we must know more about the operations of traditional agriculture. It is time that an agency or a foundation began to collect the studies and surveys that exist, subject them to careful analysis, and finance further surveys of traditional farming in various parts of the world. Land reforms are multiplying the number of small traditional farms, and learning more about such farms is imperative if failure of the reforms is to be avoided.

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Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR*, New York, Viking Press, 1964, 461 pp. $7.50.
Karl de Schweinitz, *Industrialization and Democracy: Economic Necessities and Political Possibilities*, New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, 309 pp. $6.95.
Ronald Wraith and Edgar Simpkins, *Corruption in Developing Countries*, New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1964, 211 pp. $5.95.
Albert O. Hirschman, *Journeys Toward Progress: Studies of Economic Policy-Making in Latin America*, New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1963, 308 pp. $4.00.

I

HOWEVER much men differ about what constitutes good government, they agree that it is conducive to economic development. It is sometimes taken for granted that the first step on the road to economic development is the establishment of an effective government that is determined to achieve such development. Thus Dr. Nkrumah enjoined his followers: "Seek ye first the kingdom of politics and all else shall be added unto you." Students of economic development might not think the matter is as simple as that, but they still spend most of their time in search of government policies conducive to economic growth; they ask how economic plans can be improved, when governments can best rely on private initiative, and so on.

While the effect of political leadership and government on the developing economy is everywhere thought to be important, and widely studied, the reverse of this relationship—the effect of the level and rate of economic development on the nature of government and politics—is seldom emphasized and only rarely studied, at least by economists. There would, I suppose, be few with the boldness to deny that the rate and level of economic development must have *some* effects on the character of a nation's politics and government. But not many have explicitly emphasized this relationship or bothered to

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2 THE UNITED NATIONS RECONSIDERED, edited by Raymond A. Moore

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3 DESTINY OF A DYNASTY: *The Search For Institutions In Morocco's Developing Society* by I. William Zartman

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study it. Not many, that is, apart from the Marxists: the doctrine that the level of economic development determines the direction of political life is of course the very blood and bone of Marx's theory. In their discussions of the effects of economic aid on the long-term political interests of the advanced countries, some economists outside the Marxian circle have assumed (usually implicitly) that economic growth does influence political evolution, but they have not spelled out why or how it would have this influence. Though a number of economists have often asked what conditions were likely to promote good entrepreneurship in the private sector, they have not asked what socioeconomic conditions are apt to breed good entrepreneurship in the growing public sectors of the underdeveloped countries.

Students of economic development must consider the effects of the rate and level of economic development on the character of government and political life, not so much because these effects are important, as because they are part of a two-way relationship. When economic development influences political change and political change in turn influences economic development, it is important that the two relationships be considered together. Though the weather influences the economy, the economy does not have a similar influence on the weather. Thus the economist can construct his models without studying meteorology; changes in the weather may be regarded as exogenous. On the other hand, when, as with the relationship between economic development and political change, the causal connections go both ways, one side of the relationship cannot be understood properly without an analysis of the other; both relationships ideally should be handled endogenously in a single model. The student of economic development (and the student of political modernization) should therefore consider the political effects of economic change in connection with their conventional concerns.

Unhappily, they have not usually done so in the past, but it is to be hoped that this neglect is only temporary. One sign that it might be is the recent appearance of a few books on precisely this subject, particularly the books being reviewed here. Because of this past neglect, the books under review have the interest and importance that normally attaches to studies that are among the first in any important new line of inquiry.

II

The most comprehensive and provocative of these books, but, it is sad to say, the least useful, is the one by Cyril Zebot, which is best

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THE NATIONAL GUARD IN POLITICS

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described by its subtitle, *Convergence Through Growth.* It is not always possible to find any continuing thread of argument in this discursive—indeed, disorganized—study. Zebot seems to have cluttered it up with all the economics he understands (and a good deal that he does not).[1] Still, the work deserves our attention, for it states and defends, more boldly and baldly than any book to my knowledge has done before, the thesis that the Western nations, the Soviet bloc, and the underdeveloped nations will, if they have continuing economic growth, come to resemble one another in all of the most fundamental respects. The reasoning behind this thesis of convergence is that each of the three groups of nations has a "root problem" that now limits its economic potential, and while these problems are different, the policies each group must follow to solve its own root problem are such that they will give the three types of nations roughly similar socio-economic systems.

In the Soviet bloc (Zebot doesn't bother much with distinctions between the Soviet Union and China) the root problem is a tension between the interests of the Communist Party bureaucrats, who control both the property and the government in the Soviet system and run the society in their own interests, and the broader goals of the Marxian ideology and the broader interests of the Soviet peoples. According to this analysis, which draws heavily upon Djilas's work, the Soviet economic system cannot succeed in satisfying the demands of its people as long as economic decisions are centralized in the hands of the Communist Party bureaucrats, for these bureaucrats will have neither the capability nor the desire to satisfy the varying demands of the many diverse individuals in the Soviet sphere. Thus a decentralized economic system, using market mechanisms to a considerable degree, will be essential to the realization of the economic potential of the Communist bloc. Zebot does not expect that the Soviet Union will copy the private-enterprise forms characteristic of the West, but thinks that some type of decentralized, democratic socialism will emerge instead. But this democratic, decentralized socialism will in essentials resemble the Western economic systems, because it will give

[1] It would take us far afield here to go into the technical shortcomings of Zebot's book. But here is a characteristic, if trivial, example. Zebot argues that there is a "basic psychological preference" for private goods over public goods (p. 53). But obviously the valuation people place upon a unit of any good, public or private, depends among other things on how much of that good is already available to them; if there is a surfeit of a given private good but no amount of some desirable public good has been provided, the public good would presumably be preferred to the private good.

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Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence

By CRAWFORD YOUNG. This is a study of the process of decolonization, the development of the nationalist movement, and the salient aspects of the emerging post-independence policy in the Congo since 1945. The author considers the forces set loose by the Leopoldville explosion that uprooted a history of colonial rule. He distinguishes the elements of this experience and evaluates its impact on the African. Crawford Young has based his analysis on first-hand investigation in seventeen provinces of the Congo, and interviews with local administrators in more than half the territories of former Leopoldville Province. *616 pages. $12.50*

The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931-1939

By GABRIEL JACKSON. While recognizing the international aspects of the Civil War, Professor Jackson has chosen to relate the history of the Second Republic and the Civil War as seen from within Spain. He emphasizes the significance of events—the church burnings, the battle of Madrid, the bombing of Guernica—as the Spaniards saw them rather than as foreign journalists, poets, and diplomats saw them. *565 pages. $12.50*

A Sterner Plan for Italian Unity: The Italian National Society in the Risorgimento

By RAYMOND GREW. Drawing upon unpublished materials from archives and libraries throughout Europe, the author presents a comprehensive picture of the social, political, and intellectual climate of the period in which Italy became a nation. ". . . an important contribution to Risorgimento studies. It is the first full-scale treatment of the operation of the Italian National Society."—*The Historian. Winner of the Unità d'Italia prize, 1963, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.* *504 pages. $10.00*

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a large degree of freedom to the individual and adjust to the diverse demands of individual consumers.

In the less developed countries, the root problem that Zebot says must be solved before these countries can have sustained economic growth is the development of their human resources. While in the short run some growth may be attained by developing only the technological skills of the people, in the long run these nations can realize their economic potential only if they experience an extended period of cultural and intellectual advance of the kind that Europe experienced in the medieval and early modern ages that preceded the Industrial Revolution. The educational programs that will bring about this expansion of the capacities of the peoples in the underdeveloped countries will somehow make these countries over in the image of the Western democracies. It will at the least make them value the individual and individual freedom to the same degree that the Western nations do.

In the nations of the West, Zebot expects a much less striking transformation (and this fact, along with others, raises the suspicion that there may be a parochial bias in his thinking). The root problem of economic growth in the West is some (inadequately defined) type of wage-cost push inflation. This inflation can be cured only if labor unions and large business develop a social ethic that leads them to follow wage and price policies that are consistent with price stability. This may not require socialism, apparently, but will demand a type of "socialization" of a sense of justice that will keep union members and businessmen from exploiting their monopoly power to an extent that would bring about inflation.

The outcome, then, is that each of the three groups of nations, if they solve the problem of economic growth, will come to have decentralized societies with respect for the desires and dignity of the individual, and either a type of democratic socialism, or a type of ethical socialization, that places great emphasis on justice in the economic relationships between the various groups in each society.

The redeeming virtue of Zebot's book is its basic approach or method, which is built upon the assumption that in given circumstances economic growth will require some particular, ascertainable economic policy (or at least some ascertainable set of alternative policies), and thus in many cases also obvious political and social changes. Unhappily, the best that can be said of his application of this method is that it is far too simple. The need for more careful study is suggested by the fact that two other books were published at about the

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Revolution in Bavaria, 1918-1919: The Eisner Regime and the Soviet Republic

By ALLAN MITCHELL. The tangled affairs in Bavaria at the close of World War I constitute an important part of the history of the early Weimar Republic. This is a study of the 1918 revolution which overthrew the Bavarian monarchy—its causes, nature, results. "Most informative on Bavarian history in general."—Gordon Craig. "Many balanced judgments about long-controverted questions . . . adds greatly to our understanding of the Weimar Republic."—Klaus Epstein. *365 pages. $8.50*

Underdeveloped Areas Within the Common Market

By GERGIO BARZANTI. Mr. Barzanti is concerned with the serious threat of the underdeveloped areas of the Common Market—the south of Italy and certain regions in France—to European unity. The author points out that existing regional imbalances may assume more serious proportions when greater free play is given to economic forces by the removal of custom barriers between the Member States of the European Economic Community. Since already industrialized areas tend to attract most new economic activities, he focuses on the need for intervention to reverse this trend—by national governments now and by the proper European authorities later. A detailed analysis is made of the regional economies of each of the underdeveloped areas in relation to its main economic problems: agriculture, industry, transportation, power, tourism. *456 pages. $10.00*

Gaon: Conflict and Cohesion in a Maharashtrian Village

By HENRY ORENSTEIN. The author reveals the way social change has affected village bonds, and how conflict, unequal power, and caste interaction have shifted with the weakening of village cohesion. Rich data about village organization and politics in a region of India that has received little recent attention are presented. The author's conclusions indicate that a certain kind of solidarity in villages is now disintegrating because of the formality and secularization that are part of the general movement toward social cohesion in the larger units of region and nation. *350 pages. $8.50*

Princeton University Press

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same time as Zebot's which between them cover the same subject, but which draw conclusions exactly the opposite of his own.

III

One of these is *Political Power: USA/USSR* by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington. This book deals primarily with the convergence arguments advanced most forcefully by W. W. Rostow, who suggested (much earlier than Zebot) that there was a likelihood that the Soviet Union and the United States would in general come to resemble each other more closely as the Soviet Union approached the time when it too would be in the stage of "high mass consumption," and that even the politics and foreign policies of these two countries would tend to converge. Brzezinski and Huntington concede that the Soviet Union and the United States may very well tend to converge technologically, economically, and even socially. But, they ask, does this "reduce the political difference" (p. 420)? After discussing the political (and, for the most part, only the political) systems of the two countries at considerable length, they conclude that there is no likelihood that the political systems of the two countries will tend to converge, or that their foreign policies will tend to become compatible. They think that both the Soviet Union and United States will change over time, but that the two nations will evolve in different directions, at least where their political systems are concerned. They argue that the degree of economic advancement, with its concomitant changes in the amount and character of leisure, in mass culture, in working habits, and in degree of urbanization, has little to do with the character of a nation's political life. The primitive economic systems in historic times, they contend, were much alike, but political systems were nonetheless extremely diverse. Today, China and India are at the same low level of economic development, "yet no one would seriously argue that their political systems are becoming more alike" (*ibid.*). Similarly, Essen under the Nazis was economically and culturally quite like Detroit, but the political life in the two cities was drastically different. Brzezinski and Huntington seem to suggest that one reason why Soviet and American politics are unlikely to come to resemble one another is that the politician-bureaucrats of the Communist Party apparatus will not want to give up their power voluntarily, and no other group in Soviet society is likely to be able to take it from them. In addition, they point to the fact that the Soviet political system has been very successful, just as the political system in the

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United States has been, and argue accordingly that in neither country are those who hold positions of power apt to be in a mood for radical changes.

The central assumption in Brzezinski's and Huntington's book, however, and the one that above all accounts for their conviction that the United States and the Soviet Union are not likely to converge politically, is the (essentially undefended) assumption that politics is primary; that the political system is relatively unaffected by economic and social changes, and that the economic and social changes that take place are largely those desired by the political leadership. The main reason the Soviet Union is not apt to come to resemble the United States, they say, is that the ruling group in that country—the politician-bureaucrats who make up the apparatus of the Communist Party—will shape economic and social change in its own interest, that is, in such a way that it will ensure continued control of Soviet power. This "political determinism" makes their book, despite its fresh insights, its superb clarity, and its considerable learning, less persuasive (to me at least) than Zebot's less impressive book, with its crude (non-Marxian) "economic determinism."

The first fatal weakness in the Brzezinski-Huntington analysis is that it (implicitly) assumes that the rulers of the Soviet Union (or any nation) have a wide, if not unlimited, set of alternative economic policies that they can follow without impairing their capacity to achieve their economic objectives. In fact, the rulers of the Soviet Union are considerably constrained in the economic policies and institutions that they can choose if they are to maintain—much less improve—their rate of economic growth, as they obviously want to do. It may well be that the Soviet Union, notwithstanding its past achievements in other sectors, cannot solve its so far intractable agricultural problem without fundamental changes in its agricultural institutions, changes that it has for political reasons been understandably hesitant to allow. Several of the smaller Communist regimes in East-Central Europe, at least, have found that economic realities limited their choice of policies, and even their control, in the countryside. Similarly, the Jeffersonian conception of a democracy based on the yeoman farmer (or even the small, independent artisan) was not something Jeffersonians (however long they remained in office) could have maintained indefinitely in the United States, if they had wanted, or even acquiesced in, continued economic growth.

The second serious shortcoming in the Brzezinski-Huntington brand

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

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

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of political determinism is that it neglects the fact that a government, even if it should have a wide range of alternative economic policies consistent with economic growth, may not know which (if any) of these policies would be consistent with its long-run political interests. When the effects of economic and social change on political life are involved, actions are particularly likely to have unintended effects. The authors whose long and laborious researches and reflections are being reviewed here have for the most part come to widely different views about the effects of economic change on political life. Can political leaders caught up in the frenetic activity of politics and government think these problems out with any certainty that their answers will be right?

IV

The books under review differ not only about the Soviet Union, but also about the less developed countries. Just as Brzezinski's and Huntington's views about the implications of economic growth for the future of the Soviet Union are, as I indicated, almost the exact opposite of Zebot's, so also Karl de Schweinitz, in *Industrialization and Democracy*, offers conclusions about the effects of economic growth on the less developed countries that almost exactly contradict those in Zebot's book. De Schweinitz contends that the industrialization of the still underdeveloped countries is not likely to produce democratic governments in those countries. The correlation of economic growth with the development of democratic political systems in the Western nations in the nineteenth century was due to specific conditions that no longer exist, and thus we should not expect any similar political evolution in the underdeveloped countries of today. De Schweinitz does not, like Brzezinski and Huntington, deny or minimize the interplay between economic and political life. Indeed, he emphasizes it, and goes so far as to say that true democracy is not possible in a poor country.[2] Democracy is of course possible in wealthy nations, he says, but this is not in fact the likely outcome when the currently underdeveloped countries have successfully industrialized.

A poor country cannot be democratic, de Schweinitz avers, because democracy requires, first, a considerable degree of individual ration-

[2] David M. Potter, among others, has made this same point, and moreover concluded that the durability of democracy in the United States can be explained primarily in terms of the nation's wealth. (See his *People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character* [Chicago 1954], 111-27.) The opposing view that poor nations can be as democratic as rich ones has been argued most forcefully by W. Arthur Lewis in *Politics in West Africa* (forthcoming).

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224 pages, paper *A March 1965 Publication*

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ality, and, second, a considerable degree of consensus on fundamental political values, neither of which it is likely to have. Poor countries will not have the requisite voter rationality, simply because they cannot afford the education necessary to bring it about. The reasons why they do not have the requisite consensus are more complex. One thing that works against consensus in a poor and stagnant society is that people in such a society are accustomed to a more or less given economic output, and thus assume that economic life is described by a zero-sum game—that is, that what one gains, another must lose. In an advanced and growing society, by contrast, people will take it for granted that trade and cooperation can be mutually advantageous, and thus have values that emphasize cooperation and consensus. Another factor is that an advanced economy is obviously interdependent in a way a primitive economy is not, and thus citizens in a well-to-do country have a vivid sense of the need for cooperation that will help create the necessary consensus. De Schweinitz also contends that the fundamental loyalties of the people in poor societies are to small tribal, communal, or kinship groups, rather than to any national political entity, and this too will work against the needed national consensus.

A nation will not necessarily obtain the requisite consensus as its economy expands. The main reason why industrialization is not a sufficient but only a necessary condition for political consensus, de Schweinitz argues, can be seen by considering the industrial revolutions or "take-offs" during which rapid economic growth first occurs. Rapid economic growth requires above all a high level of investment. When industrialization begins, a nation normally will have to finance the vast amount of investment it needs out of its meager current income. Wages and the consumption of the masses must be mercilessly kept down if there is to be rapid economic growth, for otherwise there will not be enough saving and investment. In the early periods of industrialization in the Western democracies, it was possible to keep wages and mass consumption levels down without what de Schweinitz calls "totalitarian" controls over labor. He claims that these nations had relatively permissive environments for labor organizations during their periods of industrialization, first, because labor discontent was not as serious then as it is in the nations now industrializing, and second, because the technology needed for totalitarian control over labor did not exist, as it does today. Labor discontent was less then for several reasons. For one thing, workers did not have the example of much more prosperous workers in other countries to heighten their

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sense of deprivation and create "demonstration effects." For another, those nineteenth-century workers who were most aggressive and discontented could emigrate, or (because of the small-scale enterprise of the time) reasonably hope to become entrepreneurs; these opportunities for geographic and social mobility were "safety-valves" that made labor discontent in the nineteenth century less virulent than it is now in poor countries. Finally, in the nineteenth century, the labor unions needed to make labor protest effective in an industrial environment had to be developed more or less from scratch, and this meant the economy had time to get up a head of steam before labor protest became effective (and may also have been related to the fact that relatively conservative skilled workers were the first to organize). In the poor countries now, by contrast, labor unions are usually there and organized to strike at the first flicker of industrialization.

For all the foregoing reasons, de Schweinitz argues, the less developed nations of today face more labor discontent and accordingly have a greater incentive to impose totalitarian controls. The governments in poor countries today also have a greater capacity to impose totalitarian controls than their Western counterparts of the last century had. Since the nineteenth century, weapons technology has become more complex and costly (i.e., there are economies of scale in the use of military weaponry), thus increasing the power of the government with its organized military establishment vis-à-vis that of the individuals or small groups scattered throughout the country. Technological advances (and increasing economies of scale) in the communications industries have in a similar way opened up new propaganda possibilities to governments that are not equally accessible to dissident groups in the population. These changes in weapons and communication technology, de Schweinitz argues, make totalitarian controls more feasible and effective in underdeveloped countries than they were when the Western democracies were beginning to industrialize.

Totalitarian controls over labor are therefore very likely, if not inevitable, in the industrializing nations of the twentieth century. This in turn makes it much less likely that democracy will develop even after the "take-off" is completed, for these nations will have no *independent* labor movements to pressure their governments into giving political rights to the workers. Moreover, the process of industrialization in the twentieth century somehow requires state-sponsored growth, de Schweinitz asserts, even though this was not necessary in the last century. This means that the underdeveloped countries, even after the

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"take-off" is complete, will not have a variety of independent business groups either; there will be few, if any, private groups in the society that can pressure the state (which will presumably be run by a single party anxious to preserve its monopoly) to give up some of its power. In short (and here, as elsewhere, I have amended de Schweinitz's account slightly to give this summary more coherence), the underdeveloped nations when they become industrialized will not be pluralistic, as the Western democracies were when they finished their industrial revolutions (and still are). Growth now spreads from the state to the society; not vice versa, as it did in the West. "How," de Schweinitz asks rhetorically, "can societies which are being made ready for economic growth by the state develop the autonomy and independence with which to shape and control the institutions of the state?" He answers by saying that it is altogether unlikely that the underdeveloped nations, as their economies grow, will naturally develop in a democratic direction, because of the conditions in which growth now takes place. Therefore, where the underdeveloped nations are concerned, we should not any longer make "free elections and majority rule the measure of a nation's moral worth."

Interesting as de Schweinitz's argument may be, it can no more than Zebot's contrary conclusion be accepted as it stands. First, it is far from certain that underdeveloped countries need emerge from the "take-off" without a pluralistic group structure. Students of politics continually and correctly emphasize the fact that the people in the emerging countries belong (and usually give their primary loyalty) to traditional groups such as the tribe, the extended family, the caste, or the village. They are understandably concerned about the need for "nation-building"—for submerging the loyalties to traditional and parochial groups in a loyalty to the new nation-state. This suggests an outcome that is the opposite of de Schweinitz's dismal prophecy: it suggests that through the early phases of the industrialization process at least, the underdeveloped countries will be filled with groups that are not creatures of the state, or even controlled by it, and which are independent sources of power that can press the state to maintain or extend political freedoms.

A second shortcoming in de Schweinitz's argument is that it appears to assume not only that the state will have a central role in the process of development, but that it must, because of the allegedly unique difficulties of twentieth-century industrialization, more or less monopolize the process. Where the Soviet pattern is followed, the state will of course attempt to monopolize economic life, but this is not the

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only or inevitable pattern. One could quite as well say that economic growth is easier for poor nations now than it was in the nineteenth century, since the gain in productivity that can be achieved by switching from traditional methods of production to twentieth-century productive processes far exceeds anything made possible by the inventions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries alone. Thus the twentieth-century economic difficulties do not make anything like a state monopoly of industrialization essential. And, in any event, it is not obvious that any advantage state-sponsored economic activity may have is greater when economic growth is difficult than when it is easy. Moreover, the administrative capacities of the governments in underdeveloped areas seem to be stretched to the limit already, so these governments may well find it advantageous to let private firms bear part of the burden of entrepreneurship.

When the limits to administrative capacity are considered, a third objection to de Schweinitz's conclusion becomes evident. His image of a monolithic government in an underdeveloped country single-mindedly and resolutely pursuing a program for economic growth, and in the process liquidating or exercising detailed, totalitarian control over the various groups in the society, seems unrealistic. Governments in underdeveloped societies will share the characteristics of their societies: they are divided into subgroups, as their societies are, and they too are underdeveloped, as their societies are. They may not have the undivided will and administrative efficiency needed to control or suppress all of the groups and local loyalties in their nations. In underdeveloped countries, however undemocratic, government policy is often the result of group pressures, and there is much that goes on that the government never sees.

V

There is strong support for this last criticism of de Schweinitz's view in the two other books considered here: *Corruption in Developing Countries* by Ronald Wraith and Edgar Simpkins, and *Journeys Toward Progress* by Albert Hirschman. These books presumably were not intended to demonstrate the divided and ineffective character of many governments in developing areas, but their pages are filled with evidence that illustrates exactly these points. This is particularly true of the book by Wraith and Simpkins, whose interest is at least partly in the moral implications of corruption. They present an appallingly long and specific list of examples of the most incredible corruption in underdeveloped countries. Though most of their evi-

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dence is drawn from former British colonies in West Africa, they are convinced that things are much the same in most other developing countries, and there seems little reason to dispute this claim. It is the blatant and habitual character of this corruption that is most saddening, and the fact that it exists in almost every part of the governmental machinery. They say, for example: "It is incongruous that in the merciful professions of nursing and medicine the out-patient must find his twopence for admission, at the head of the queue, to his rightful place; that in the most ignominious of human emergencies the bed-pan can only be secured for a penny; that the pound note is looked for under the pillow of the consulting room of the Government doctor" (p. 17). Corruption is of course commonplace in many wealthy countries, and (as anyone who has observed the politics of Massachusetts, for example, will concede) not least in the United States. But the Wraith and Simpkins book gives the impression that in many underdeveloped countries nepotism and other forms of corruption take on a routine and virtually omnipresent character that surpasses anything in the rich countries today.

But, as Wraith and Simpkins point out, the presently rich countries were, in the historic periods before they became industrialized, as corrupt as any of the underdeveloped countries today. This was at least true of Great Britain, which is today known for its uncommonly high standards of probity in government. *Corruption in Developing Countries* compares the corruption, and the attempts to control it, in pre-industrial Britain and in present-day Africa, with bountiful detail. The results are highly instructive and make this book, despite its careless construction, a most useful one. After their long comparison, Wraith and Simpkins conclude: "The first thing that emerges from our examination of bribery and corruption in eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain is that little that happens today in Asia or Africa could be any worse. There are indeed striking parallels, but the prizes for what we now regard as iniquitous go to Britain rather than to the emerging nations of the twentieth century" (p. 173). After reading this study, one suspects that there is a causal connection between the level of economic development and the extent of corruption in government.

But if corruption is endemic in the governments of developing countries, can these governments manage to establish totalitarian control over the individuals and subgroups in their societies, and at the same time monopolize economic activity, as de Schweinitz expects? A corrupt bureaucracy is usually an inefficient and ineffective bureauc-

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racy, and the degree of corruption that Wraith and Simpkins depict may be in some small part redeemed by the fact that it makes the totalitarian controls de Schweinitz expects unfeasible.

Hirschman's *Journeys Toward Progress* also leaves the reader with the impression that governments in underdeveloped societies are themselves underdeveloped, and that this limits their capacity for good or ill. (His well-known work on *The Strategy of Economic Development*, published earlier, leaves the same impression.) Hirschman's excellent and important book is probably the best of those under review, but it is much too rich and varied to summarize here. All of what it says is based on Latin American experience, and is only by implication applied to other developing areas. Yet the impression of Latin American governments that the book conveys is quite consistent with the impression Wraith and Simpkins have of West African governments with an inheritance of British rule. Hirschman cites the remark that "it is much easier to have a revolution in Latin America than a really effective land tax." He also finds that in Colombia, a country with "powerful landowners" and "weak local administration" (as well as considerable inflation and rapid economic development), the establishment of realistic land values for tax purposes is unattainable. "This," he says, "is a most serious conclusion, for it appears to rule out the use of taxation" as a means of controlling land utilization and bringing about land reform. His pages are filled with references to laws that are on the books, but never enforced; to bureaucrats who "obey, but never carry out" their orders; to inflations that continue unchecked because no one can resist group pressures; to peasants who simply appropriate the land belonging to absentee landlords, yet are never expelled by the state (even when the state is so sensitive to the power of these landlords that it cannot tax them effectively); to unchecked and widespread illegal violence, such as has persisted for years in rural Colombia. The pattern in rural Colombia, indeed, has been not so much one of totalitarian control as of anarchy. The Latin American governments Hirschman describes are also remarkably responsive to the wants of the major groups in their nations, and they may well be responsive even when they are *not* democratic. Violence, as Hirschman notes, is not only the instrument of revolution: it is also a stimulant to reform. When the peasants take the law into their own hands, or when city dwellers riot, governments tend to respond. Hirschman thinks that even when the ruling oligarchy is well entrenched, reform is usually possible without a prior revolution. Indeed, the central point in Hirschman's book is that South

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American governments do respond to pressures; government adjusts to the society, not society to the government, even in that dictator-ridden continent. Hirschman does not find monolithic governments resolutely forcing the various groups in the society to curtail consumption to the requirements of a development plan, as de Schweinitz expects. Yet, withal, the Latin American countries he describes have had on the whole reasonably rapid rates of economic growth. In the present, as in the past, a resolute and rigorous government is not necessarily essential to economic growth.

VI

How can the examples of corruption, nepotism, administrative ineffectiveness, and subordination of government policies to pressure group interests that are cited by Wraith and Simpkins and by Hirschman be explained? These characteristics would seem to have been equally as serious in the pre-industrial periods in the Western nations as they are in the developing nations today, and this suggests that these characteristics might perhaps be causally connected with poverty and primitive economic conditions. One explanation of such a connection would be the concepts of economies and diseconomies of scale —the notion that the costs per unit of output in any type of enterprise may vary with the level of output. It has often been observed that most productive establishments in pre-industrial Europe were quite small—the factory was a rarity until the Industrial Revolution, and mass production was a rarity until the twentieth century. In the developing countries today most productive enterprises are similarly small, except in those cases where the developing economies have experienced economic intrusion by companies from the wealthier nations, or have borrowed productive patterns from them. It would seem natural that a poor and primitive economy, with little capital, elementary techniques, small markets, poor transportation and communication, and a predominant dependence upon agriculture should find that relatively small productive units would be most efficient. But if such diseconomies of scale often make only small units of production feasible, there would be little or no incentive to form large organizations; large corporations, for example, would serve no purpose. It is a commonplace observation that in poor societies most institutions are unspecialized, and simultaneously serve economic, social, and political purposes. The advantage of small-scale economic activity in poor societies would therefore tend to bring about generally small-scale institutions of a multifunctional type as well. And in fact in

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poor societies relatively small-scale, multipurpose institutions like the extended family, the tribe, the feudal manor, the city-state, the village, and the communal group are characteristic. Large-scale institutions like the corporation, the labor union, the totalitarian party, and to a considerable extent the nation-state are the products of relatively recent times and at least slightly advanced economic conditions. In the well-to-do societies the "organization man" has become a stereotype: a set of values has developed to fit the new, large scale of modern enterprise.

Now think of the situation in a developing area that has become an independent nation-state. The peoples of the area have traditionally been governed through tribes, extended families, rural villages, and other small-scale institutions. But even the smallest of the new nation-states requires a *large* and bureaucratic governmental organization. The primitive economic conditions are not, however, suited to such a large organization: it may experience diseconomies of scale. Transportation and communication are not adequate to govern large areas effectively. The prevailing values will not be those of the "organization man," but rather those of the "extended-family man." In such circumstances, nepotism will probably seem praiseworthy (as it was once thought to be in Europe), the resistance to corruption in general will be very small, the loyalty to any existing large organizations (like the state) very limited, administrative effectiveness very low, and the government may well be in a weak position vis-à-vis the traditional groups in the society. In other words, there may well be a variety of distinctive administrative and political problems for the nation-state in the poor country, and these problems may be causally connected with the lack of economic development.

This analysis is consistent with much European historical experience and also with much of what is known about large organizations in currently developing countries.[3] It is certainly also consistent with the fact, emphasized by Wraith and Simpkins, that the same people who act with extraordinary self-sacrifice in the extended family or tribe would often be thoroughly corrupt in a modern governmental setting.

The foregoing analysis explains at best only one aspect of the relationship between the level of economic development and the character of political and social life. But this analysis, and the interesting argu-

[3] Frederick Harbison, "Entrepreneurial Organizations as a Factor in Economic Development," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LXX (August 1956), 364-79.

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ments offered in several of the books under review, should at least suggest how important the political and social effects of economic development can be, and thus how important it is that both sides of the two-way relationship between economic change and socio-political change should be considered in studies of economic development or political modernization. These arguments should also suggest that the effects of economic development on social and political life are evidently much more complex than the usual generalizations about the level of economic development and the prospects of democracy would indicate.

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